FRENCH AGGRESSION, &c.

THREE SHILLINGS.

One of the best & fullest answers
to Mr. Erskine's pamphlet,
shewing the weakness of its
reasonings, & the evil tendency
of its principles in their
strongest light.

FRENCH AGGRESSION,

PROVED FROM

MR. ERSKINE's " VIEW OF THE CAUSES OF THE WAR;"

WITH

REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINAL CHARACTER OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, AND ON THE SUPPOSED DURABILITY OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

BY JOHN BOWLES, ESQ.

" Oh that mine Adverſary had written a book!"

Job.

THIRD EDITION.

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FRENCH AGGRESSION

PROVED

FROM MR. ERSKINE's "VIEW OF THE CAUSES OF THE WAR," &c.

WHEN I firſt ſaw Mr. Erſkine's "View of the Cauſes and Conſequences of the Preſent War," announced for publication, knowing the general tenor of that gentleman's ſentiments upon the topics alluded to in the above title, I thought it very likely that I ſhould aſpire to the honour of entering the liſts with him as an antagoniſt.

Upon a peruſal of the work my reſolution was formed agreeably to my expectations, and I began to carry it into execution. Circumſtances aroſe, which obliged me to ſuſpend the proſecution of my deſign; and, in the mean time, as might have been expected, Mr. Erſkine's publication called forth very able anſwers.

Of thoſe anſwers, that of Mr. Gifford appeared to me ſo ſatisfactory, as to ſuperſede the neceſſity of purſuing the controverſy any further, unleſs Mr. E. ſhould be ſo fortunate as to find matter to urge in reply, which does not appear to have been the caſe *.

But it is ſo ſeldom that any of the diſtinguiſhed members of the party, with which Mr. E. acts, chooſe to commit themſelves in print, that, whenever ſo precious an opportunity preſents itſelf, it ſhould be improved to the utmoſt. For while the preſs daily overflows with publications of the moſt inſidious and inflammatory nature, to which the moſt violent partiſan would be almoſt aſhamed to ſet his name, the leaders of oppoſition take ſpecial care not to afford their political adverſaries the gratification of that wiſh, which has been rendered proverbial by a man diſtinguiſhed for meekneſs, and which I have taken as the motto of my title page. They rather prefer, and with reaſon, the vague and general declamation by which in a public debate, they not only evade the effect of refutation, but alſo give, to looſe aſſertions and unfounded charges, a ſemblance of truth, and an air of authenticity. Anxious to elude the graſp of controverſy, and the teſt of deliberate inveſtigation, they wiſely chooſe ra-

* Beſides Mr. Gifford's, I have hitherto only ſeen one anſwer to Mr. E. entitled, "Plain Thoughts of a Plain Man," which is alſo written with great ability.

ther to *talk* than to *write*; and they take care not to venture out of their entrenchments, or to expoſe themſelves to an encounter in the field of fair diſcuſſion. They feel that the maxim *litera ſcripta manet* is extremely unfavourable to their ſyſtem of ratiocination, the object of which is rather to addreſs the paſſions than the judgment. In ſhort they practiſe the Scythian mode of fighting, and though inceſſantly employed in attacking and haraſſing their opponents, they inſtantly fly off, and avoid, with the greateſt caution, a regular engagement. But Mr. E. has had the candour, and the manlineſs, to deliver his ſentiments in a form in which they can be met, and to ſubject them, in indelible characters, to the teſt of ſcrutiny. Whether in ſo doing he has liſtened more to the dictates of courage, than to thoſe of prudence, it does not become me to pronounce; but I will not heſitate to ſay, that he has merited the thanks of every friend of truth and of fair diſcuſſion. And as he has ſtated and inforced, with all the novelty and eloquence that could be expected from the exertions of talents like his, whatever has been urged at different times, to prove that this country was the aggreſſor in the war—and as his work, beſides being circulated with incredible zeal, among all claſſes of ſociety, is conſidered as *oracular* by all who eſpouſe his ſide of the queſtion—it cannot be unimportant to examine in various lights, and to analyze by different proceſſes, his reaſonings upon a ſubject, in which the prevalence of error muſt endanger the

preſent and future happineſs of millions of the human race.

It is not, however, my deſign to enter into a formal examination of every part of Mr. E's work. Conſidering it as of infinitely greater conſequence to trace the war to its ſource, than to view it in its progreſs and effects, I am rather diſpoſed to follow Mr. E. in his inveſtigation of the "Cauſes" than of the "Conſequences" of the war. For however tremendous, or even fatal thoſe conſequences may prove, the queſtion of moſt importance, and that which is moſt expoſed to miſrepreſentation is, *to what are they to be attributed?* We all feel and regret the effects produced by the war. And whatever our political tenets may be, we ſhall all deplore its ultimate conſequences, if, for want of ſpirit or union, we purſue it with languor while it laſts; an effect which it is impoſſible to deny that Mr. E's view of the ſubject, whether juſt or not, has a direct tendency to produce. But the cauſes which gave riſe to this event occaſion a wide difference of opinion, and ſeem to afford an inexhauſtible ſource of controverſy: and, according to the opinion which may prevail upon that ſubject, England or France muſt be conſidered as reſponſible—not only for all calamities immediately attendant upon the war—but for all its diſaſtrous conſequences, however extenſive or remote. God forbid! that the innocent party ſhould, even in the eyes of men, bear the weight of ſo dreadful a reſponſibility, or that the guilty ſhould not

not be deteſted in proportion to the miſchiefs of which it has been the cauſe: on ſuch a ſubject I do not heſitate to ſay, whatever riſk I may incur, as an Engliſhman, for a ſhare both of the guilt and of the puniſhment, *Fiat Juſtitia, ruat cælum.*

It is the more important to purſue the inquiry in the manner I propoſe, becauſe there is abundant reaſon to conclude that both the *origin* and the *continuance* of the war are to be aſcribed to the purſuit of the ſame ſyſtem. Without the moſt poſitive evidence to the contrary, it will be juſt and reaſonable to preſume that the party, which was really the aggreſſor, has remained under the influence of the ſame views of ambition, of the ſame ſpirit of reſtleſſneſs, of the ſame antipathy to peace, as he was actuated by in the firſt inſtance; on the other hand it is not at all likely that the party, which, being inclined to repoſe, was obliged againſt its will to take up arms, ſhould acquire an affection for war from an experience of its effects, or that changing its original ſentiments of moderation and juſtice, it ſhould obſtinately reject all means of fair and equitable accommodation, to which its antagoniſt had become willing to accede. By coming to a right deciſion reſpecting the *original ſin* of aggreſſion, we ſhall, therefore, enable ourſelves to form an accurate judgment of the merits of each party, in all the diſcuſſions and negociations, which have had for their profeſſed object, on both ſides, the termination of the war. We ſhall obtain an almoſt infallible criterion

criterion of the ſincerity of the reſpective profeſſions repeatedly made by each of a deſire for peace, on juſt and equitable grounds, and we ſhall diſcover which ſide was ſincere in thoſe profeſſions, and which advanced them with a view of obtaining credit for a pacific diſpoſition with the public in its own country, and with the public throughout Europe. For theſe reaſons I ſhall principally direct my attention to thoſe topics which Mr. E. has introduced in relation to the *cauſes* of the war; and which, independently of their connection with the main ſubject, will be found to contain abundant matter for original as well as important obſervation.

It is impoſſible to peruſe Mr. E's work without being impreſſed with the idea that it is more like the ſpeech of an advocate, labouring to criminate the Britiſh miniſter, than an impartial inveſtigation of the cauſes of the war. The author appears rather in the character of an accuſer than of an inquirer after truth. The charge which he advances is rather the object than the reſult of the inveſtigation; and inſtead of deducing that charge by way of inference from facts previouſly and fairly ſtated, and illuſtrated by impartial reaſoning, he makes it the ſubject matter of the diſcuſſion and the very point which he undertakes to eſtabliſh. Thus in appearing to depart from profeſſional forms he has not renounced his profeſſional habits; and it would have been perfectly compatible with both the ſubſtance and the tenor of his publication, to have had prefixed to it the following introduction:

May

May it pleaſe your Lordſhip: Gentlemen of the Jury.

This is an Indictment againſt the Right Honourable William Pitt, as Principal, and the Britiſh Parliament and Britiſh Nation, as Acceſſaries, in an offence the moſt atrocious and the moſt aggravated that can occupy the attention of a human tribunal—No leſs an offence than that of having wickedly engaged in an unjuſt and an unneceſſary war.

The charge undoubtedly involves the Parliament and Nation, becauſe it is undoubtedly true, that without their ſupport and cordial approbation, the Miniſter would never have been able to effect his purpoſe of involving the country in war*. But as I truſt the Parliament and the Nation will be ſhortly diſpoſed to renounce their connection with the Miniſter, and to abandon him to his fate, I ſhall purſue the charge againſt him alone, and I ſhall be perfectly ſatisfied if you, Gentlemen of the Jury, will pronounce your verdict againſt this "author of our preſent calamities."

* That Parliament and the Nation are involved in the charge will appear from the following paſſage of Mr. E.'s work.

"The war could neither have been begun nor continued to this hour, if the great repreſentatives of the landed intereſt had not ſupported the miniſter who projected it." p 64.

The ſpirit which became *prevalent* about this time, and which bore down every thing before it, and *prepared the nation for war*, was an abſolute horror of every thing connected with France, and even for liberty itſelf, becauſe France avowed being contending for it," &c. p. 17, 18. 1ſt. edition.

It may fairly be preſumed that Mr. E. has availed himſelf of all the evidence that could poſſibly be adduced, in ſupport of ſuch an accuſation. The abilities of the honourable gentleman are too well known to admit of a doubt, that he has diſplayed to the beſt advantage, and with the greateſt poſſible effect, every fact, circumſtance, and topic which could in any reſpect tend to ſubſtantiate his charge. He is not accuſtomed to neglect any thing within the ſcope of human ability, to inſure ſucceſs to any cauſe, that has the advantage of his aſſiſtance; and in a caſe like the preſent, where he ſtands forward under the impulſe of patriotic feeling, to ſnatch the nation from that deſtructive influence, which, according to his ſentiments, has already involved it in inexpreſſible calamity, and which is likely to plunge it into the gulph of deſtruction, he may be expected to ſurpaſs, in zeal and exertion, the moſt diſtinguiſhed periods of his profeſſional life. Knowing, therefore, the ſide he has taken on this moſt important ſubject, I ſhould not heſitate to conſider the work before me as containing the moſt complete and ſatisfactory demonſtration, of which the nature of the caſe would admit, that the guilt of aggreſſion in the preſent war is chargeable on this country, through the influence of adminiſtration.

As far as miniſters are concerned in the queſtion, there is one general point of conſiderable difficulty and importance, on which Mr. E. has afforded us no kind of ſatisfaction.

Philoſophers

Philoſophers (I mean thoſe of ancient rather than of modern times) admit that even in the minuteſt concerns of life, it is impoſſible to act without a motive—and ſurely the ſame rule muſt be applicable to affairs of magnitude. If, therefore, Mr. Pitt and his colleagues in office be juſtly chargeable with the exiſtence of the war, if they were determined, with an obſtinacy that nothing could reſiſt, to plunge the kingdom into hoſtilities, I ſhould have expected Mr. E. to refer their conduct in that reſpect to ſome aſſignable motive. I ſhould have expected him to ſhew that, while it was the obvious intereſt of the country to maintain peace, provided it could be maintained without ſacrificing the national honour and ſecurity, the intereſt of miniſters was oppoſite to that of the country. It was the more eſſential to ſhew this as, according to outward appearance, and judging from oſtenſible circumſtances, it ſhould ſeem that of all men in the country, miniſters, and particularly Mr. Pitt, had the ſtrongeſt inducement to avoid the war by all practicable means. Inſomuch that it is next to impoſſible to account for that predilection and eagerneſs for war, imputed to him by Mr. E. otherwiſe than by ſuppoſing him to poſſeſs ſo diabolical a diſpoſition, as to be willing to ſacrifice his favourite objects rather than loſe an opportunity of betraying the intereſts of the country, to which he is under inexpreſſible obligations. But Mr. E. has intirely omitted to account for this glaring inconſiſtency between the

obvious intereſt of miniſters and the deſigns imputed to them. I do not however conſider that omiſſion as abſolutely fatal to the charge. The motives of human conduct are ſometimes concealed with ſo much art, as to elude the keeneſt penetration, and they are often ſo perverſe, as to baffle all attempts to explain them in a ſatisfactory manner. Of this it would be impoſſible to adduce a more ſtriking proof than is to be found in the conduct of certain men of the firſt rank, conſequence and fortune in this country, whom nothing can reſtrain from purſuing ſuch meaſures as abſolutely tend to the annihilation of their rank, conſequence and fortunes; notwithſtanding they have immediately before their eyes the example of men, who, a little while ſince, were ſimilarly circumſtanced in France, and who, by the adoption of ſuch a line of conduct, have brought ruin upon themſelves and their country. Such a caſe would be deemed impoſſible, were it not proved to exiſt by the moſt incontrovertible of all evidence—the evidence of our ſenſes—and although we are at times induced almoſt to diſtruſt even that evidence, the proofs are ſo frequent and ſo glaring, that we are compelled to afford our aſſent to its authority.

In like manner it *may* have happened that, in defiance of all probability and even of all credibility, Mr. Pitt has been induced, by ſome ſecret and inexplicable impulſe, and without any neceſſity, both to engage and to perſiſt in the war, at the evident riſk

of

of every thing that could be dear to him and the ſtate.—But in proportion as ſuch a ſuppoſition is repugnant to probability, the evidence to ſupport it ſhould be clear, direct and poſitive; and the exiſtence of a caſe ſo directly at variance with every rule of judgment, and with the uniform tenor of experience, ſtands in more need of the evidence of the ſenſes, than even the infatuation of ſuch of the nobility and gentry, as refuſe to take warning by the example and the fate of the Gallic reformers.

The firſt queſtion that preſents itſelf in an inquiry of this nature, reſpects the actual commencement of hoſtilities. The party who declares war or begins the attack, is, undoubtedly, *prima facie*, the aggreſſor, and the preſumption is in favour of the other party. This evidence, however, is not concluſive. A ſtate may be obliged to declare war, in order to redreſs an injury, for which, no reparation could be obtained by treaty. Thus in 1790, if Spain had refuſed ſatisfaction for the attack made by her on our ſettlement at Nootka Sound, we ſhould have been juſtified in declaring war, and in ſo doing, we ſhould not, ſtrictly ſpeaking, have been the aggreſſors. But there can be no doubt that the *onus* lies upon the party who firſt reſorts to violence to juſtify the attack, byproving that he had ſuſtained an injury, for which he had in vain demanded ſatisfaction. It is notorious that the evidence ariſing from the declaration of war is, as far as it goes, altogether againſt France, who in that reſpect was undoubtedly

the aggreſſor againſt every one of the powers which have been engaged in this conteſt. But Mr. E. acting up to the character of an advocate againſt his country, has entirely overlooked this conſideration. Inſtead of giving ſo important a circumſtance its due weight, and acknowledging, as candour ſeemed to preſcribe, that he was bound to explain it by making out a very clear and ſtrong caſe of provocation in favour of France, and by ſhewing that ſhe had been injured by us and had no other means of compenſation than actual hoſtility, he argues as if the explanation were due from us, and as if, by ſtriking the firſt blow, we had incurred the neceſſity of juſtifying ſuch an act of violence.

It is, indeed, remarkable that not only Mr. E. but every one who eſpouſes his ſide of the queſtion of aggreſſion appears to ſhun, with the greateſt caution, all notice of this important fact, the *Declaration of war by France.* A fact which is deciſive of the queſtion, unleſs it be repelled by the moſt incontrovertible proof of previous injury and of refuſal of ſatisfaction. Had the caſe been reverſed—had Great Britain been the firſt to draw the ſword, would Mr. E. and his coadjutors have been ſilent reſpecting ſuch a circumſtance? Would they not rather have reſounded it in our ears, and preſſed it again and again upon our attention? would they not have called upon us to ſhew that we had been driven by neceſſity to ſo fatal an expedient, as the only means of maintaining our honour, and of vindicating our violated rights? But it

ſeems

ſeems that Great Britain is not to have the ſame meaſure as France; and that an act which, on our part, nothing but the moſt preſſing and abſolute neceſſity could have juſtified, our enemies and their advocates have no occaſion even to explain, while the reſponſibility which attaches upon ſuch an act is ſhifted entirely from them to ourſelves. But perhaps it may be contended that although Mr. E. has not taken any formal notice of the declaration of war, and of the commencement of hoſtilities by France, he has proved that thoſe violent meaſures were juſtified by the previous conduct of this country; and that the war, though actually begun by France, originated in aggreſſion of Great Britain. Whether or no this was the caſe, I am willing ſtill to admit to be the true queſtion in diſpute.

There certainly is nothing in the 37 firſt pages of Mr. E's work that can throw the leaſt light upon the ſubject in this point of view. The topics therein diſcuſſed relate either to matters of domeſtic concern, or to events which happened ſubſequently to the commencement of hoſtilities. In vain ſhould we ſeek for proof of the aggreſſion of Great Britain in the indifference and unconcern with which Mr. E. complains that the failure of the late negociation at Paris was received by the people of this country, or in their determination, notwithſtanding that failure, to continue their ſupport of government. But I muſt beg leave to obſerve that, as they entertained the moſt ardent deſire that honourable peace ſhould be the

reſult

reſult of that negociation, what Mr. E. conſtrues to be into indifference and unconcern, upon the diſappointment of their wiſhes, was in reality nothing elſe than a ſentiment of perfect ſatisfaction with the exertions of the government for the attainment of peace: and indeed, the diſpoſition they ſtill manifeſted to ſupport government, afforded the moſt unequivocal proof of their entire approbation of its meaſures.

The great ſtreſs laid by Mr. E. upon the change of ſentiments experienced by Mr. Pitt, ſince the commencement of his political career, reſpecting the expediency of attempting a parliamentary reform, ſeems to imply a conſciouſneſs of a great deficiency of evidence to ſupport his main charge againſt the Britiſh miniſter. That change of ſentiment is ſo completely in uniſon with the public opinion, that I ſhould conſider myſelf guilty of an inſult upon that opinion, were I to enter into a formal diſcuſſion of a ſubject ſo very remote from the queſtion of aggreſſion. I cannot however refrain from obſerving, that it is a curious mode of reaſoning to infer that if, by what is called reform, the houſe of Commons had been made more *popular*, we ſhould have been leſs expoſed to the calamity of war, when it is eſtabliſhed by hiſtory, that, in proportion as ſtates have been ſubject to popular forms of government, they have been invariably addicted to war; and the hiſtory of France ſince the revolution confirms, in the ſtrongeſt manner, this general deduction.

I may alſo be permitted to remark, without going at large

large into this ſubject, that, according to the preſent ſtate of Society in relation to the practice of our conſtitution, the only danger we have to apprehend, is leſt the Monarchical and Ariſtocratical branches ſhould be unable to maintain themſelves againſt democratical influence, and if that influence were to acquire a greater weight in the Houſe of Commons, it would inevitably deſtroy the balance, which every true friend to the conſtitution ſhould make it his great object to preſerve. So far from that balance being expoſed by encroachments from the Crown, or the Ariſtocracy, it is as much as both can do to preſerve their due weight in the ſcale. It is equally falſe and abſurd to contend that the people have not as much influence as ever, and certainly as much as is conſiſtent with their own true intereſts, and with a monarchical form of government. If then that influence were to be increaſed, particularly as Mr. E. admits that the French revolution has given to the zeal of ſome of thoſe, whom he denominates Britiſh reformers, "a tinge of republicaniſm" (a tinge which has ſince been mellowed into colours of the deepeſt hue), it is evident that the equilibrium muſt be deſtroyed, and that the other ſcale, having no acceſſion of weight, muſt kick the beam. If, as the Houſe of Commons is *now* conſtituted, we ſee members of that Aſſembly paſs from the orgies of a jacobin feſtival, thronged with green cravats,* to re-aſſume the

* One of the outward tokens of jacobiniſm. Many of theſe tokens were to be ſeen at a recent jacobinical meeting, at the Crown

ſacred

ſacred character of Senators—if even in that character we hear them make declarations that ſavour ſtrongly of republicaniſm—what might we not expect if, according to Mr. Grey's propoſal, the defence which chartered rights and the weight of property ſtill afford, were to be taken away?

The tranſition from reform to revolution is ſo eaſy, ſo ſhort, and ſo obvious, that he muſt renounce all claim, not merely to penetration, but to common foreſight, who cannot diſcover it. Condorcet was much more enlightened, when he candidly announced that "a reform in our national repreſentation would lead to the entire eſtabliſhment of a Republic." Chronique de Paris, Nov. 3d 1792. But it is the profeſſed object of thoſe who favour the adoption of untried ſchemes of reform to bring the Conſtitution back to its original purity and principles. But while they find it impoſſible to point out a period in our hiſtory, in which the Conſtitution exiſted in greater purity than at this day, the ſchemes they propoſe are only calculated to remove it further from its original principles. It is an original and an eſſential

and Anchor, at which ſeveral members of the Houſe of Commons were preſent, and the chair was filled by one gentleman of that deſcription (I do not know whether he will be pleaſed at my applying to him the *ancient* term of gentleman) who preſerved his conſiſtency by candidly declaring in the Houſe ſoon afterwards, that "if a monarchical form of government was inconſiſtent with freedom, he ſhould avow himſelf a ſtaunch republican." An *if* is frequently a word of great effect, but in this caſe it can neither weaken the force of the ſentiment, nor conceal its true meaning.

principle

principle of the conſtitution to provide againſt democratical influence? For this purpoſe both the *repreſentative* and the *conſtituent* were required to poſſeſs certain qualifications in point of property, which is the only *conſtitutional* as well as the only *rational* teſt of independence. It is the fundamental principle of the Houſe of Commons, to be *a repreſentation of property by property*; and the reform which would be moſt congenial to the conſtitution, would be to enforce the laws reſpecting qualifications. If there be any members of that Houſe, who, inſtead of poſſeſſing the neceſſary qualification, are indebted to their ſeats for the ſecurity of their perſons, this is an evil that calls loudly for reform. And as the qualifications of county electors were fixed, when a freehold of 40 ſhillings per annum was equivalent to one of many times that value at the preſent day, inſtead of giving a vote to every houſeholder, as Mr. Grey propoſes, it would be much more conformable to the ſpirit and principle of the Conſtitution to narrow the qualification, in order to bring it nearer the eſtimate according to which it was originally calculated.*

* Mr. E. uſes one expreſſion in alluſion to Mr. Pitt's early exertions in the cauſe of reform which I cannot avoid noticing. He ſays "libels on Parliament at that time as ſince were written; but Mr. Pitt's were unqueſtionably the ſtrongeſt and *the beſt*." It would be a curious ſubject of inquiry by what train of thinking and reaſoning Mr. E. has been led to apply the term "beſt" to the de-

The proceedings of the ſeditious ſocieties furniſh Mr. E. with another topic equally irrelevant to his main ſubject. Thoſe ſocieties he conſiders as having been actuated by "an honeſt but irregular zeal," although he admits that they ſent congratulations to the French Government, when it ceaſed to be *monarchical*; and he contends that the full extent of their deſigns was a reform of Parliament, becauſe ſome of their members had the good fortune, by his aſſiſtance, to be acquitted of a charge of high treaſon. Indeed, he does not pretend to found this opinion upon any other authority than the acquittals; but he ſeems to conſider that authority as concluſive upon the ſubject, although he muſt know that an acquittal, far from amounting to evidence of the non-exiſtence of the crime, is in reality no *demonſtration* of the innocence of the party accuſed. I will remind him of one caſe, in which an acquittal muſt accompany even a *demonſtration* of guilt. By the law of England two witneſſes are required to prove a charge of high treaſon.—If therefore only *one* can be produced, although he ſhould convince every man upon the jury that the priſoner is guilty, they would be bound to acquit, and the Judge muſt direct them in

nomination of a crime. It ſeems, indeed, as if he conſidered a libel not only as deſtitute of any criminality, but as ſomething meritorious. That muſt be in itſelf poſitively *good*, which, in its higheſt degree of compariſon, deſerves to be denominated "*beſt*." Where is this abuſe of language to ſtop? As well might we ſay, the beſt robbery—the beſt murder—or the *beſt treaſon*, as the *beſt libel*.

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the moſt poſitive terms ſo to do. A thouſand other cauſes may produce an acquittal of the guilty, among which may be reckoned the exertion of ſuch eloquence and ingenuity as Mr. E. is known to poſſeſs; and he is the laſt man, who, having ſtrained all his powers in a manner, which ſhewed that he conſidered the caſe of his clients as very ſerious and alarming, and the danger of a conviction as very great, is intitled to come forward, and to infer from the verdicts which he obtained with ſuch difficulty, that three Engliſh juries determined "that a reform of the repreſentation of the Houſe of Commons was the ſole object of the accuſed." The juries did not determine any ſuch thing—the verdicts do not and cannot bear any ſuch conſtruction—nay, the public have been convinced by the trials, that the object of the priſoners and of the ſocieties to which they belonged, was to ſubvert the Conſtitution. Believing as I do, not only that this was their object, but that they purſued it in a manner which brought their caſe within the clear rule of law relating to high treaſon—convinced as I am that the acquittal of thoſe men gave a vent to that dangerous ſpirit which would have been reſtrained by their puniſhment; and that it was a leading cauſe of the ſhocking tranſactions which have ſince diſgraced the Britiſh Navy, and inflicted on the country the ſevereſt wound it has received during all the wars in which it has ever been engaged; I would not for a thouſand times the wealth which Mr. E. has derived from his profeſſion, be chargeable with the ſhare

he had in producing thoſe verdicts. Nor do I think that I can expreſs a wiſh more friendly to him, or more replete with ſolicitude for his welfare than this—May he reflect deeply upon the part he took upon that occaſion, and conſider ſeriouſly whether that part was juſtified by the plea of profeſſional duty, before the period ſhall arrive when reflection would be too late!

In like manner the king's proclamation to ſuppreſs thoſe wicked and ſeditious publications by which the country was inundated—the diviſion of the Whig Club, when the moſt reſpectable members of that body were impelled by principle to refuſe, on any terms, to countenance its proceedings—the horror which was inſpired by the French Revolution, and which, notwithſtanding all the endeavours of Mr. E. and his friends to bring it into contempt, is a ſentiment of virtue and a ſafeguard of ſociety—the aſſociations formed throughout the country to ſupport Government, and to enforce the laws againſt thoſe republicans and levellers, who, foſtered by lenity, and hardened by impunity, have at length endeavoured to deſtroy the very *palladium* of our national defence—the late attempt upon Ireland, where, as Mr. E. obſerves, "the ſpirit which neither laws nor wars will repreſs, is at preſent high," but where thoſe who are actuated by that ſpirit, have given inconteſtible proof of the exiſtence of that connection, which he ſo ſtrenuouſly denies, between "a deſire, or a pretended deſire, to reform abuſes in government, and diſloyalty to its eſtabliſhment"—

and,

and, finally, the expedition to Quiberon, which Mr. E. cenſures in the moſt harſh and unqualified terms of abuſe, although, beſides being fully juſtified by the laws of war, it had for its object—not plunder, nor deſolation—but to afford aſſiſtance to a very large body of men who were faithful to their religion and lawful government, and who had maintained themſelves, for a long time, without any ſuccour, againſt all the force which the uſurping oppreſſors of their country had been able to ſend againſt them—theſe topics, on which Mr. E. has expatiated, are entirely foreign to the queſtion, which, as I before ſtated, forms the main ſubject of inquiry—whether the declaration of war by France was juſtified by the previous conduct of Great Britain? They do not even afford any evidence of that diſpoſition to a rupture with France, which, Mr. E. ſays, "was viſible in miniſters before the memorable era of the French king's death." That diſpoſition was viſible only to the keen optics of Mr. E. and his party, and the reſt of the country fancied they ſaw an evident diſpoſition to avoid, if poſſible, a rupture. It is not, however, by ſurmiſes of a *diſpoſition*, either one way or the other, but by ACTS, that the queſtion is to be decided. And I am glad to have arrived at length at that part of Mr. E.'s work, where he brings forward the evidence which he has been able to collect, in ſupport of the charge of aggreſſion adduced by him againſt this country.

The only direct evidence with which his induſtry has

has furniſhed him for that purpoſe, is the Correſpondence between M. Chauvelin and the Britiſh Government. He afterwards reaſons very much at large on the different topics which are uſually reſorted to by thoſe who, like him, contend that we were the aggreſſors in hoſtility, and which I ſhall notice in their turn. But he relies with full confidence on the above correſpondence, which he repreſents as abſolutely deciſive of the queſtion of aggreſſion. This correſpondence, he ſays, "is ſcarcely known to, or recollected by the Engliſh public; its authenticity is unqueſtionable, and the examination of it will place the authors of the war in their proper colours." It muſt be admitted indeed that the correſpondence is a moſt material document; for it muſt be ſuppoſed to contain a full, if not a fair expoſition, of all the grounds of difference and complaint which exiſted between the two countries, and of the explanations which each had to offer in juſtification of its conduct; commencing in the month of May, 1792, ſoon after the arrival of M. Chauvelin in England, and being continued to the 24th of January, 1793, a very few days before the declaration of war by France; we may look to it with confidence for an enumeration of all the injuries, and of all the refuſals of ſatisfaction by which Great Britain impoſed upon France the neceſſity of appealing to arms, to obtain that juſtice which ſhe could not procure by way of negociation.

But what muſt be the ſurpriſe of any one who, upon

upon examining the correſpondence, with ſuch expectations, finds that it almoſt entirely conſiſts of explanations and excuſes on the part of France, in reſpect of the principles and proceedings, by which the new government of that country had excited the apprehenſions of the Britiſh government; and that it does not contain a ſingle demand of reparation of any injury received or pretended to be received from us, nor even any complaint of the conduct of Great Britain, excepting in two particulars, which did not occur till January, 1793, and which Mr. E. did not think of ſuch importance as to deſerve his notice.

The firſt of theſe particulars was the Alien Bill, which M. Chauvelin repreſented as a violation of the treaty of navigation and commerce, and which, he contended, ſhould have contained an exception in favour of France, although it was notorious that the danger againſt which the bill was meant to provide, aroſe chiefly from the intrigues and machinations of viſitors from that country *. The other

* The object of the Alien Bill was merely to provide for the public tranquility, by ſubjecting the reſort and reſidence of aliens to certain regulations. Such a meaſure cannot, in any reſpect, be conſidered as *offenſive*, for it is conformable to the invariable uſage of foreign countries. But it has been found ſo uſeful, and continues ſo neceſſary as a *defenſive* meaſure, that I truſt it will be rendered permanent, and that it will have a ſtrict execution. It is totally unconnected with the queſtion of peace or war, excepting indeed that it is moſt wanted in time of peace, becauſe a ſtate of war brings with it remedies of a much more operative nature. Moſt of all, it will be wanted in caſe of a peace with the French Republic, in order to preſerve us from the deadly poiſon of Gallic fraternity.

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complaint reſpected ſome prudent and neceſſary reſtrictions impoſed by the Britiſh government on the exportation of grain.

I am not now inquring what degree of credit was due to the explanations of France, with reſpect to her own conduct and views ; this will more properly be matter of ſubſequent conſideration. But ſuppoſing that thoſe explanations were quite ſatisfactory, ſtill the correſpondence would amount to no more than an exculpation of France ; and its total ſilence as to any wrong, or any affront received from us, except in the two reſpects above mentioned, amounts to the moſt complete demonſtration that ſhe did not find any thing elſe in our conduct which afforded her the leaſt cauſe for complaint.

Indeed Mr. E. ſeems himſelf to conſider that the *main* point eſtabliſhed by this correſpondence, is the magnitude of the conceſſions made by France—conceſſions which, he ſays, " would ſcarcely be believed, if they did not remain on record in the correſpondence." Now as it would be a contradiction in terms to ſuppoſe *conceſſions* to proceed from the *injured* party, it is at leaſt fair to preſume, that when France made conceſſions of ſuch magnitude as to be *ſcarcely credible*, inſtead of feeling that ſhe had any cauſe of complaint againſt this country, ſhe was conſcious, either of ſomething in her own conduct which made thoſe conceſſions neceſſary, or of ſomething in her views which rendered them expedient.

An examination of the extracts themſelves, which

which Mr. E. has made from the correſpondence by which he undertakes to aſcertain " the authors of the war," will fully confirm the conſtruction which I have put upon this important *record*.

The very firſt note tranſmitted to Lord Grenville by M. Chauvelin, ſoon after the arrival of the latter in this country, and which Mr. E. ſays, " had for its object to explain the reaſons which had determined France to a war with the Emperor," proves that the conduct of France had already excited general ſuſpicion and alarm in foreign ſtates. How elſe are we to account for the declarations introduced into this note, of the reſpect which ſhe " would ſhew, at all times, for the laws, the cuſtoms, and the forms of government of different nations"—and for the aſſurance it contained, that " the king would diſavow all agents at foreign courts in peace with France, who ſhould dare to depart an inſtant from that reſpect, either by fomenting or favouring inſurrection againſt the eſtabliſhed order, or by interfering in any manner whatever in the interior policy of ſuch ſtates, under pretence of proſelytiſm, *which, exerciſed in the dominion of friendly powers, would be a real violation of the laws of nations.*" Nothing can be more clear than that France had either offended, or was ſuſpected of an intention to offend in all theſe particulars, otherwiſe it would have been altogether nugatory to make profeſſions of ſuch a nature, that the like had never before occurred in the intercourſe of civilized ſtates. She appears, however, in the very outſet of

the correſpondence, to be endeavouring to vindicate her own conduct inſtead of pretending, in any reſpect, to criminate ours.

Indeed, Mr. E. introduces his recital of the above aſſurances by obſerving, that " much had been ſaid of attempts made by France to produce diſturbances in this country." That ſuch a charge might even then be urged with great juſtice is indiſputably certain; and of courſe it is equally certain that the profeſſions contained in this communication were *falſe and hollow*. Nor is this any imputation upon the King, in whoſe name thoſe profeſſions were made; for beſides that no one can ſuſpect *him* of a wiſh to ſow diſturbances in other ſtates, the unfortunate monarch was intirely deprived of free agency, and was, moreover, at that time, in the hands of a Jacobin adminiſtration which he had been compelled to form, and the members of which made him their inſtrument, for the purpoſe both of diſguiſing and promoting their execrable deſigns. However, we have here the beſt poſſible authority, the declarations of France herſelf, that the conduct ſoon afterwards purſued by her in the moſt *open* manner, and whereby ſhe endeavoured to " foment inſurrections againſt the eſtabliſhed order of other ſtates" was " *a real violation of the law of nations.*"

The anſwer of Lord Grenville is couched in general terms, prudently avoiding all diſcuſſion reſpecting the cauſes of the war with the Emperor, and containing aſſurances of a diſpoſition, on the part of his

his Majeſty, to preſerve a good underſtanding with the moſt Chriſtian King.

The next letter of M. Chauvelin contains an alluſion to the Royal Proclamation, which had been iſſued for the ſuppreſſion of wicked and ſeditious writings, and which contained a ſuggeſtion, fully confirmed by the evidence adduced on the late ſtate trials, as well as by numberleſs other proofs, that "correſpondencies had been entered into with ſundry perſons in foreign parts, with a view to forward the criminal and wicked purpoſes" therein deſcribed.

This Proclamation as Mr. E. obſerves, "took no direct notice of France; and being an act of national police, France had in ſtrictneſs no right to complain of it." I ſhall therefore paſs over to the next communication noticed by Mr. E. on the part of M. Chauvelin, and dated June 18, 1792; the object of which was to obtain the interpoſition of the Britiſh court with foreign powers, and particularly with its allies, to prevent them from affording aſſiſtance to the Emperor, in the war in which that prince was engaged with France. On this ſubject M. Chauvelin begins with expreſſing a hope founded (as he ſays) in the friendly diſpoſition of his Britannic Majeſty, that the latter would "be induced eagerly to employ his good offices with his allies, to diſſuade them from granting, directly or indirectly, any aſſiſtance to the enemies of France." This paſſage (which Mr. E. has omitted to quote), con-

tains in the moſt direct and expreſs terms the object of the application. The reſt of the communication, (which Mr. E. *has* quoted) repreſents the court of Vienna as taking ſteps to engage other powers in a quarrel, which according to M. Chauvelin is "foreign to them;" and it contains an intreaty that his Britannic Majeſty would ſtop the progreſs of an extenſive confederacy, which it ſtates to be forming "againſt the peace, the liberty, and the happineſs of Europe."—A requeſt which Mr. E. thinks proper to deſcribe as an earneſt application "for the mediation of Great Britain."

Inſtead of inquiring in this place whether the confederacy to which the French plenipotentiary alludes, had not for its object the *preſervation* of the peace, the liberty, and the happineſs of Europe, which, as the event has proved, were all expoſed to the greateſt danger from the ſyſtem newly adopted by France—inſtead of expatiating upon the unreaſonableneſs of the requeſt that Great Britain ſhould interpoſe, to prevent the Emperor from obtaining any ſuccour in a war, in which he had, undoubtedly, been attacked by France,—I think it more material to obſerve that our refuſal to comply with ſuch a requeſt, was no ground for offence. Great Britain was certainly under no obligation to conſider the enemies of France as her own, or to break, or even endanger her neutrality, by endeavouring to prevent thoſe enemies from forming alliances both offenſive and defenſive.

Had

Had the application been for our interference to bring about an accommodation with the Emperor, this country would, without being accountable to any one, have been perfectly free to refuſe to interfere even for that purpoſe. But ſo far from this being the nature or the object of the interpoſition requeſted by France, ſhe did not expreſs the leaſt ſolicitude for the termination of the then ſubſiſting war, but in effect deſired our intervention (or as Mr. E. terms it our *mediation*) that the Emperor might be left expoſed to her attack, without any alliances to aid him in a conteſt, which the reſult proves to have been exceedingly unequal, even with the advantage of ſuch aſſiſtance.

This, I believe, is the firſt time that the word *mediation* was ever uſed in ſuch a ſenſe. It has hitherto ſignified an interference on the part of a neutral power, with a view to bring about a pacification between belligerent powers. Mr. E. has applied it to the caſe of an interpoſition in favour of one belligerent power, to prevent the other from ſtrengthening itſelf by the acquiſition of allies. But as ſuch an intervention would betray a viſible and decided partiality for the party on whoſe behalf it ſhould be made, it would amount to an act of hoſtility againſt the other party, and it would be, at leaſt, an impertinent, if not an inſolent intruſion with regard to all powers to whom it ſhould be addreſſed.

dreſſed. A refuſal to comply with ſuch a propoſition was dictated by ſound policy, as well as by a proper reſpect to other powers; and the propoſition itſelf, if it did not amount to an inſult, was probably intended as a ſnare. At all events it was in no reſpect an application for our interference " to mediate a peace with the emperor," as France did not (as I before obſerved), ſignify the moſt diſtant wiſh that we ſhould interpoſe for that purpoſe.

It is impoſſible not to obſerve in this place, on what inſufficient grounds Mr. E. has advanced that charge againſt the Britiſh miniſters, which he prefixed to his details of the *correſpondence*. He ſays that thoſe miniſters " had *notoriouſly* connived at, if not aſſiſted in fomenting the conſpiracy then forming throughout Europe."

I wiſh Mr. E. would have the goodneſs to explain how ſuch a charge can be reconciled with the total ſilence of M. Chauvelin upon the ſubject, during the whole of his correſpondence, and particularly on this occaſion; and how it can be made compatible with the requeſt, " That Great Britain ſhould *interfere* to prevent the progreſs of the " Conſpiracy?" What! ſolicit the interpoſition of the Britiſh court to ſtop the progreſs of a conſpiracy which that court " *notoriouſly* connived at," and, perhaps, " aſſiſted to foment," &c. Is it Mr. E. who repreſents the French miniſters, and the French ambaſſador, as engaged in ſo miſerable a farce?

I will

I will allow them more credit for ſincerity. I will admit that they were really deſirous to prevent, by the interpoſition of England, any addition to the number of their enemies, that they might employ their whole force againſt the Emperor. But certainly if the Britiſh miniſters were *notoriouſly* purſuing the meaſures here aſcribed to them, France, inſtead of ſoliciting their interpoſition, would rather have taken the earlieſt moment to requeſt them to deſiſt from ſo unfriendly a conduct, and to complain of that conduct as a departure from neutrality. No ſuch complaint was then or has ſince been made; and, therefore, I muſt conſider the charge advanced by Mr. E. not only as intirely unſupported by evidence, but as refuted by the ſtrongeſt evidence of which the nature of the caſe would admit. Indeed, the note in queſtion, inſtead of affording the leaſt pretext to ſuppoſe that France ſaw or apprehended any cauſe for complaint whatever in the conduct of Great Britain, repels ſuch a ſuppoſition by the following aſſurance (not noticed by Mr. E.) of intire ſatisfaction and confidence. M. Chauvelin in alluſion to the anſwer which had been given by Lord Grenville, to the note of May 24, reſpecting the King's proclamation, declares, that " he is directed to aſſure his Britannic Majeſty of the due ſenſe which the (French) King entertains of the friendly diſpoſition, and of the ſentiments

of

of humanity, of juſtice, and of peace, which are ſo clearly manifeſted in that anſwer."

As the Britiſh government was not diſpoſed to join its arms to thoſe of France, and to become a party in the war againſt the Emperor, Lord Grenville very wiſely refuſed to accede to the propoſal of interference made by M. Chauvelin, obſerving, in terms diſtinguiſhed for their moderation, that " the ſame ſentiments which had determined his Majeſty not to take a part in the internal concerns of France, ought equally to induce him to reſpect the rights and the independence of other ſovereigns, and eſpecially of his allies."

Mr. E. is guilty of a conſiderable anachroniſm in obſerving that the expreſſion of this determination not to interfere with the internal affairs of France, was written only *a few days* before M. Chauvelin was ordered to quit the kingdom, under circumſtances of direct interference. I beg leave to remind him, that the determination, to which he alludes, was conveyed by Lord Grenville's note, dated June 18, 1792, and that M. Chauvelin was not ordered to quit the kingdom till Jan. 1793.

The part of the correſpondence next quoted by Mr. E. did not occur till after thoſe ſhocking events, which deſtroyed the remaining veſtiges of the French monarchy, and in conſequence of which M. Chauvelin, who had been the ambaſſador of the French King, was metamorphoſed into a republican citizen,

citizen, and became, as Mr. E. obſerves, " *a private man.*" But although Lord Gower was recalled from Paris, becauſe his miſſion was terminated on the depoſition of the Monarch, to whom he was deputed, " M. Chauvelin was ſtill continued by France at the court of London, although he was no longer conſidered as her ambaſſador," a circumſtance which Mr. E. conſiders as " a pretty ſtrong proof that ſhe (France) was not deſirous of ſeeking a cauſe of quarrel;" and he goes on to remark, that " though M. Chauvelin was now in a manner a private man, yet the correſpondence nevertheleſs continued with the Secretary of State."

If it had not been proved by a variety of circumſtances, that the objects of M. Chauvelin's continuance in this country, as a private individual, were by no means of a friendly or harmleſs nature, it muſt, nevertheleſs, be allowed that his being permitted to remain here, and ſtill more the continuance of his correſpondence with the Secretary of State, were certainly very ſtrong proofs, that *we* were not deſirous " of ſeeking a cauſe of quarrel," although Mr. E. does not give us any credit on that account for a pacific diſpoſition.

Not having found in the foregoing parts of the correſpondence any evidence, nor indeed any complaints on the part of France, of any acts of aggreſſion or injury chargeable on this country, one is apt to look with confidence to the remainder of this official communication for a full diſplay of ſuch

evidence and of ſuch complaints. But what muſt be our aſtoniſhment on finding that, inſtead of pretending to detail any accuſations brought by France againſt the conduct of Great Britain, Mr. E. introduces his extracts from this part of the evidence with the following obſervation—" and it appears on referring to *it* that the charges made by *this country* to the *conduct of France*, were principally theſe:" On the firſt reading of this paſſage any one would ſuſpect that there had been an error of the preſs, and that the compoſitor had transpoſed the words " this country" and " France;" but what follows proves that the language of the author has been faithfully conveyed to the public, and that the ſubſtance of the enſuing part of the correſpondence related to charges, and to charges too of the moſt ſerious and weighty nature, " made by this country to the conduct of France."

I am very willing to refer to Mr. E's recital of theſe charges, which he has ſtated in a manner much more honourable to his candour than favourable to his argument. " *A meditated attack upon Holland; and at all events, a violation of her rights, notwithſtanding her neutrality, by the proceedings of the convention reſpecting the Scheldt, and the opening a paſſage through it to attack the citadel of Antwerp. The French invaſion and poſſeſſion of the Netherlands; and the encouragement given to revolt in other countries, not only by emiſſaries in this country, but by the decree of the 19th of November, which contained a formal declaration*

tion to extend univerſally the new principles of government adopted in France, and to encourage revolt in all countries, even in thoſe which were neutral."

It muſt be admitted that unleſs France was able in the moſt ſatisfactory manner to refute ſuch charges, the obſervation of Mr. E. that "the correſpondence would place the authors of the war in their proper colours" was perfectly well founded, though in a very different ſenſe from that which it was intended to convey. Whether ſhe did, or could clear herſelf from imputations of ſo ſerious a nature, the memorial addreſſed to M. Chauvelin by M. le Brun in the name of the executive council, and delivered by the former to Lord Grenville on the 13th of January 1793, will enable us to determine.

"In this note (Mr. E. ſays) the executive council again in terms declared that *France would reſpect the ſafety of all nations while they preſerved their neutrality*, and that ſhe had before renounced and again renounced every conqueſt." The decree of fraternity which had at this time been addreſſed to all nations, *neutral* as well as *hoſtile*, and the violation of the territories of neighbouring ſtates, without pretending that they had departed from their neutrality, (particularly in the caſe complained of by Lord Grenville reſpecting the paſſage of the Scheldt,) afford remarkable proofs of the *profound* reſpect entertained by France for *neutral* nations. Her *renunciation of conqueſt* was exemplified, in a manner no

leſs ſtriking, by the annexation of Avignon, Savoy, and Nice to France. But leſt the poſſeſſion of the low countries ſhould afford another proof that France was, notwithſtanding all her profeſſions to the contrary, at leaſt as eager as ever for conqueſt, the memorial goes on to ſay "the occupation of the low countries ſhall only continue during the war, and the time which may be neceſſary to the Belgians to inſure and conſolidate their liberty; after which let them be independent and happy, France will find her recompence in their felicity." This it muſt be admitted was not the language of conquerors—but it was much worſe. It was the language of the new ſyſtem adopted by France, whereby ſhe endeavoured to promote revolutions under the guiſe of diſintereſted friendſhip, and to eſtabliſh her own dominion under the pretext of conferring liberty.

The queſtion reſpecting the Scheldt M. le Brun artfully ſhifts over to the *Belgians*, ſaying, that if that people "when in the full enjoyment of liberty ſhall conſent to deprive themſelves of the navigation of the Scheldt, France will not oppoſe it." But as the liberty intended for this unfortunate people was nothing elſe than an entire dependence on France, this reference to their will, (beſides being unjuſt becauſe the queſtion equally concerned another party, the Dutch) can only be conſidered as one of many ſpecimens of French republican duplicity.

The actual violation of the territory and neutrality of

of Holland, by an officer in the ſervice of France, who had forced a paſſage up the Scheldt to attack the citadel of Antwerp, M. le Brun, inſtead of attempting to juſtify, does not think proper to notice. But he contends for the right of France to diſpenſe with the treaty reſpecting the Scheldt, not merely on the vague and general grounds of the rights of nature, (grounds on which France had aſſumed a right to ſuperſede all treaties and all laws) but on the abſurd pretext that this "treaty was concluded without the participation of the Belgians."

But the principal ſubject of complaint, reſpected the decree of Fraternity, and the numerous other proofs given by France, of a ſettled deſign to encourage ſedition and revolt in all countries. M. le Brun denies the exiſtence of any ſuch deſign, and he enters into an explanation of the decree, in order to ſhew that it did not bear the conſtruction which had been put upon it. Inſtead, indeed, of explanations we were undoubtedly intitled to a repeal of this atrocious decree; but it ſo happened that the very explanations given by France, were no leſs obnoxious and inadmiſſible than the decree itſelf. For under the pretence that aſſiſtance was not meant to be afforded to other countries except in the ſingle caſe, in which the "general will of a nation, clearly and unequivocally expreſſed, ſhould call the French nation to its aſſiſtance and fraternity;" the right of France to interfere in the domeſtic affairs of other countries was expreſsly aſſerted; and even the reſtriction,

triction, which ſhe pretended to impoſe on the exerciſe of that right, was a mere nullity, becauſe the exiſtence of the caſe to which the reſtriction referred was to be decided only by herſelf. Beſides, the reception and encouragement which the convention had given to the miſſionaries of ſedition, deputed from the Engliſh clubs, and the conduct of the republic in various other inſtances, and particularly in the invaſion of the territory of the Duke of Deux Ponts, (whom they expelled from his dominions, becauſe a *ſingle* Bailiage belonging to him, had diſplayed the three coloured flag and planted the tree of liberty) afford indiſputable evidence that France herſelf conſidered the reſtriction as a mere ſubterfuge, and that ſhe was ready to encourage the ſeditions in every ſtate, however inconſiderable their numbers might be*.

To ſupply the defect of ſuch unſatisfactory explanations, reſpecting the ſpecific grounds of complaint

* The following reply of Lord Grenville to this part of the explanation of France is ſo clear, forcible and convincing, that it would be an injuſtice to the ſubject not to inſert it. " Neither ſatisfaction nor ſecurity is found in the terms of an explanation, which ſtill declares to the promoters of ſedition in every country, what are the caſes in which they may count beforehand on the ſupport and ſuccour of France; and which reſerves to that country the right of mixing herſelf in our internal affairs, whenever ſhe ſhall judge it proper, and on principles incompatible with the political inſtitutions of Europe. No one can avoid perceiving how much a declaration like this is calculated to encourage diſorder and tumult in every country."

which

which had been advanced by us, the diſpatch was filled up with general profeſſions and aſſurances "that the French republic did not intend to erect itſelf into an univerſal arbitrator of the treaties which bind nations. That ſhe would know how to reſpect other governments, as ſhe would take care to make her own reſpected. That ſhe did not wiſh to impoſe laws upon any one, and would not ſuffer any one to impoſe laws upon her," and a note of M. Chauvelin to Lord Grenville, dated Dec. 27 (not noticed by Mr. E.) contains the declaration that "the National Convention never meant that the French Republic ſhould favour inſurrection, eſpouſe the quarrel of a few ſeditious perſons, or, in a word, endeavour to excite diſturbances in any neutral or friendly country whatever." Nothing is more eaſy than to deal largely in profeſſions of ſo general a nature. They are not attended with any riſk. They coſt nothing, and they pledge to nothing ſpecific. They are nevertheleſs of great utility. They impoſe on the ſuperficial, who never bring matters to the teſt of reaſon or of fact. They afford a ſpecious argument to partizans—and, by a very *eaſy* tranſition *in language*, they may be converted into "*conceſſions* ſcarcely to be believed, if they did not remain on record." But he ſurely muſt be formed to be a dupe, who, after the flagrant proofs given by France, that ſhe entertained the views, adopted the ſyſtem, and purſued the deſigns which ſhe ſo ſolemnly diſclaimed, could be impoſed

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on by ſuch profeſſions—Profeſſions which were not only in direct contradiction to acts of the moſt public nature, and even to formal decrees, but abſolutely inconſiſtent with the pretenſions and principles avowed in the communications of which they formed a part.

Thus it appears from the evidence to which Mr. E. had appealed, as deciſive of the queſtion of aggreſſion, and from which he undertook to exhibit *the authors of the war in their proper colours*, that France, who declared war againſt us within a few days after the concluſion of the correſpondence, had no cauſe of complaint to alledge againſt Great Britain.—On the contrary, throughout the whole of this important evidence ſhe appears in the character of the *accuſed* rather than of the *accuſer*, endeavouring, (with what ſucceſs we have ſeen,) to vindicate her own conduct, but not attempting to criminate ours. She abounds, not in charges againſt us, but in explanations, profeſſions, and aſſurances reſpecting herſelf; which are, however, at direct variance with her actions. In order to gain our confidence, ſhe condemns, in the ſevereſt terms, the conduct and the views which ſhe diſclaims, but of which ſhe is proved, by the moſt incontrovertible evidence, to have been guilty, and thereby ſhe paſſes a righteous judgment upon herſelf. Add to which, it is perfectly clear, even upon the face of the correſpondence itſelf, that it was dictated by perfidy, and intended only to blunt our ſuſpicions, and to lull us into a ſtate of ſecurity,

curity, that ſhe might, without moleſtation from us, purſue her ſchemes of conqueſt and aggrandizement.

Nor does this deſcription, either of the effect of the correſpondence, or of the conduct of France, differ materially from Mr. E's ideas of both. For after obſerving that he had adverted "to all the material parts of the correſpondence," he ſums it up in theſe emphatical words—"I deſire very diſtinctly to be underſtood that I am not undertaking the juſtification of the conduct of France at this period, though I ſhall ever think her more ſinned againſt than ſinning." (As this latter obſervation is neither ſupported by an enumeration of any offences committed by us againſt France, nor conſiſtent with Mr. E's ſubſequent enumeration of thoſe committed by France againſt us, it muſt be taken merely as an *obiter dictum*, for which his authority is not pledged.) He thus proceeds—"With regard to this decree of the 19th of November, no conſideration can juſtify it: becauſe there is a great difference between one nation giving PARTICULAR aſſiſtance to another which is oppreſſed by its government, as King William did to England, and a GENERAL PROSPECTIVE DECLARATION, SUCH AS IS CONTAINED IN THE DECREE OF THE 19TH OF NOVEMBER, and which became more hoſtile to the peace of other nations, as being iſſued upon the eve of a great revolution, which naturally affected the temper and feelings of mankind. Neither do I ſeek to maintain that England ſhould have reſted ſecure from the

explanation of the other points in difference, as they are explained in this correſpondence, much leſs that ſhe ſhould have relied upon the ſincerity of them, or the durability of French councils, to give ſincerity its effect. Theſe are matters of fair political controverſy, which I purpoſely avoid; but hazard the aſſertion, that common policy and common ſenſe abſolutely enjoined that they ſhould either have been made the inſtant foundations of war, as aggreſſions which admitted no ſettlement, or the ſubject of negociation upon terms conſiſtent with dignity and ſafety." P. 41, 42.

Thus, according to Mr. E. himſelf, the reſult of the correſpondence is—not that France complained of any injury from Great Britain—not that ſhe demanded any kind of ſatisfaction or redreſs, but that ſhe herſelf was chargeable with acts which "*no conſideration can juſtify*," that ſhe was guilty of aggreſſions, which *admitted of no other alternative than to be either made the "inſtant foundations of war, or the ſubject of ſafe and honourable negociation*;" while the explanations by which ſhe attempted to juſtify her conduct were ſuch as to deſerve no credit for their *ſincerity*, and the councils from which thoſe explanations proceeded were not poſſeſſed of ſufficient *durability* to *give effect* even to *ſincerity* itſelf.

Mr. E. complains that neither of the courſes mentioned by him were purſued. "We neither made war upon theſe aggreſſions, nor would we conſent to put them into a train of amicable negociation."

tion." It is ſomething to have ſuch an admiſſion that we did not adopt the moſt violent part of the alternative to which Mr. E. had reduced the queſtion; as to the more moderate part, without pretending to know what ideas he may annex to the term "*amicable* negociation," the *correſpondence* certainly proves that the aggreſſions of France were made "the ſubject of negociation," upon ſuch terms as were alone "conſiſtent with dignity and ſafety," which is all that he declares to have been neceſſary, in the caſe of our not proceeding at once to hoſtilities. The correſpondence, though not official, had all the effect which an official communication could produce—it contained an expoſition of the complaints and apprehenſions of this country, and it produced a very long and elaborate anſwer from France. If that anſwer was ſincere it could not be accepted as ſatisfactory, for it maintained principles and pretenſions, no leſs injurious and offenſive than thoſe which had been made the ſubject of complaint; and if it was not ſincere, to what purpoſe could we have ſought for further explanations? In either caſe the anſwer fully juſtified the reſolution of the Britiſh government, which is condemned by Mr. E. not to enter into a more *formal* communication with the ruling party in France; and it afforded the ſtrongeſt poſſible reaſon not to depart from that reſolution. How could we with dignity and ſafety have entered into a cloſer intimacy with perſons, who had not only rebelled againſt their lawful ſovereign, and uſurped his autho-

rity, but who, by ſucceſſive decrees, had iſſued and confirmed * "a general proſpective declaration, hoſtile to the peace of other nations"—Perſons *on whoſe ſincerity we could not rely*; whoſe authority was as unſtable and undefined, as it was unjuſtly acquired; and who did not even pretend that they conſtituted any fixed or regular government, or that they were poſſeſſed of any powers but what were *proviſional*. Beſides, what advantage could have been expected from a more formal communication with ſuch perſons, even if it had not been forbidden by ſuch powerful conſiderations? would M. Chauvelin have ſpoken another language if he had been *accredited* by our court as a republican ambaſſador? Would his reception in that character have altered his inſtructions, or changed the principles and the views of thoſe who ſent him? Or, would ſuch a reception have rendered the *ſincerity and durability of the councils*, whoſe organ he was, more deſerving of confidence?

The truth is, that the correſpondence, as it exiſted, was not only fully adequate to every purpoſe which the moſt formal negociation could have effected, by producing a ſufficient underſtanding of the ſentiments and views of each party reſpecting the matters in diſpute, but it alſo led to a communication of the *final* determination of the French rulers upon theſe

* The decree of December 15th, not only confirmed that of November 19th, but preſcribed the mode by which it was to be carried into execution.

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matters. After having dealt in explanations, on the *ſincerity* of which Mr. E. does not pretend to ſay we ſhould have relied, M. Chauvelin himſelf ſhut the door to further diſcuſſion, by declaring thoſe explanations FINAL, and by announcing WAR, if we did not think proper, not only to be ſatisfied with them, but to repoſe in the perſons from whom they proceeded ſuch blind and implicit confidence, as to deſiſt from our complaints, and even to diſcontinue our naval preparations. " If," ſays M. Chauvelin, at the cloſe of the laſt note quoted by Mr. E. " the explanations of France appear inſufficient, and if we are obliged to hear a haughty language; if hoſtile preparations are continued in the Britiſh ports; after having exhauſted every means to preſerve peace, WE WILL PREPARE FOR WAR, with a ſenſe of the juſtice of our cauſe, and of our efforts to avoid this extremity: we will fight the Engliſh, whom we eſteem, with regret, but we will fight them without fear."

Such of Mr. E's readers as have never ſeen the correſpondence otherwiſe than as it appears in his work, will, I doubt not, be ſurpriſed at his *omiſſion* of ſo important a part as that which I have juſt quoted, and they will find it difficult to reconcile that omiſſion with the aſſurance that he had " *adverted to all its material parts*," p. 39. But certainly the language here adopted by M. Chauvelin affords the fulleſt demonſtration that all attempts, on our part, to obtain further, or more ſatisfactory explanations, would have been no leſs nugatory than inconſiſtent

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"*with dignity and ſafety.*" Was it poſſible for France to have taken a more effectual mode of convincing us that ſhe had no other explanations to give, than by declaring that if thoſe which ſhe had communicated appeared inſufficient *ſhe would prepare for war?*

That declaration was, however, *material* in another reſpect, for it held out to us the terms on which alone we might hope to avoid a war with France. It contained the truly important information that, in order to continue at peace with the French Republic, we muſt not only conſent to have the explanations ſhe had given, unſatisfactory and inſincere as they were, crammed down our throats, and to acknowledge ourſelves ſatisfied, when the *aggreſſions* of France had been aggravated by inſult and perfidy, but we muſt alſo have diſcontinued thoſe defenſive preparations, for which it was ſo likely we ſhould ſoon have occaſion, while France was endeavouring to bring all the force ſhe could command into action—when ſhe had already ſubjugated the Netherlands—and when ſhe was not only menacing Holland, but had actually violated the Dutch territory. But that is not all. At the time when we were thus called upon to diſcontinue our naval preparations, the French Miniſter of Marine, Monge, in a letter to the ſea ports, had announced the intentions of France to "fly to the ſuccour of the Engliſh republicans—to make a deſcent in the iſland—to lodge there 50,000 caps of liberty—to plant the *ſacred* tree—to ſtretch out her arms to her republican brethren—

and

and to deſtroy the tyranny of the Britiſh government!"

Having finiſhed his extracts from the *correſpondence*, Mr. E. does not bring forward any additional evidence to ſtrengthen his caſe, excepting the refuſal of the Britiſh government to receive M. Chauvelin as ambaſſador from the republic, and the diſmiſſion of that gentleman (or rather *citizen*) from this country; in lieu of adducing further evidence, he expatiates much at large upon a variety of general, and, moſtly, collateral topics, in order to ſupport the charge which he had undertaken to eſtabliſh. Many of thoſe topics are in themſelves of great importance; and as they have been perverted by the groſſeſt miſrepreſentation, in order to ſhake the opinion of the public reſpecting the war, it cannot fail to be uſeful to conſider them with ſome attention.

Firſt, however, let us ſee what Mr. E. has to ſay reſpecting the rejection and diſmiſſion of M. Chauvelin.—"The letters of credence ſent by the republic were refuſed, not becauſe of thoſe enumerated aggreſſions, or any other, but becauſe ſhe was a republic: and in a few days afterwards M. Chauvelin, who preſented them, was alſo diſmiſſed the kingdom, not becauſe the anſwers of his government were unſatisfactory, but becauſe the French monarchy had been finally terminated by the death of the French king." Neither of theſe ſtatements is conſiſtent with facts. The new letters of credence tendered by M. Chauvelin do not appear, even in the letter

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of Lord Grenville upon the ſubject, to have been refuſed becauſe France was a republic, but becauſe the unhappy events of the 10th of Auguſt having, of courſe, ſuſpended all official communication with that gentleman, as the accredited ambaſſador of the French king, the Britiſh government did not think it prudent haſtily to decide the new queſtion, which evidently and unavoidably aroſe, whether it ſhould receive a Miniſter "accredited by any other power or authority in France," which might profeſs to be entitled to adminiſter the government of that country.

The perſons who had ſeized on the powers of government in France had no right, upon general principles, to expect this queſtion to be determined in the affirmative, or to make the ſuſpenſion of official communication a ground of quarrel; for even among *eſtabliſhed* governments ſuch ſuſpenſion is not conſidered as a cauſe for war, though it is generally a ſymptom of ſuch ſerious differences, as lead in their reſult, if not accommodated, to that extremity. But when the Government of a country is, from whatever cauſe ſuſpended, a ſuſpenſion of official intercourſe with other nations follows of courſe. Of this event the Revolution itſelf had furniſhed a precedent. For upon the flight of the King to Varennes, according to the report of M. Montmorin, Miniſter for foreign affairs, all intercourſe with foreign nations had ceaſed during the ſuſpenſion of the royal authority, and only recommenced upon the King's acceptance of the Conſtitution.

"I defy

that the Britiſh government had a right, nay, that it was its duty, to ſuſpend its deciſion upon this ſubject, until it might be aſcertained, not only whether the new government could eſtabliſh itſelf ſufficiently to give validity and effect to its tranſactions with foreign powers, but whether its principles and views were compatible with the ſafety of other ſtates. On both theſe points Mr. E. has adduced abundant reaſon to decide the queſtion *againſt* the immediate reception of the republican ambaſſador, which would have involved a recognition of the republic itſelf. For how could we rely on the acts of a government which was not deſerving of confidence in reſpect of its ſincerity, and which had not acquired ſufficient "durability to give ſincerity its effect?" And how could we conſider its views, or even its exiſtence, as compatible with our ſecurity, after it had iſſued decrees "which no conſiderate perſon could juſtify," and containing "a general proſpective declaration, which was hoſtile to the peace of other nations." It would, therefore, upon Mr. E's own ſhewing, have been an act of folly, if not of frenzy, to receive M. Chauvelin in the character of republican ambaſſador; and his letters of credence were refuſed, not becauſe France was a Republic, but becauſe that Republic had commenced its career by acts ſo aggreſſive and injurious, ſo hoſtile to the peace, and ſo dangerous to the ſecurity of the reſt of Europe, that even, according to Mr. E. himſelf, they admitted of no other alternative than to be "made the inſtant foun-

dations of war, or the ſubject of negociation upon terms conſiſtent with dignity and ſafety." That theſe reaſons were not expreſsly aſſigned as the motives of the refuſal, can hardly be conſidered by Mr. E. as a ground for cenſure. For certainly the mildeſt poſſible mode of communicating that refuſal was to put it on the footing of the termination of M. Chauvelin's original miſſion.

The extreme horror felt by Mr. E. at all idea of interference in the domeſtic concerns of France, would, I ſhould have thought, have ſuggeſted to him another very cogent reaſon againſt our precipitate reception of the republican Ambaſſador.—For that a reception would have ſavoured ſtrongly of ſuch an interference, by diſplaying an eagerneſs to acknowledge the Republic before, in fact, any Republic exiſted, and while there was no Government whatever in France*. For while the ancient Government was ſubverted, the great and arduous taſk of ſubſtituting another in its room remained to be performed. For this expreſs purpoſe the Convention was called, and, in the mean time, it was not pretended that any

* It is not by giving to a country the denomination of a Republic, that it acquires even a republican form of Government. On the contrary, the term Republic, which, at the beſt, is expreſſive of a baſtard ſpecies of Government, in its modern ſenſe conveys a negative idea, and ſignifies the abſence of all eſtabliſhed Government. It is this which renders it ſo grateful to perſons of reſtleſs and depraved minds, to whom it ſuggeſts merely an abſence of reſtraints, and preſents to their view a boundleſs ſpace, in which all their corrupt propenſities may range without controul and without end.

but

but *proviſional* powers exiſted in France. Surely it did not become us to recognize *proviſional* powers, and thereby to decide on their validity. If we had done ſo, the Monarch, had he been reſtored, might have juſtly reproached us with having interfered in the internal concerns of his country, by taking a part againſt him and his cauſe. I leave it to the conſciences of divers perſons in this country whether this conſtruction be not juſt, and whether their impatience for our reception of M. Chauvelin was not founded in an idea, that by ſuch an act we ſhould contribute to promote the eſtabliſhment of a Republic, and give a *coup de grace* to the expiring Monarchy.

Not leſs uncandid and unſupported by facts is the aſſertion, that " M. Chauvelin was diſmiſſed from the kingdom, not becauſe his anſwers were declared unſatisfactory on the points objected to, but becauſe the French Monarchy had been finally terminated by the deſtruction of their King." The events that have occurred afford no reaſon whatever to conclude, that if the explanations of the French rulers had been ſatisfactory, (a ſuppoſition which implies a juſt and well grounded confidence, ariſing from thoſe explanations, that no danger was to be apprehended to other ſtates from the internal changes of France) the murder of the French King, horrid and atrocious as it was, would have produced the diſmiſſion of the French Ambaſſador. But be that as it may, the permiſſion to M. Chauvelin, to remain here upwards of five months after his miſſion was

terminated by the depoſition of his Sovereign, and the correſpondence which paſſed during that time between Lord Grenville and him, afford the moſt incontrovertible proofs that the Britiſh Miniſtry were anxious, by all practicable means, to avert a war. At the period of his diſmiſſion, it was clear that no ſatisfaction could be expected from any further intercourſe. He himſelf had announced that France would prepare for war, if the explanations ſhe had given were not accepted as ſatisfactory, and if we did not even diſcontinue both our complaints and our naval preparations. His functions, which had been ſo long ſuſpended, were, as Lord Grenville obſerved to him, *entirely terminated by the death of the French King*. There could therefore remain no pretence for his being permitted to continue in this country; and the period, which was choſen for his diſmiſſion, was the moſt proper that could poſſibly have been ſelected for that purpoſe. Nor could that meaſure, any more than the former one of declaring his official character ſuſpended, be any juſt ground of offence. If he had been even a formal and accredited Ambaſſador, France could not, on the principles already ſtated, have conſtrued his diſmiſſion into a cauſe for war. But inſtead of poſſeſſing ſuch a character, he was, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, a private individual; and it was in *that* light that he was, in conformity to ſubſiſting laws, refuſed reſidence in this country. How Mr. E. can conſider the notification of ſuch a refuſal as an inſult, to be compared with the abrupt diſmiſſion of Lord

Malmeſbury

Malmeſbury from Paris, it is difficult to conceive. Lord Malmeſbury was an Ambaſſador, whoſe credentials had been received, and therefore the order given to him, immediately to quit France, was certainly a very groſs inſult on the Sovereign, whoſe repreſentative he was acknowledged to be.—M. Chauvelin was only a private perſon, and an order for him to quit England on *whatever* occaſion, was no inſult at all, unleſs he choſe to conſider it as one to himſelf individually. And if it was afterwards ſtated by France as a pretext for war, it is evidently one of thoſe pretexts, which only afford a proof that the power, by which they were urged, was previouſly determined on hoſtility, and the exiſtence of which no prudence, no caution, no moderation can poſſibly prevent.

This pretext, however, frivolous and abſurd as it was, Mr. E. ſuppoſes to have transformed the ſolicitude of France for peace, into a diſpoſition for war; "Before this period France was undoubtedly ſolicitous for peace." If France thought proper to aſſume a hoſtile diſpoſition without a ſufficient cauſe, ſurely Great Britain is not reſponſible for ſo unjuſtifiable a caprice; but certainly that ſolicitude for peace was of a very curious nature, which was manifeſted by acts which no conſiderate perſon can juſtify, and which common policy and common ſenſe required us to make either the inſtant foundations of war, as aggreſſions which admitted of no ſettlement, or the ſubject of negociation, on terms

terms conſiſtent with dignity and ſafety." Such acts accord much better with the acknowldgement of Briſſot, that "the determination was made to brave all Europe" than with that *ſolicitude for peace* which Mr. E. aſcribes to the Republic. But our author does not content himſelf with a bare aſſertion on this ſubject. In proof of the ſolicitude of France for peace, before the diſmiſſion of M. Chauvelin, he urges the following reaſons, which are moſtly taken from the *correſpondence*, and in which he gives full credit to explanations, on the ſincerity of which he had juſt before admitted that we could not rely.

Firſt, "She (France) had done none of the acts complained of in the correſpondence, until her independence had been threatened by a hoſtile confederacy." Without inquiring in this place whether the confederacy to which Mr. E. alludes was hoſtile or defenſive, I will be contented with the admiſſion, that France did "the acts complained of in the correſpondence" *after* the exiſtence of that confederacy: Acts which, according to the deſcription already given of them by Mr. E., no confederacy could juſtify, but which were of a nature themſelves to produce and require a confederacy, to ſecure the independence of other ſtates. At all events as Great Britain, inſtead of being a party to the confederacy, was expreſsly acknowledged by the convention itſelf to have obſerved "an exact neutrality in the war which broke out between France Auſtria,

Auſtria, and Pruſſia,*" the confederacy can in no reſpect furniſh an excuſe for thoſe acts as they related to this country.

Secondly, "She had prayed the mediation of Great Britain to diſſolve that confederacy and to avert its conſequences." I have already proved that Great Britain could not liſten to that prayer conſiſtently, either with the reſpect due from her to foreign powers, or with her own ſafety.

Thirdly, "She had diſavowed conqueſt and aggrandizement; and the only ſteps ſhe had taken inconſiſtent with that declaration, were invaſions of the territories of princes confederating or confederated againſt her." If ſhe had taken *any* ſteps inconſiſtent with that declaration, it is clear that the declaration was falſe. But ſhe had taken other ſteps of that nature than thoſe deſcribed by Mr. E.; for beſides that what he calls invaſions were really made in the ſpirit of conqueſt, (as the event has fully proved both in reſpect of the Low Countries, Nice,

* See the report from the Committee of General Defence to the National Convention, on the diſpoſition of the Britiſh Government towards France delivered by Briſſot, on the 12th of January, 1793, and quoted by Mr. Gifford in his letter to Mr. Erſkine, p. 19, 20. In that report it is acknowledged not only that Great Britain had obſerved an exact neutrality in the then ſubſiſting war with the Emperor and the king of Pruſſia; (an acknowledgment that completely repels all idea of her having interfered in promoting the confederacy) but that Mr. Pitt "at the beginning of December teſtified the ſtrongeſt deſire to avoid a war, and to procure from the French Miniſtry the proof of a ſimilar diſpoſition."

and

and Savoy), ſhe had annexed to her own dominions the diſtrict of Avignon and the Comtat Venaiſſin (both belonging to the Pope), before the formation of any confederacy was pretended; and ſhe had ſeized upon the territories of the Duke of Deux Ponts, who had ſeparated his cauſe from that of the reſt of Germany, and had actually acknowledged the French republic.

Laſtly, "She offered to reſpect the neutrality of Holland, and ſolemnly diſavowed every act or intention to diſturb the government of Great Britain."

I cannot find even in thoſe parts of the correſpondence which are quoted by Mr. E. any thing amounting to an offer to reſpect the neutrality of Holland. On the contrary the actual violation of that neutrality, by forcing the paſſage of the Scheldt (which had been complained of by Lord Grenville, and which, without actual reparation, would have rendered ſuch an offer of no value) was paſſed over in ſilence, and the avowed intention of reſerving the queſtion reſpecting the navigation of that river, until the indefinite period when the Low Countries ſhould be in the full enjoyment of liberty, was itſelf a violation both of the neutrality and the territory of the United Provinces.

As to the diſavowal of any act or intention to diſturb the government of Great Britain, the decree of fraternity and the reception of the deputies of our ſeditious clubs at the bar of the Convention, muſt

muſt ſurely render it impoſſible for any man in his ſenſes to be the dupe of ſuch a diſavowal.

Such are the proofs adduced by Mr. E. in ſupport of his propoſition that "France was ſolicitous for peace."

It muſt be acknowledged that the diſcuſſion has already produced a conſiderable effect. It has placed the ſubject on new grounds—The queſtion is no longer by what injuries or aggreſſions did Great Britain oblige France to declare war in order to obtain redreſs? no ſuch injuries or aggreſſions were even complained of, although a very detailed correſpondence took place between the Britiſh miniſters and the agents of the executive council of France, reſpecting the points in difference between the two countries.

It appears from the very evidence produced by Mr. E. that we have no *ſins of commiſſion* to anſwer for. But although that is amply ſufficient to juſtify the nation, it is not ſufficient to ſatisfy the refined delicacy of modern patriots; who, when their country is concerned are ever ready to diſcover *ſins of omiſſion*, which they make equally penal with acts of the moſt flagitious nature. Mr. E. in particular burns with ſo pure a flame of patriotiſm that to ſatisfy him his country, like Cæſar's wife, muſt not only be innocent but unſuſpected. But when it is conſidered how many foul ſlanderers ſhe finds amongſt her own children, ſuch an expectation muſt ſeem quite unreaſonable. The charge, however, is now reduced to ſuch narrow grounds, that

it does not relate to what we *have* done, but to what we have *not* done. I might very fairly decline an inveſtigation of this nature, and contend that if nothing really hoſtile and injurious can be proved againſt Great Britain, ſhe is entirely exculpated from the charge of aggreſſion in a war, in which hoſtilities were declared and commenced by France. But there is really no better foundation for the *negative* than for the *poſitive* charge.

There is abundant reaſon to conclude that it was abſolutely out of the power of this country, by any means whatever, to avert the war. It has already appeared from the *correſpondence* that France would not continue at peace with us, except on terms to which no Engliſhman has hitherto ventured to ſay we ſhould have acceded. We were expreſsly told that to purchaſe peace, we muſt be ſatisfied with explanations, which were notoriouſly inſincere; we muſt ceaſe to complain, while our cauſe for complaint remained in full force; and diſcontinue our preparations for defence, while the danger was faſt approaching to our very doors.

But although the language of France was ſo explicit as to leave us no other alternative, than to put ourſelves in a ſtate of preparation, for that war with which we were threatened, and which, ſoon afterwards, broke out, the gentlemen of the oppoſition have the modeſty to contend, that, if we had followed their advice, by entering into a more formal nego-

negociation with France, the war might have been prevented.

Thus Mr. E. attributes the exiſtence of the war to the rejection of the motion of Mr. Fox in the houſe of Commons "*That an humble Addreſs ſhould be preſented to his Majeſty, praying that he would be pleaſed to appoint a Miniſter to be ſent to Paris,* TO TREAT WITH THE PERSONS EXERCISING PROVISIONALLY THE FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE, *touching ſuch Points as might be in difference between his Majeſty and his Allies, and the French Nation.*" A motion which, among the objections to which it was liable, was inconſiſtent with the ſpirit of the Conſtitution, as it tended both to interfere with the undoubted Prerogative of the Crown, and to abſolve miniſters from that reſponſibility, which would have attached upon them, had they done what was propoſed as *their own act.* Suppoſing that the motion had been complied with, and that afterwards (which is not at all improbable) it had been diſcovered that the meaſure it recommended was the moſt diſgraceful and injurious that could poſſibly have been laid to the charge of any adminiſtration, and deſerving of the ſevereſt puniſhment that could be inflicted on the agents of the Crown, how could the Houſe of Commons have proſecuted miniſters for an act which itſelf had propoſed, and which it had ſolicited the Crown to adopt? Or, if it had made that act the ground of an impeachment, what anſwer could the managers of ſuch an impeach-

ment have furniſhed to the plea, that miniſters had acted upon the expreſs advice, and under the ſanction, of parliament?

But waving all objections to the propoſal in point of form, it was in ſubſtance rendered highly inexpedient, by the correſpondence which had taken place with M. Chauvelin. A peruſal of that correſpondence muſt convince every one, that to have ſent a miniſter to Paris could not poſſibly have produced any good, but muſt inevitably have been productive of much evil. The *extreme* ſolicitude for peace—the dread of a warfare with France—the ſacrifice of dignity and conſiſtency which would have characterized ſuch a meaſure, inſtead of rendering the French councils more moderate and pacific, muſt, in the nature of things, have inſpired them with increaſed inſolence and temerity, and have confirmed them in thoſe plans of encroachment, aggreſſion, and diſturbance, from which the correſpondence proves they were not at all diſpoſed to depart; while on the other hand, that national ſpirit which on our part had been ſo deeply wounded—which was rouſed to ſuch a pitch, as to afford our author a ſubject of the moſt pathetic lamentation—and to which we may, in a great meaſure attribute the victories and the conqueſts, which have ſince crowned the Britiſh arms—would have been fatally damped by a conſciouſneſs of having degraded our national character, by aſſuming a poſture of ſupplication, when our keeneſt reſentments were

were due for the menaces, inſults, and injuries, which had been heaped upon us.

It ſhould, however, in candour be acknowledged, that at the time when Mr. Fox's motion was brought forward, the correſpondence had not been communicated to parliament; a circumſtance which affords the only apparent excuſe, of which ſo extraordinary a propoſition was capable. But Mr. E. inſtead of availing himſelf of ſuch an excuſe for the unſeaſonable propoſition of his friend, argues as if that propoſition were in fact juſtified by the correſpondence, and he infers from Mr. Fox's ignorance of the latter, the wonderful ſagacity and penetration of that gentleman in propoſing a meaſure, which he would hardly have ventured to ſuggeſt, if the correſpondence had been before the Houſe. "At the time this motion was made, the correſpondence between Lord Grenville and M. Chauvelin, being ſtill kept back from the Houſe of Commons, Mr. Fox himſelf did not know the additional foundations he had for his propoſition. It reſted upon his own wiſe forecaſt at the time he made it." P. 65. I am very willing to allow Mr. Fox the full advantage of ſuch extraordinary proofs of his wiſe forecaſt.

But even an ignorance of the correſpondence with M. Chauvelin affords no ſolid excuſe for the motion made by Mr. Fox. That motion was, upon the face of it, an inſult on the underſtanding, as well as on the feelings of thoſe to whoſe conſideration it was addreſſed.

addreſſed. It contained an expreſs acknowledgment that there was no Government eſtabliſhed in France; for its profeſſed object was to enter into a treaty with the perſons who exerciſed *proviſionally* the powers of Government in that Country—and although the conduct of thoſe perſons had given cauſe for offence and alarm to other States, beyond any examples in the hiſtory of civilized nations, it was propoſed to a Britiſh Parliament, to adviſe a Britiſh King, to recognize their authority, and thereby to ſanction the principles and the ſyſtem they had adopted with regard to foreign Powers.

It is a curious circumſtance that on the *very day* on which Mr. Fox made the above motion, Dec, 15, the national Convention paſſed the Decree which reduced the Decree of Fraternity of Nov. 19, into a methodical ſyſtem, and preſcribed the mode by which it ſhould be carried into execution. By that Decree the Convention declared, that *the French nation would treat as enemies the people who, refuſing or renouncing liberty and equality, ſhould be deſirous of preſerving their prince and privileged caſts, or of entering into an accommodation with them.* Although Mr. Fox could not anticipate this decree, yet it proves that his motion afforded no very ſtriking ſpecimen of his " wiſe forecaſt."—I rather think that, ſuppoſing his motion to be a ſincere effort of patriotiſm, inſtead of a manœuvre of Party, it will be a laſting monument of his want of diſcernment and political ſagacity.

In ſupport of the ſyſtem recommended by Mr. Fox

Fox of entering into a formal negociation with the French Republic, Mr. E. aſſumes an hypotheſis of a very ſingular nature,—namely, that it was in the power of Great Britain to direct and controul the ſtorm which had burſt forth ſo ſuddenly, which had already produced ſuch dreadful ravages, and which menaced all Europe with deſolation; that an opportunity was afforded us, not merely of preventing the flames of war from extending to ourſelves, but of extinguiſhing them intirely, and even of reſtoring quiet and order to France itſelf. "This poſture of things (ſays Mr. E.) if not wholly ſatisfactory, was certainly a poſture for amicable and commanding ſettlement," and he afterwards aſſerts that we might have been the arbiters "of the repoſe of Europe," and have ſpoken with "a commanding voice to France, while her factions were tearing one another to pieces."

To eſtabliſh an hypotheſis ſo obviouſly inconſiſtent with the events which diſtinguiſhed the period in queſtion, we might naturally have expected Mr. E. to bring forward circumſtances with which the public was hitherto unacquainted, and which would have proved, that there were ſome ſecret ſprings at our command, by which we could have given the political machine whatever direction we though tproper.

But inſtead of throwing any new light upon the ſubject, he merely recapitulates (with additional miſrepreſentation indeed) thoſe partial references to the

the Correſpondence with M. Chauvelin, by which he had before attempted to ſupport his aſſertion, that France was ſolicitous for peace. He ſays "When this propoſition was made, THE ANNEXATION OF BELGIUM, now the main obſtacle to peace, was diſavowed by France; and as ſhe was a ſuitor to us, beſides, for our mediation with the Emperor, it is eaſy to ſee how ſure the road was to its return to its former government. The ſecurity of Holland, whilſt ſhe preſerved her neutrality, was profeſſed, and in a manner guarantied. The ancient limits of France were propoſed as her dominion, and implicit reſpect was manifeſted to the independence and conſtitution of other nations." P. 44.

It cannot eſcape obſervation how Mr. E. riſes in every conſtruction he makes of the Correſpondence, until at length he renders it ſubſervient to the purpoſe of proving that Great Britain might have been "the arbitreſs of Europe."

Thus France, who, a few pages ſince, was repreſented as *praying the mediation of Great Britain to diſſolve a hoſtile confederacy with which ſhe was threatened*, is here become *a ſuitor for our mediation with the Emperor*. I have already had occaſion to ſhew that this could not by any implication be conſtrued as the object of the interpoſition which was requeſted from us. But, at all events, as the requeſt alluded to was made in the *month of July*, in the name of the *King*, it was intirely inapplicable to the propoſition of Mr. Fox *in the month of December*, to negociate

negociate *with the republic.* By a ſimilar climax, France, who in page 41, merely *offered to reſpect the neutrality of Holland,* has in page 44, *in a manner guaranteed her ſecurity.*" But a ſtill greater flight is diſplayed in the information that " the ancient limits of France were propoſed as her dominion:" for although France had in general terms profeſſed to renounce every conqueſt, (a profeſſion which has been ſhewn to be at direct variance with her practice even in the caſe of the Netherlands, to which it was chiefly meant to apply) yet as ſhe never hinted in the moſt diſtant manner at any intention to reſtore Avignon and Venaiſſin to the Pope, or Savoy and Nice to the King of Sardinia, Mr. E. has proved nothing but the force of his own imagination by aſſerting *that her ancient limits were propoſed as her dominion.* " As to the implicit reſpect manifeſted by France to the independence and conſtitutions of other nations," I can only ſuppoſe ſuch a deſcription to be intended as a pleaſant and ironical conſtruction of the decree of Fraternity, " which no conſiderate perſon can juſtify "

There is, however one argument to which I am confident no writer but Mr. E. would have ventured to reſort, in order to prove that the mediation of Great Britain might have been efficaciouſly exerted to preſerve or to reſtore the peace of Europe. The obvious inſincerity and the precarious authority of the French rulers (which had before been acknowledged by Mr. E.) preſented an inſuperable bar to

all confidence in their profeſſions and aſſurances, and of courſe afforded the ſtrongeſt poſſible reaſon againſt our following up the correſpondence with M. Chauvelin with a formal embaſſy to Paris. But Mr. E. accuſtomed in the courſe of his profeſſional occupations, not merely to ſurmount the greateſt difficulties, and to prevail over the cleareſt evidence, but by his wonderful ingenuity to convert even obſtacles themſelves into the means of ſucceſs, does not ſcruple to urge the above conſiderations as grounds for confidence and as motives for negociation. I will quote his own words, as I could not otherwiſe expect to gain credit for having conſtrued them fairly! "The powers that then exiſted in France, however inſincere, or however unſettled in their authority, having proffered the continuance of peace, and having aſked our mediation with the Emperor upon the renunciation of conqueſt and aggrandizement, and upon the disavowal of interference with the governments of other countries, *we ſhould have taken them at their words.* The poſſible inſincerity of the offer, or the weakneſs of perhaps an expiring faction to give it efficacy, would have only added to the predominancy of Great Britain," p. 47. Whatever we may think of the juſtneſs of ſuch reaſoning, it is difficult to withhold our admiration from the novelty by which it is diſtinguiſhed. If originality be a characteriſtic of genius, there never was a ſtronger proof of genius than is diſplayed in the obſervation

obſervation that the inſincerity of an offer, would, if that offer had been accepted, have added to the predominancy of the party accepting it—To my poor underſtanding this ſeems to be preciſely the ſame thing as it would be to maintain, that to ſuffer ourſelves to be deluded by artifice and cajoled by impoſture is the ready way to defeat the machinations of the deceiver; and that the moſt certain mode of avoiding a ſnare is to throw ourſelves into the midſt of it. Mr. E. is, I apprehend, the firſt writer who ever repreſented perfidy as a ground for confidence, and after him I conceive no one will venture to aſſert, that becauſe the powers in France were inſincere in their propoſals, and unſettled in their authority, "*we ſhould have taken them at their words.*"

It ſhould not however be forgotten that the offer, inſincere as it was, which according to Mr. E. was made to Great Britain of becoming "the arbitreſs of the repoſe of Europe," inſtead of extending even in *terms*, to "a mediation with the Emperor upon the renunciation of conqueſt and aggrandizement" went no further than a requeſt to prevent the Emperor from obtaining any aſſiſtance in the war in which he was engaged; if, therefore, that offer had been accepted, it would have had no other tendency than to enable France to aggrandize herſelf by the conqueſt of that prince's dominions, and thereby to conſtitute *herſelf* inſtead of *us* the *arbitreſs of Europe.*

As a further proof that we loſt the faireſt poſſible opportunity, not only of preſerving ourſelves from the calamities of war, but of reſtoring peace to Europe, Mr. E. vouches the unſettled and diſtracted ſtate of France, which he contends would have enabled us to acquire a commanding influence over that country. "With what a commanding voice might ſhe (Great Britain) have ſpoken to France whilſt her factions were tearing one another to pieces, and her Government could ſcarcely ſupport itſelf during peace," p. 46 and again p. 48. "amidſt the tyrannies of quick ſucceeding factions the united force of this country and her allies, exerted upon ſuch a ſound principle, and thrown into the ſcale of any party in France that might have been willing to preſerve the peace, would have given to that party an over ruling aſcendancy." Am I really awake, or is my fancy roving in the romantic regions of an incoherent viſion, when it preſents to my contemplation ſuch ſentiments as proceeding from one of that party, which, during the whole war, has been raiſing an inceſſant outcry againſt all manner of interference in the domeſtic affairs of France—which has contended ſo ſtrenuouſly that the people of that country ſhould be left to ſettle their own concerns without any interference on the part of Foreign powers—and which has made it one of its moſt weighty charges againſt miniſters, that they were guilty of ſuch interference? Is it

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ſo diſtinguiſhed a member of that party as Mr. E. who aſſerts, that we ſhould have reſorted to intrigue in order to turn the ſcale of contending factions, and to have given an over-ruling aſcendancy to thoſe whoſe wiſhes were moſt congenial with our own? Before the war the Britiſh Government obſerved the ſtricteſt neutrality, and cautiouſly abſtained from all interference in the affairs of France, and ſince the exiſtence of the war, when ſuch interference became not only a right, but a matter of policy, and, indeed, of duty, that Government has only interfered (and I am ſorry to ſay too ſeldom and too ſcrupulouſly) in favour of the Royaliſt party, which alone could be ſuſpected of a deſire for peace, and which alone was friendly to the civil and religious eſtabliſhments of Europe, for the preſervation of which we were obliged to draw the ſword. But what a clamour has been raiſed againſt ſuch interference by thoſe very perſons, whoſe oracle, Mr. E., now declares, that *previouſly* to our being engaged in the war, we ſhould have ſpoken with a commanding voice to the factions of France, and by throwing our weight into the vibrating ſcale, have given to ſome one or other of thoſe factions an over-ruling aſcendancy!

Thus are we blamed, not only for having interfered when our interference was proper and neceſſary, but for not having interfered when alone it could, in any reſpect, have been unjuſtifiable ſo to do.

do *. And the tender ſolicitude which the Gentlemen of the Oppoſition have manifeſted, on ſo many occaſions, for the independence of France, is of ſo very ſingular and delicate a nature, that though it would not allow of the ſmalleſt interpoſition in favour of the lawful Government, *during a war* with the enemies of that Government, it would preſent no obſtacle whatever to an interference *in time of peace*, in order to give an over-ruling aſcendancy to faction.

It muſt, however, be acknowledged that there is ſome generoſity in Mr. E's views on this ſubject. He would not have invaded the independence of France by the exertion of foreign influence, and then have left her expoſed defenceleſs to her enemies. He would have exerciſed a *protecting* as well as a "commanding" influence in her favour. It is but juſtice to quote what he ſays on this ſubject. "If inſtead of inciting and encouraging the Princes of Europe to invade France, for the purpoſe of diſſolving her eſtabliſhment, we had become her ſecurity againſt their invaſions, whilſt her revolution ſhould be confined to her own limits and ſubjects, it is not poſſible to believe, upon any reaſoning from human life or experience, that Europe could have

* I am far from meaning to ſuggeſt a doubt that our interference would have been juſtifiable before the war. On the contrary, ſuch were the original nature, tendency, and conduct of the Revolution with regard to other States, and ſuch was the univerſal danger with which it was fraught, that it would have been no leſs *juſtifiable* than *fortunate*, if all Europe had riſen at once to cruſh the monſter in its birth.

now

now been in its preſent condition." I have already ſhown that the charge which is here again dragged in of *inciting and encouraging the Princes of Europe to invade France* is not only unſupported by proof, but repelled by the ſtrongeſt and moſt indiſputable evidence—the requeſt of M. Chauvelin to the Britiſh Court to ſtop the progreſs of the confederacy; and the expreſs declaration of the Committee of General Defence, whoſe reporter, Briſſot, acknowledged that "the Cabinet of St. James did in fact obſerve a ſtrict neutrality till the immortal day of the 10th of Auguſt*." But laying that conſideration out of the caſe, where would have been the policy or the juſtice of our interfering for the purpoſe of ſecuring France againſt invaſions? What were the obligations that France had conferred upon us, what were the benefits we had to expect from her, that ſhould have induced us to any interference in her favour, particularly ſuch a one as would have been evidently inconſiſtent with our neutrality? She had attacked the Emperor, ſhe had invaded his dominions (tho' at firſt unſucceſsfully) the very moment ſhe had declared war againſt him: but all this is very well. Mr. E. does not pretend that we had any buſineſs to interfere to prevent *ſuch* invaſion, although the

* It is tireſome to refer ſo often to the ſame facts, but the frequent repetition of the ſame aſſertions renders it neceſſary as frequently to ſuggeſt, that they are not only altogether unſupported by proof, but abſolutely contradicted by the moſt poſitive and indubitable evidence.

Low

Low Countries have ever been conſidered as a bulwark to Great Britain againſt the power of France. Nay, when ſhe had afterwards obtained poſſeſſion of that country, and was menacing Holland, our near Ally, ſtill Mr. E. contends that it was no concern of ours. But when the Emperor, in his own defence, was preparing to retaliate, and, in conjunction with the King of Pruſſia, to invade France, then it ſeems that our interference became not only juſtifiable but neceſſary, and we ſhould have been *her ſecurity* againſt the invaſion of thoſe Princes.—Mr. E. has neglected to inform us how we could have juſtified ſo groſs a partiality in favour of one Power, which, according to his own ſtatement, far from poſſeſſing any claim on our gratitude, had merited our utmoſt indignation, againſt *other* Powers which had given us no cauſe for offence, one of which was our Ally, and whoſe intereſts were preciſely the ſame as our own. But it is particularly remarkable, that an advocate for peace ſhould recommend a line of conduct, which would have been a direct breach of our neutrality, and have expoſed us to a war with Powers, with whom we had no kind of difference whatever.

There ſeems to be no other way of ſolving theſe difficulties than by ſuppoſing that, in Mr. E's opinion, all conſiderations of juſtice and policy were ſuperſeded in favour of the new French ſyſtem of liberty and equality, and that war itſelf would loſe its ſting, if entered into in behalf of rebels and traitors

tors. Mr. E. attempts, indeed, to qualify the *new political* ſyſtem of making Great Britain the guardian of France, by confining its operations to the time when the revolution of the latter was, " confined to her own limits and ſubjects." But that time unfortunately never exiſted; for the Revolution was, from the firſt, univerſal in its principle and tendency, as I ſhall hereafter ſhew—and it had, in *fact* as well as in *principle*, paſſed the limits preſcribed by Mr. E. before our protection was wanted, for the invaſion of the Netherlands preceded that of France.

The generoſity of Mr. E. for revolutionary France was not, however, to be ſatisfied even by our becoming her ſecurity againſt invaſions; this he calls merely " a *paſſive* and *preventive* influence." His friendſhip and compaſſion demand nothing leſs than that Great Britain ſhould have taken the Revolution itſelf under her immediate protection. " If," ſays he, " inſtead of this *paſſive and merely preventive* influence, Great Britain, in the true ſpirit, and in the full ripeneſs of civil wiſdom, had felt a juſt and generous compaſſion for the ſufferings of the French people; if ſeeing them thirſting for liberty, but ignorant of the thouſand difficulties which attend its eſtabliſhment, ſhe had taken a friendly, yet a commanding part; if, not contenting herſelf with a cold acknowledgment of the King of the French, by the inſidious forms of an embaſſy, ſhe had become the *faithful, but, at the ſame time, the cautious protector of the firſt Revolution*;

if ſhe had put the reins upon Europe to prevent its interference, inſtead of countenancing the confederacy of its powers againſt it, the unhappy Louis might now have been reigning, according to his oath, over a free people ; the horrors of ſucceeding revolutions might have been averted, and much of that rival jealouſy, the ſcourge of both nations for ſo many centuries, might, without affecting the balances of our mixed Conſtitution, have been gradually and happily extinguiſhed."

Leaving it to Mr. E. to reconcile this ſympathetic effuſion with the known ſyſtem of himſelf and his party, that it was a kind of ſacrilege to interfere in any reſpect with the French Revolution, I muſt confeſs that it is a myſtery far beyond my powers of comprehenſion, that a man of his loyalty, humanity, and religion—of his attachment to order—of his reſpect for rank and property—of his reverence for the laws—ſhould have been diſpoſed to protect a Revolution, the principle, and the object of which were to eradicate every one of thoſe ſentiments from the human breaſt: A Revolution which, in its earlieſt ſtage, dragged forth from his palace the lawful Sovereign of France, a pious and beneficent Prince, whoſe wiſhes all centered in the happineſs of his people, and led him, in worſe than ſavage proceſſion—loaded with inſult and mockery—preceded by the bleeding heads of his murdered guards—to be incarcerated in his capital, and afterwards brought to a public and ignominious execution—A Revolution which commenced

menced its career by maſſacre and confiſcation—by a violation of all the rules and rites of the national faith—by a perſecution of the Miniſters of religion—by an annihilation of all diſtinctions of rank—by a ſubverſion of the eſtabliſhed order, and of the lawful Government—and by an open and ſtudied contempt of all laws human and divine! Such was the Revolution of which Mr. E. contends that we ſhould have been the faithful protectors! Such was its original character—ſuch was the diſpoſition it diſplayed, ſuch the conduct it manifeſted, long before it could be ſuppoſed to want any protection; nay, when our proffered protection would have been conſidered as an inſult.

Mr. E. admits that we could not, without ſome danger, have meddled with ſuch a Revolution, even for the generous purpoſe of affording it protection. For he acknowledges that *caution* would have been neceſſary while we acted as its protectors. But as well might he adviſe us *cautiouſly* to take a viper to our boſom. And if we had, with all the caution in our power, accorded to the protection claimed for the Revolution by its advocate Mr. E. inſtead of ſeeing the unhappy Louis reigning over a free people, it is more than probable that we ſhould have had to bewail the *judicial murder* of our own Sovereign, and that our own religion, laws, property, and ſecurity, would have been involved in a fate ſimilar to that, which France exhibited, by way of warning, to all States, which

ſhould have the folly and the wickedneſs to patronize her crimes, or to follow her example.

Before I quit this ſubject, I muſt beg leave to enter my proteſt againſt the doctrine, obliquely inculcated by our author in the paſſage laſt quoted, that *it would be happy if we could extinguiſh the old rival jealouſy between England and France.* Inſtead of conſidering the extinction of that jealouſy as a deſirable event, I think it would be one of the greateſt national misfortunes that could befall this country. A jealouſy of France, which is a kind of native ſentiment in Engliſh breaſts, has been one of the principal cauſes of our proſperity. At this time it is eſſential to our ſecurity; and I can hardly conceive a more uſeful effort of patriotiſm than to cultivate ſuch a ſentiment. Nay, I go further, and do not heſitate to ſay that a principle of virtue, as well as a ſenſe of ſafety, requires us to entertain and encourage an *utter antipathy* to France *as a nation*, until ſhe ſhall have renounced her accurſed Revolution, returned to the paths of ſocial order, and ſubmitted to the claims of lawful Government. I know how to reconcile theſe ſentiments with an active humanity in favour of the unfortunate individuals of that country whom a moſt cruel perſecution has thrown upon our hands, and who have a claim to our aſſiſtance, not merely as men, but as the victims of a ſyſtem not more hoſtile (though *hitherto* more deſtructive) to them than to ourſelves*.

that

* I regret exceedingly that the ingenious author of the "Purſuits

Mr. E. ſoon afterwards reſorts to another proof of a very remarkable nature, in ſupport of his hypotheſis, that we had a fair and advantageous opportunity to interfere with the parties in France for the preſervation of peace. He obſerves, that "the ſhare which even Briſſot had in the commencement of hoſtilities, amidſt all the provocations to them, was the principal cauſe of his deſtruction, and the root of Robeſpierre's popularity, which enabled him to become the tyrant of France." I am glad to find that Mr. E. is apprized of the ſhare which that demagogue (Briſſot) had in the commencement of hoſtilities, and alſo of the important fact, that it was made a ſubſtantive charge upon his trial, that *he had been the means of involving France in a war with England.* The ſame obſervation might have been applied to Le Brun, who was tried on a ſimilar charge. The above circumſtance reſpecting Briſſot, which Mr. E. ſtates candidly and ſtrongly, by repreſenting it as "the principal cauſe of his deſtruction," would, I ſhould think, have convinced the honourable author, not only of the injuſtice of charging this country with the guilt of aggreſſion, but alſo of the perfidy which dictated all thoſe "*profeſſions*," "*conceſſions*," and "*explanations*," on which he lays ſo much ſtreſs, and which were iſſued at the time when the main

ſuits of Literature" (a work, calculated in general, for the greateſt utility) inſtead of recognizing the compatibility of theſe ſentiments, ſhould have been frightened out of his humanity by the extraordinary apprehenſion, that in theſe days of religious apathy, a collection of fugitive French Prieſts, ſtarving in a ſtrange land upon a ſhilling a day, ſhould convert the Britiſh people to the Roman Catholic faith.

ſpring of the French Government was that *very* Briſſot, whoſe "*ſhare in the commencement of hoſtilities was the principal cauſe of his deſtruction.* If Mr. E. had duly attended to this circumſtance, which is of inexpreſſible importance in an inveſtigation into the cauſes of the war, I conceive that moſt of what he has written on this ſubject would have been omitted; and ſhould he loſe ſight of it in any future part of the diſcuſſion, I will take the liberty of recalling it to his recollection. At preſent I ſhall content myſelf with obſerving, that it by no means warrants the concluſion which he attempts to deduce from it—*that peace was at our command.* For the charge againſt Briſſot upon his trial was confined to his having involved France in a war with *England.* He was not accuſed of having excited *that* againſt *the Emperor*, although, in addition to other proofs, there was in exiſtence the evidence of his own declarations, that he had been principally inſtrumental in producing that war, in order to complete the deſtruction of the French Monarchy *.

From this diſtinction it is fair to infer, not that there was in any party a real diſpoſition for peace, but that, while war with the Emperor had produced its deſired effect, the ſuppreſſion of royalty in France, it was found that the war with England had only removed to a greater diſtance the objects for which it was under-

* "We made him declare war in order to put him to the teſt. But for the war France had not been a Republic. It was the abolition of Royalty I had in view, in cauſing war to be declared."

taken

dertaken—that it had fruſtrated thoſe hopes of an Engliſh Revolution which the miſſionaries of ſedition deputed from this country, the Froſts and the Barlows, had inſpired—that it had diſappointed the friendly expectation of ſending addreſſes of congratulations to A NATIONAL CONVENTION OF ENGLAND, and, inſtead of promoting, had actually checked the progreſs of Engliſh ſedition, by depriving it *too ſoon* of the foſtering influence of French Fraternity—that it had alſo been the means of reſcuing Holland from the moſt imminent danger, and of enabling the Emperor *(pro hac vice)* to recover the Netherlands—and that, upon the whole, it had been found extremely adverſe both to the ambitious and the revolutionary projects of France. No wonder, then, that it ſhould have become ſo unpopular, as to be made the ſubject of a criminal charge againſt Briſſot. But to infer from that circumſtance that it was unpopular in its commencement, or that, by condeſcending to intrigue with French factions, we could have reſtrained Briſſot from incurring that charge, is a ſtretch of reaſoning which can ſurely impoſe on none but ſuch as are determined to be deceived.

Mr. E. ſeems, indeed, to be aware of the extreme difficulty which would have attended any endeavours on our part to controul the furious elements which had been let looſe in France, and which menaced every civilized ſtate with deſolation, and he ſtates his apprehenſions

henſions in that reſpect in terms remarkably appoſite and expreſſive. "But ſuppoſing the practicability, or the effects of ſuch a ſyſtem in Great Britain, to be altogether falſe and viſionary; admitting, for the ſake of argument, that the agitation of the French revolution was too violent, and its principles, from the very beginning, too diſorganizing and miſchievous for regular governments, under any reſtraints, to have intermeddled with, or even acknowledged, nothing would follow from the admiſſion in favour of the war;" and ſoon afterwards; "France was at that time (according to the authors of the war) torn to pieces by the moſt furious and nearly balanced factions, which made her government a mere phantom, competent only to evil, and incapable of good. Be it ſo."

I was at a loſs to conceive how Mr. E., with all his ingenuity, could ſupport the aſſertion that nothing would follow from admiſſions like theſe *in favour of the war.* For if "the agitation of France and its furious factions was too violent" to allow even our "*commanding voice*" to be heard—if the principles of the Revolution were, "*from the very beginning, too diſorganizing and miſchievous for regular governments, under any reſtraints, to have intermeddled with, or even acknowledged*" (and this I contended to have been preciſely the caſe), it ſeems to me to follow that we had no means in our power to prevent hoſtilities; and that it is equally abſurd and uncandid to accuſe us of having neglected any thing for that purpoſe, ſince nothing done by us could

could have had any effect, when put in competition with ſuch powerful and indeed irreſiſtible cauſes of war.

Mr. E., however, is never at a loſs for expedients—and the one he ſuggeſts on this occaſion is neither more nor leſs than—NEUTRALITY. How ſuch a remedy was to produce effects which were out of the reach of our *all commanding influence*, it is difficult to imagine—But, ſuch as it is, we are fully intitled to the merit of having made the experiment. We waited with a patience more than human, until France thought proper to declare war and to make actual hoſtilities ſucceed to "aggreſſions" which we have ever been cenſured for not making the "*inſtant foundations of war, as aggreſſions which admitted of ſettlement*;" and I have ſhewn that we have the teſtimony of the Convention itſelf to prove, that we obſerved "an exact neutrality in the war which broke out between France, Auſtria and Pruſſia."

Mr. E. does not ſeem to have ſatisfied his own mind reſpecting the ſpecies of neutrality which was moſt likely to be efficacious, in preventing a war. For he mentions two kinds, without informing us to which the preference ought to have been given. In one place he ſays that "a ſincere but armed neutrality on the part of Europe would have been the ſureſt, and the moſt obvious cauſe for diſſolving the new Republic, or, at all events, of recalling it the ſooneſt to ſome ſocial order of things." —And afterwards he declares that we ſhould have obſerved the moſt perfect and even the moſt ſoothing neutrality." For want of Mr. E's aſſiſtance in

chooſing between remedies of ſo different a nature, we ſhould be much embarraſſed in making the ſelection, if it were not exceedingly clear, that neither the one nor the other was applicable to the caſe. An *armed* neutrality was, indeed, moſt compatible with our own ſafety, but it was at the ſame time much too rough an expedient to accord with the delicate and irritable nature of the French revolution. This was manifeſt, as well previouſly to the war with the Emperor, as to that in which we were afterwards obliged to engage. For that Prince was required to reduce his force in the Netherlands, although that force did not exceed its ordinary peace eſtabliſhment; and it has already been noticed that the reſult of the correſpondence between Lord Grenville and M. Chauvelin was an intimation on the part of the latter, that if we did did not diſcontinue our naval preparations, France would prepare for war. But while an *armed* neutrality was thus totally out of our power, a *ſoothing* neutrality would have been no leſs inefficacious. He muſt really have great faith in political quackery, who can believe that this milk and water remedy could have counteracted the "*violent agitation of the French Revolution,*" the "*diſorganizing and miſchievous nature of its principles,*" and "*the fury of factions which made the Government competent only to evil and incapable of good.*"

It muſt, however, be admitted that, although Mr. E. perplexes us with a choice of difficulties, he ſhews the fertility of his own mind, by ſuggeſting ſuch a variety of expedients. In the courſe of a very

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few pages he preſents his readers with no leſs than three different ſyſtems; the *commanding* ſyſtem, or that of interference—the ſyſtem of *armed neutrality*—and the *ſoothing* ſyſtem. If, as a writer, he diſplays ſuch a command of means, as a miniſter, his reſources muſt have been inexhauſtible. But in the latter character he would have found it neceſſary to cultivate one quality which in the former he ſeems to think ſuperfluous—I mean *deciſion*. His deficiency, however, in that reſpect may perhaps be attributed to his ſenſe of the extreme embarraſſments which diſtinguiſhed the affairs of Europe, at the period to which he alludes, and which rendered it impoſſible for him to determine what line of conduct it would have been moſt wiſe for this country to adopt. In one reſpect only he ſeemsto have made up his mind and to have formed a decided opinion—namely, that the Britiſh Government ought to be cenſured for every thing it did, and for every thing it omitted to do.

I come now to a topic on which the party adverſe to Government ſeem chiefly to rely, in order to promote a belief that this country is chargeable with the guilt of aggreſſion. It is difficult to find a ſpeech or a publication on the ſide of oppoſition that does not more or leſs rely on the topic I allude to; and Mr. E. calls forth the whole energy of his mind, and employs all the richneſs of his fancy, in order to preſent it to his readers in a ſpecious and impreſſive manner. It readily acquires conſiderable

weight,

weight, becauſe it is founded on indiſputable facts. But thoſe who are moſt expert in ſophiſtry, take care to build their reaſonings on poſitions that cannot be diſputed; and having, by ſuch means, gained the confidence of thoſe they addreſs, they eaſily ſucceed in impoſing the moſt fallacious inferences on the inattention and credulity of mankind. I am about to expoſe a remarkable inſtance of this inſidious mode of reaſoning.

Mr. E. ſays, "Heterogeneous bodies having no principle of union capable of conſtituting a ſubſtance, and which, if left to themſelves, would ſeparate and diſperſe, may be bound together by external force, and paſſed through the furnace until they incorporate*. This was preciſely the caſe with France. She was rent aſunder by the internal diviſions of her own people, but cemented again by the conſpiracy of Kings. Her great leaders were banded againſt each other, not only from the moſt deadly hate and luſt of dominion, but ſeparated by the moſt extravagant zeal for contradictory theories of Government, whilſt the people were toſſed to and fro, the alternate victims of repugnant and deſolating changes. In this unexampled criſis, per-

* I humbly conceive that there is ſome chemical inaccuracy in the figure here exhibited by Mr. E. How bodies which have no principle of union, capable of conſtituting a ſubſtance, can be made to coaleſce by external force, I am quite at a loſs to conceive?

ſons,

ſons, capable upon other occaſions of judging with accuracy and acuteneſs, were looking by every mail for the utter deſtruction of the French Government; but they had loſt the clue to the myſtery, or rather to the plain principle which preſerved it: the Britiſh Miniſter was the guardian angel that hovered over France, and the ſole creator of her ominous and portentous ſtrength. The neceſſity of reſiſting, by combination, the external war with which he ſurrounded her, counteracted the ſeparation ariſing from her internal commotions. It raiſed up a proud, warlike, and ſuperior ſpirit, at the call of national independence, too ſtrong for the inferior ſpirits, whoſe enchantments were diſſolving her as a nation, and by the operation of this ſimpleſt principles of unalterable and univerſal nature, rather than from any thing peculiar in the characteriſtic of Frenchmen, conſolidated her mighty Republic, and exhibited a career of conqueſt and glory unequalled in the annals of mankind."

As this paſſage contains matter which will lead to a clear and ſatisfactory explanation of the cauſes of the War, I ſhall examine it with attention, and point out how far the reaſoning it contains is juſt, and in what reſpects that reaſoning is *erroneous*.

But before I proceed to ſuch an examination I muſt be indulged with one reflection ſuggeſted by the character aſcribed by Mr. E. to the Britiſh Miniſter. He was it ſeems no leſs than the *guardian Angel* of France. By what acts of beneficence did he merit ſuch an appellation? By ſurrounding

France

France with an "*external War*," whereby "*he counteracted the ſeparation ariſing from her internal commotions*," and prevented the "*utter deſtruction of her Government.*" I deny that Mr. Pitt has any ſuch claims on French gratitude, becauſe he was in no reſpect the cauſe of the War which produced ſuch effects. But it is plain, from Mr. E's. own confeſſion, that to confer ſuch benefits on a country, though by the rough and violent proceſs of foreign war, gives a juſt title to the appellation of "*Guardian Angel.*" And if this country has, as I verily believe, contrary to the intentions of thoſe who ſought and produced the war, been ſaved by it from civil Commotions: If it has by ſuch means preſerved its Government, and its Conſtitution from that "*utter deſtruction*" to which it would have been expoſed by a pacific intercourſe with France, and the united efforts and co-operation of its Jacobin foes within and without the kingdom; then is the war which has produced ſuch effects, to be hailed as a bleſſing, and to be attributed to the protecting influence of the "*Guardian Angel*" of the country?

A queſtion of ſome importance preſents itſelf on this occaſion. If the benefits derived by a Country from internal union, although that union be produced by war, be ſo conſiderable——if it be ſo great a happineſs to eſcape a ſeparation ariſing from internal commotions, and to avoid the deſtruction of even a "*phantom*" of Government, that the perſon to whom a nation is indebted for ſuch advantages, deſerves the title of a *Guardian Angel*,

Angel, what appellation belongs to them who ſeek to excite broils and contentions in a ſtate, and that at a time when it is involved in a difficult and dangerous war—when its *lawful* and *ancient* Government is expoſed to deſtruction—and when its very exiſtence ſeems to depend upon union and co-operation? I will leave it to Mr. E. to find the proper appellation for perſons who act in ſuch a manner; not chooſing to ſtain my page with language properly deſcriptive of ſuch characters and ſuch conduct.

But to proceed to an examination of the paſſage above quoted. Nothing can be more juſt than the deſcription contained in that paſſage of the internal ſtate of France previouſly to the war: a deſcription which exhibits a beautiful and ſtriking picture of Anarchy. That miſerable country was, indeed, in a ſituation preciſely ſimilar, as Mr. E. ſays, to that of bodies which " if left to themſelves would ſeparate and diſperſe," but which " may be bound together by external force." She was " rent aſunder by internal diviſions"—Her leaders were " banded againſt each other by the moſt deadly hate, and by the luſt of dominion," they were alſo " ſeparated by the moſt contradictory theories of Government; and her People " were toſſed to and fro, the alternate victims of repugnant and deſolating changes." It is likewiſe undoubtedly true, that nothing but foreign war could unite a people ſo torn and diſtracted, or " counteract the ſeparation ariſing from their internal commotions." I alſo admit that the war did in point of fact furniſh a prin-

a principle of internal union and create *the ominous and portentous ſtrength of France*; and I will beg leave to add, what is alone wanting to make the deſcription complete, but which Mr. E. happened to overlook, that the war, by furniſhing a pretext for calling forth the national force in a manner altogether unprecedented, enabled the ruling powers, which ſucceeded each other in the direction of that force, to eſtabliſh a ſyſtem of terror, which converted, what Mr. E. admits to have been before but "a phantom of Government," into the moſt oppreſſive and formidable deſpotiſm that ever exiſted in any country.

Having thus agreed with Mr. E. in his leading facts, (a pleaſure which I own I never expected) I am ſo unfortunate as to differ altogether with him in his concluſions from thoſe facts. He ſays, "the Britiſh Miniſter was the Guardian Angel which hovered over France and the ſole creator of her ominous and portentous ſtrength," and that he (the Britiſh Miniſter) "by ſurrounding her with external war, counteracted the ſeparation ariſing from her internal commotions." I am at a loſs to diſcover the chain of reaſoning by which Mr. E. can connect ſuch a concluſion with the above premiſes. The facts and the inference ſeem to me, not only to be ſeparated by an immenſe chaſm, but to lie in quite oppoſite directions. I cannot ſee how it follows, that becauſe the war was neceſſary to compreſs France into a ſtate of political union, and becauſe in fact it did create *her ominous aud portentous ſtrength*, that therefore the war is to be aſcribed to the Britiſh Miniſter. Ac-

cording

cording to my poor underſtanding ſuch facts ſeem to lead to a directly oppoſite concluſion. If nothing but war could prevent "*the utter deſtruction of the French Government,*" common ſenſe would, I conceive, induce every one to infer, that the war is to be attributed to the French Government, which had ſo obvious an intereſt in promoting it, rather than to the Engliſh Miniſter, who had no ſuch intereſt.

This preſumption appears to me to be ſo obvious and ſo ſtrong, that nothing can repel it, but the moſt direct, clear, and incontrovertible evidence to the contrary. No ſuch evidence has Mr. E. attempted to adduce; but inſtead of ſupporting the charge againſt the Britiſh Miniſter by proof—inſtead of even bringing forward that charge in a form in which it could be met—he endeavours to ſmuggle it under the garb of declamation, and to make it paſs, in the diſguiſe of a metaphor, as a deduction from premiſes which by no means warrant ſuch a concluſion.

Without recapitulating in this place the indiſputable evidence which has been ſo frequently advanced, and as conſtantly evaded, and which proves, in the moſt concluſive manner, that France was, in every ſenſe, the aggreſſor in the war—without inſiſting on the acknowledgment of the Jacobin rulers of that country that they had produced the war, becauſe it was neceſſary to the accompliſhment of their republican ſchemes—without even availing myſelf of the

argument urged by Mr. E. himſelf, no further back than two pages, and of which, fearing he might forget it, I promiſed to remind him ſhould there be occaſion; that "the ſhare which Briſſot had in the commencement of hoſtilities, was the principal cauſe of his deſtruction"—I will conſent to conſider the queſtion on the very ground here ſtated by Mr. E.; and I will appeal to any candid and impartial man, whether, if France was in ſuch a condition, that external war alone could diſappoint the expectations of thoſe "*who were looking by every mail for the deſtruction of her government*," any thing can be more abſurd than to infer from ſuch premiſes, that the war was produced by the Britiſh Miniſter? who, without the riſk and expence inſeparable from a ſtate of hoſtility, without any interruption of his favourite and ſucceſsful plans of finance, might have ſecurely derived, from the feeble, unſettled, and diſtracted ſtate of France, whatever a Britiſh Miniſter could propoſe to himſelf, as the utmoſt object of his ambition. Nay, I will appeal in like manner, whether, if the war was rendered ſo neceſſary by the internal ſtate of France, it is not reaſonable to conclude, that it was abſolutely out of our power, by all the influence we could exert, and by all the caution we could obſerve, to prevent its exiſtence?

Perhaps Mr. E. is in poſſeſſion of ſome ſpell, by which he could have reſtrained thoſe who had the direction of the Gallic force, from employing that force in a manner indiſpenſably neceſſary to the eſtabliſhment

eſtabliſhment of their own authority. If he had ſuch a ſpell he was doubtleſs prevented from employing it, by an unwillingneſs to check that "career of conqueſt and glory unequalled in the annals of mankind," of which he ſpeaks with ſuch unbounded rapture *. Certain, however, it is that nothing leſs than enchantment, could have obliged the rulers of France to overlook or to forego means ſo obvious, ſo practicable, and ſo efficacious, that "*by the operation of the ſimpleſt principles of univerſal nature, they were able to conſolidate the mighty Republic.*"

The annals of ſophiſtry do not, I will venture to aſſert, furniſh another inſtance of ſo groſs an attempt to

* That France has run an almoſt unexampled career of *conqueſt*, is a truth which unfortunately for the peace, happineſs, and ſecurity of mankind, is too obvious to admit of a doubt! but to call that career "a career of glory," betrays a degree of exultation in the ſucceſſes of the French arms, which might be very properly diſplayed by one of the Citizen Directors, or by the orator of a Republican Tribune, but which is highly diſhonourable, when proceeding from the pen of an Engliſh writer, and equally inſulting when addreſſed to Englih readers. Does Mr. E. think that vice and infamy can derive glory from their triumphs, or that thoſe who can "command ſucceſs," do *therefore* deſerve it? Whatever he may feel on the occaſion of French victories, in which his party have uniformly and indecently exulted, I had infinitely rather ſhare in the defeats and diſaſters of the truly dignified Houſe of Auſtria, than in the ſucceſſes of the inſolent, impious, and guilty Republican Tyrants, whom no ſucceſſes can dignify, or reſcue from the execration of mankind.

"And more true joy Marcellus exil'd feels,
Than Cæſar with a ſenate at his heels."

impoſe upon the underſtandings of mankind, as that which I have juſt noticed. To take occaſion from the diſtracted and anarchical ſtate of France, to aſcribe the war to the Britiſh Miniſter, is, in point of reaſoning, juſt as abſurd, as it would be falſe, in point of fact, to aſſert, that France was attacked by Great Britain. An aſſertion ſo glaringly repugnant to fact no man in his ſenſes would venture to advance; and that any man of honour and diſcernment ſhould attempt, by the aid of ſophiſtry, to eſtabliſh a concluſion which is equally repugnant both to fact and reaſon, can only be attributed to that overpowering influence of party zeal, which enchains the faculties, and renders even the beſt underſtandings the ſlaves of paſſion, the dupes of error, and the inſtruments of deception.

I am bound, however, to acknowledge, that Mr. E. has rendered the greateſt ſervice to the cauſe of truth by exhibiting the queſtion in this point of view; ſince nothing can tend more to remove all doubt and error, reſpecting the real cauſes of the war, than an attention to the cloſe and intimate union which he has pointed out between the war and the internal ſtate of France. If that country was in ſo divided and anarchical a ſituation, that nothing but foreign war could bind her in any kind of union, or prevent her from being entirely rent aſunder by her internal diſſentions; we are led by a natural inference, not only to aſcribe the war to ſuch a ſtate of things, but alſo to deduce a general principle, as ſimple as it is incontrovertible

controvertible—that, as every ſyſtem purſues, inſtinctively, the means neceſſary for its own preſervation, *anarchy has a direct and natural tendency to the production of foreign war.* The diſcovery of this principle relieves the queſtion reſpecting the origin of the war of every degree of obſcurity; and enables us to ſolve it in a moſt clear and ſatisfactory manner.

I challenge the warmeſt admirer of Mr. E. to deny that the cauſes of the war aſſigned by that gentleman, leave the mind at leaſt in a ſtate of ſuſpenſe and uncertainty—that inſtead of being explanatory of the event to which they relate, they render it the more myſterious and inexplicable—and that they afford but a very forced and unnatural conſtruction of the conduct of both countries on the occaſion. But when the war is conſidered as proceeding from the anarchy of France, it becomes perfectly clear and intelligible—all myſtery vaniſhes in an inſtant—the whole chain of events appears regular and connected, and the conſtruction is conſiſtent, not only with reaſon and probability, but with the minuteſt fact, andwith the characters and intereſts of all parties. In ſhort, fiction and truth never exhibited a ſtronger contraſt than in theſe different modes of accounting for the war.

I cannot, therefore, refrain from again expreſſing my gratitude to Mr. E. for having led me to the application of a general principle, which is at once deciſive of the queſtion of aggreſſion. The voluminous pleadings on this queſtion, may now be brought

to

to a point, and I invite him to join iſſue on that point, which ariſes out of his own allegations. It ſhall be at his option an iſſue of *law* or an iſſue of *fact*. He may either demur to the principle itſelf, or deny its application to the caſe before us. But I fear that, notwithſtanding his ſuperiority of talents, he will not think it prudent to meet me on either of theſe grounds, but that he will chuſe rather to rely on thoſe vague and unfounded conjectures and inſinuations, and on thoſe unſupported charges againſt the Britiſh Miniſtry, which form the ſubſtance of his publication. I ſhall not, however, on that account, abſtain from the diſcuſſion, but, avaling myſelf of the facts which he himſelf has inſiſted on, namely, that *previouſly to the war, France was in a ſtate of complete anarchy*, and that *by the war ſhe was enabled, not only to unite her jarring parties, but to conſolidate her mighty Republic*; I ſhall illuſtrate the principle ſuggeſted by the combination of theſe facts, and trace the operation by which anarchy leads to external war.

It may be proper, however, to premiſe ſome brief remarks on the ſubject of anarchy in general. As this unfortunate ſtate of ſocial exiſtence ariſes from the want of a ſettled government, it is undoubtedly true that, wherever the ſupreme Power is a matter of contention, anarchy may be ſaid to exiſt. But it is obvious that this evil admits of various of degrees, which are not attended with an equal portion of domeſtic wretchedneſs, and which

do

do not alike lead to foreign hoſtility. The natural effect of a diſputed title is *civil* rather than *foreign* war: but during ſuch a conteſt, dreadful as it undoubtedly is, it is agreed on all hands that obedience is due ſomewhere—the queſtion to whom it is due lies, generally, in a narrow compaſs—and each of the contending parties, being firmly united by the purſuit of a common object, as well as by the reſiſtance which it experiences in that purſuit, maintains among its adherents the ſtricteſt ſubordination.

But by far the worſt ſpecies of anarchy is that which is produced by the operation of the diſorganizing principles, falſely denominated the RIGHTS of MAN, and which has prevailed in France in conſequence of her Revolution. This kind of anarchy, which I ſhall diſtinguiſh by the term *democratical*, is attended with the utmoſt domeſtic miſery, and it has, at the ſame time, and partly, indeed, from that very cauſe, a direct tendency to foreign war. It does not admit of any principle or means of union, but tends to a diſſolution of all the ties of ſociety. Wherever it prevails, tumult, violence, and confuſion are univerſally predominant, and the whole community is reduced into a ſtate of chaos. The people conſidering themſelves releaſed from all reſtraints of law and order, of decorum and reſpect, of attachment, duty and obedience; ruſh wildly into all the exceſſes that their own paſſions, or the artifices of their demagogues, prompt them to commit. Even their leaders, as Mr. E. has juſtly and forcibly obſerved, are ſeparated, not by any preciſe

preciſe claims, but by "*the moſt extravagant zeal for contradictory theories of Government.*" Thoſe theories, however, are only the pretexts and the cover for the worſt ſpecies of ambition. The reins of power, lying looſe and unoccupied, are eagerly caught at by the moſt deſperate and profligate men, who are leſs under the influence of ambition, properly ſo called, than of a deſire to facilitate the gratification of the vileſt propenſities. Such men form into parties, as accident or uniformity of deſign may bring them together; and theſe parties, perpetually dividing, ſubdividing, and changing into new combinations*, ſucceed each other in obtaining a tranſitory dominion, from which they are ſpeedily driven, either by the efforts of their former antagoniſts, or in conſequence of a new diviſion among themſelves: for the very ſucceſs of ſuch men is only a ſource of jealouſy and contention, and it invariably diſſolves thoſe treacherous ties which they had founded in their intereſt to form in the purſuit of a common object.

In this ſtate of things, unleſs ſome Cromwell, greatly ſuperior to all competitors in talents fitted for ſuch a ſtruggle, ſhould be able to fix himſelf in the ſeat of Power, the tranſition muſt be very quick from the tyranny of one ſet of men to that of another; and although every art of popularity is ſure to be practiſed to engage the favour and aſſiſtance of the populace, invariably, on ſuch occaſions, (as well as on ſome others), dignified by the appellation of the

* Thus the Jacobins divided into the *Girondiſts*, and the *Robeſpierrians* or *Terroriſts*.

people,

people, the capricious multitude will not long continue to favour any party; and frequently, being moved by hidden ſprings, they will burſt forth in paroxyſms of rage, and ſacrifice to their fury the very men, who, a little while before, they had diſtinguiſhed by the moſt unbounded applauſe.

The impoſſibility which all parties thus alike experience of obtaining, by the operation of internal cauſes, a permanent aſcendancy, natually ſuggeſts the neceſſity of finding ſome external principle, by the aid of which they may hope to retain, with a firmer hand, the graſp of power, and to controul that tendency to inceſſant change, which is inſeparable from this ſpecies of anarchy. The principle which obviouſly preſents itſelf for theſe purpoſes is that of foreign war. Democratical anarchy does not admit of any queſtion ſufficiently preciſe to divide a nation into two parties, who may meet in the field, and there terminate the conteſt by force of arms. Civil war, dreadful and calamitous as it is, tends ultimately to repoſe, by affording an opportunity for one party or the other to obtain a decided and laſting ſuperiority. But the ſpecies of anarchy now under conſideration, far more dreadful and calamitous, does not admit even of that bitter remedy. It is, however, ſo replete with miſery and horror, that unleſs it find ſome partial relief, it muſt either give place to order and regular government, or produce a political diſſolution. To prevent the occurrence of either of theſe extremes, alike fatal to its

ſway, it is under the neceſſity of creating an artificial union, by the aid of foreign war. By this expedient it diverts the attention of the people to a common object—it rouſes a national ſpirit, which, though excited in ſuch a manner, Mr. E. dignifies by the deſcription of "*a proud, warlike, and ſuperior ſpirit, at the call of national independence*"—and it directs that rage and fury againſt an enemy, which would otherwiſe be inceſſantly productive of internal convulſions. By foreign war alſo a pretext is ſupplied for raiſing and maintaining a ſtrong military force, which, while it is neceſſary to cruſh inſurrections, and to intimidate the people from reſiſting that oppreſſion which, in ſuch a ſtate of things, is ſure to attend the exerciſe of power, is alſo employed in preventing thoſe diſorders and tumults, which a ſpirit of licentiouſneſs would otherwiſe produce. If ſucceſs ſhould attend the experiment, a ſpirit of moleſtation and aggrandizement will engraft itſelf on the principle of anarchy; and by furniſhing full employment to the national force, and preſenting an animating object to the national ambition, that ſpirit will ſupply the want of regular government, and will enable a ſtate to ſubſiſt by the occupation of foreign war, and the vanity of foreign conqueſt, without ceaſing to be anarchical.

So true it is that democratical anarchy leads, by a direct and immediate operation, to external hoſtility. The nation which labours under that inexpreſſible misfortune, incapable of finding any other relief, is impelled to ſeek quarrels with its neighbours,

bours, and to make warfare its habitual ſyſtem; and, in proportion to its ſtrength and reſources, will be the extent of its inſolence and ambition, and the violence of its endeavours to deſtroy the peace of mankind.

It is aſtoniſhing that Mr. E. ſhould not have diſcovered this principle, when he approached ſo nearly to it as to deſcribe, in a manner equally juſt and forcible, the extreme anarchy in which France was involved, and the wonderful effects produced by the war upon her internal condition. It is aſtoniſhing that, having advanced ſo far in the high road of truth, he ſhould ſuddenly have turned aſide into the mazes of error, and have ſought for *foreign* cauſes, to which he might aſcribe the war, when he had aſſigned *internal* cauſes, which were not only fully ſufficient to account for its exiſtence, but which, in the natural courſe of things, led to its production. How could it eſcape penetration like his, that the compariſon with which he endeavours to illuſtrate his argument, although juſt to a certain degree, fails in one point ſo extremely important, as to prove fatal to the analogy. The "*bodies*" which he calls "*heterogeneous*," and to which he compares the condition of France, having, as he obſerves, no internal principle of union, can only be bound together by external force. But he ſeems to have forgotten that ſuch bodies are entirely deſtitute of all power to produce the application of that external force, which is neceſſary to unite them; and that,

conſiſting of inert and paſſive matter, they can neither jump into the crucible, nor blow the furnace, by the heat of which they may be incorporated; but that, on the contrary, anarchy is a ſubtle, active, and potent principle, and fully capable of exciting that external action, which is neceſſary to produce a ſtate of coheſion, and to "counteract the ſeparation ariſing from internal commotions."

It appears, however, upon the grounds ſtated by Mr. E. himſelf, that the internal ſituation of France was ſuch, as to admit of no relief but the violent and deſperate remedy of foreign hoſtility; and that the war was, therefore, a natural and neceſſary conſequence of the anarchy which prevailed in that country. This *view* of the ſubject affords a much better "*clue to the myſtery*" than that which Mr. E. fancied he had diſcovered in the agency of the Britiſh Miniſter; and it points out the FRENCH REVOLUTION as the firſt parent and primary cauſe of the war, by having, in a natural courſe of things, generated that anarchy, which was its proximate cauſe. Our author does not pretend to trace the anarchical condition of France to any other ſource than the Revolution. It was not, indeed, poſſible ſo to do. The war, which is charged with all the calamities that have occurred ſince its eruption, was too late, in point of time, and the previous exiſtence of French anarchy was too notorious, to admit of the latter being placed to the account of the former. The REVOLUTION, therefore, is alone reſponſible

ponſible for all the blood which has been ſhed in conſequence of the war, as well as for that which has been poured forth in torrents at the ſhrine of civil diſcord. That diſaſtrous and horrid event was the Pandora's box, whence iſſued thoſe direful ills, which, in ſo ſhort a ſpace of time, have extended to both hemiſpheres, and which threaten to embitter human exiſtence, and to afflict generations ſtill unborn.

It is ſcarcely credible that any one, with a ſpark of humanity in his breaſt, ſhould retain any affection for a Revolution, which has brought ſuch unutterable woes into the world. And yet ſuch inſtances of revolutionary ςφγη, or rather *mania*, are ſtill to be found, in ſpite of all the correctives which have been adminiſtered by experience. It is not indeed poſſible to extol, or even to juſtify the French Revolution in the aggregate, though attempts are not wanting to palliate even its greateſt atrocities. But a forced and unnatural diſtinction is made between its different periods—the cloſe connection between its cauſes and effects, its origin and progreſs, is artfully ſuppreſſed—and in defiance of the wiſe and unerring maxim, that *a tree is known by its fruit*, we are taught to believe that its crimes were not the natural reſult of its principles. Mr. E. has gone far beyond all its other advocates, and not content with holding it out as an object both of pity and admiration, he has not ſcrupled to contend that we ſhould have been acceſſory to its guilt, by becoming *the faithful but cau-*

cautious protectors of "the firſt Revolution:"—a ſuggeſtion, the prepoſterous abſurdity of which I have already expoſed. Nothing is more productive of error reſpecting the real cauſes of the war, than this practice of diſtinguiſhing between the infancy and the maturity of the Revolution, whereby its advocates endeavour, not only to blunt the horror which every part of it ought to inſpire, but to produce a miſconception of its original character and tendency. By the aid of falſe colourings and ſpecious diſguiſes, this ſcourge of the human race firſt acquired that capacity for miſchief, which it ſoon became impoſſible to controul; and ſimilar means are ſtill reſorted to, in order to prevent mankind from being undeceived, and from tracing, not only the war, but the preſent critical and alarming ſtate of Europe, to this their only ſource. I ſhall, therefore, not be thought to wander from my ſubject, if I expoſe ſo miſchievous a fallacy, by exhibiting the Revolution in its true colours; and by ſhowing that it has been, from the firſt, and throughout all its changes, one uniform ſyſtem, fraught with the utmoſt danger to all regular governments, hoſtile to the order of civil ſociety and to the peace and ſecurity of Europe, and poſſeſſing an immediate tendency to produce thoſe general calamities, which have rendered it the greateſt curſe that ever befell mankind.

The principles on which the French Revolution was founded, rendered it, even as an example, an event

event of the moſt dangerous and alarming tendency. Thoſe principles are of an extremely contagious nature, and, wherever they prevail, they are as certainly fatal to the body politic, as the moſt deadly poiſon to the body natural. Under appearances the moſt ſpecious and captivating, they readily inſinuate themſelves into the favour of mankind; but no ſooner do they gain the aſcendancy, than they inſtantly blaſt all the happineſs, which a ſtate of ſociety is able to produce, and they introduce all the miſery of which it is ſuſceptible. They are irreſiſtibly faſcinating to the multitude, whom they are particularly calculated to flatter, and who are incapable of detecting their fallacy, or of ſuſpecting that, with the faireſt profeſſions and the kindlieſt promiſes, they are pregnant with inexpreſſible wretchedneſs to all claſſes of the community. Their operation is as ſubtle as it is baneful; and without the aid of violence, without any exertion of force, without any apparent effort, without exciting either alarm or ſuſpicion, without even profeſſing any thing hoſtile to the ſubſiſting order of things, they can deſtroy the moſt ancient and the moſt durable eſtabliſhments. They are like an univerſal ſolvent, which can imperceptibly diſperſe even the hardeſt ſubſtances. By filling the mind with notions of abſolute and impracticable equality, they render gradations of rank odious to the view, and intolerable to the feelings of the lower orders; they deſtroy thoſe ſentiments of reſpect, and they weaken

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thoſe habits of ſubordination, which form not only the ſtrongeſt ties of ſociety, but the very baſis of freedom, by enabling the ſupreme power to maintain itſelf with the leaſt poſſible degree of coercion. By preſenting to the imagination a vague, and undefined ſpecies of liberty, as a natural and unalienable right, and as a bleſſing of the greateſt value, they create an impatience under all reſtraints, however ſalutary, and they excite an irreſiſtible deſire to give a looſe to the moſt unbounded licentiouſneſs. By inſpiring the people with an idea that they are intitled to the ſovereignty (a notion no leſs abſurd than miſchievous, ſince ſovereignty is a relative quality, and cannot be the attribute of all) theſe principles lead them to deſpiſe, and conſequently diſpoſe them to reſiſt and to ſubvert every kind of legitimate authority. In ſhort, by depriving ſociety of thoſe moral influences, which render obedience and ſubordination matters rather of choice and habit than of compulſion, and by giving the rein to the moſt unruly paſſions, they render it impoſſible to reſtrain mankind by the lenient and gentle exerciſe of lawful authority, and they leave no other means for the preſervation of order than the influence of terror, and the exertion of force.

Such are the principles on which the "*firſt Revolution*" was founded — Principles which, in theory, are immediately derived from the Whig ſyſtem of Locke, and which, in practice, lead directly to the horrid ſyſtem of Jacobiniſm—Princi-

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ciples, which it is to be hoped and believed, Locke himſelf would have been the firſt to diſavow, had he lived to ſee them reduced into practice by French Revolutioniſts; for he would then have been convinced that they are infinitely more hoſtile than arbitrary power to his favourite liberty, and he would have diſcovered that the evil againſt which he wanted effectually to guard, was a *bleſſing* compared to the *remedy* which, with all the raſh confidence of an empiric, he boldly ventured to preſcribe.

When by the operation of ſuch principles, the Revolution of France overthrew, in an inſtant, the moſt ancient, and, apparently, the moſt ſolid throne in Europe, and ſubverted eſtabliſhments which had withſtood the ravages of time, and the moſt violent ſhocks of political convulſions, it may truly be ſaid that every throne and every eſtabliſhment, civil and religious, was, by the force of ſuch an example, expoſed to the moſt imminent danger. But that danger did not conſiſt merely in the effect of example.

The Revolution of France had an original and eſſential character of univerſality—a direct bearing on the internal condition of every country. It is termed, indeed, the Revolution of France, but it was in its nature, ſpirit, and tendency a principle of univerſal Revolution. France was only its centre, from which it endeavoured to dart its rays to the utmoſt extremity of the ſocial ſyſtem. Inſtead of being confined, as Mr. E. acknowledges it ſhould have been, to the limits and ſubjects of France, it never, at any period, obſerved ſuch bounds.

It diſplayed, on the contrary, from its very commencement, a manifeſt diſpoſition, not only to invade the rights and to diſturb the quiet of neighbouring ſtates, but alſo to ſubvert the eſtabliſhed government of every ſtate, to convert every people to its own faith, and to ſtimulate them to follow the example of France, by revolting againſt their lawful ſovereigns. Its original promoters, fully aware of this its univerſality, never pretended that its *benefits* were to be confined to France. They conſtantly held it forth, in their ſpeeches and writings, as the harbinger of the emancipation of mankind, as the dawn of univerſal freedom—they repreſented it, in unequivocal language, as the ſignal of the downfal of all the political ſyſtems of Europe; they even boaſted that it made thrones to totter and Kings to tremble, and they predicted that it would produce the ſpeedy diſſolution both of Monarchy and Ariſtocracy. In ſhort it intirely correſponded with the deſcription given of it by M. Malouet—a deſcription which deſerves to be recorded by every one in the tablets of his memory: *This Revolution has had a peculiar character which belongs to no other, the character of generalizing its principles, of applying them to every nation, every country, every government. It is a real ſpirit of conqueſt, or rather of miſſionaryſhip, which has ſeized on the moſt ardent ſpirits, and which ſeeks to ſpread itſelf beyond its own limits.*

The external conduct of the Revolution has been perfectly conformable to the above deſcription. Whoever will take the trouble to trace the progreſs

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of this event, will find that the behaviour of France towards other countries, has been, from the firſt date of her new æra, not only haughty, inſolent, dictatorial and aggreſſive, but marked by an open contempt for the laws of nations and the obligations of treaties, by a total diſregard for the rights of independent ſtates, and by a ſpirit of univerſal proſelytiſm. He will alſo find that the Revolution and its contemporary ſyſtem of foreign interference and moleſtation, have obſerved an exact parallel, advancing together ſtep by ſtep, and continuing, even to this moment, to keep an exact pace with each other.

The Declaration of Rights, which was made the baſis of the new French Conſtitution, afforded a ſtriking ſpecimen of what might be expected from the French Revolution in a maturer ſtate. That Declaration was a Digeſt of revolutionary principles, reduced into a ſyſtem, expreſſed in terms applicable to all countries, and preſented, not merely to the notice, but to the imitation of mankind. It ſeemed to be rather a manifeſto againſt all the political inſtitutions of Europe, than part of a code of fundamental laws for a particular ſtate. Inſtead of being confined, as it ought to have been, to ſuch regulations and changes as might be deemed proper for France, it was a promulgation of what it was thought proper to term *the natural and unalienable Rights of Man*; which, as thoſe rights were no where acknowledged, but on the contrary were conſidered to be incom-

patible with the ſtate of Society in every other country, was in effect to declare that the people were *every where deprived* of their *natural and unalienable rights*. And as univerſal attention was fixed on the proceedings of the National Aſſemby, ſuch a declaration, was in ſubſtance, what the decree of fraternity, of which it was the forerunner and the prototype, was in form—an addreſs to the people of all countries, to ſtimulate them to the aſſertion of their *rights*, or in other words to excite them to revolt and rebellion.

Having thus promulgated the rights which were declared to belong to all mankind, the National Aſſembly proceeded formally to aboliſh ſuch inſtitutions, as were found to militate againſt thoſe rights; ſuch as " Nobility—Peerage—Hereditary diſtinctions—difference of Orders—Feudal Privileges—Orders of Chivalry—Corporations—and, in ſhort, all kinds of ſuperiority but that of public functionaries in the exerciſe of their functions." Not content, however, with the abolition of ſuch inſtitutions, the Aſſembly thought proper to declare, in conformity to the univerſality of the new ſyſtem, that the inſtitutions themſelves were injurious to liberty and equality of rights; that is to ſay, to ſuch rights as had been holden forth as the natural unalienable, and ſacred Rights of Man: and as ſimilar inſtitutions were inſeparably incorporated with the whole ſyſtem of European Polity, ſuch a declaration was nothing leſs than a direct attack upon that ſyſtem.

Who can feel the leaſt ſurprize that a Revolu-

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tion, which began its courſe in ſuch a manner, ſhould have proceeded: thoſe extremities of violence, cruelty, injuſtice, and univerſal moleſtation, which have marked its progreſs? It did not, however, confine itſelf, even in its early ſtages, to *declarations*, inſulting and injurious as they were, but proved by *acts* of the moſt unequivocal nature, that it ſet at nought all thoſe obligations, which independent ſtates had been accuſtomed to regard as ſacred in their intercourſe with each other, as well as the expreſs engagements by which France herſelf was ſpecifically bound.

The year 1789, which gave birth to this monſtrous Revolution, was alſo diſtinguiſhed by a groſs violation of the faith of Treaties, and a moſt unjuſt attack on the rights of foreign Princes. By the treaty of Weſtphalia, which is conſidered as the *Magna Charta* of the Germanic Empire, and by which Alſace was ceded to France, the Feudal rights of the German Princes, who had eſtates in that Province, were expreſsly reſerved, and even ſolemnly guarantied by France herſelf. But on the 4th of Auguſt in the above year, the National aſſembly took upon itſelf to aboliſh thoſe rights by a haſty vote, paſſed by acclamation:* and, although in conſequence of the reſentment diſplayed by the German Empire on the occaſion, it was thought prudent, after the lapſe of ſeveral months, to

* The able and well informed author of the work intitled "The "Ambition and Conqueſts of France," obſerves "that there is no "doubt that this haſty deciſion of the National Aſſembly was one "of the ſeeds of the war." P. 156.

propoſe

propoſe, that indemnifications ſhould be offered to the injured proprietors; yet, ſuch a propoſal, while it proved the injuſtice of the act, did not confer any remedy, as France could not be intitled to compel the Princes to exchange rights, ſecured to them by public treaty, for any indemnifications whatſoever. In the month of June 1790, the National Aſſembly clearly manifeſted its diſpoſition to ſubvert the Governments of other countries, by receiving with applauſe the ambaſſadorial addreſs of Anacharſis Cloots, at the head of a body of pretended envoys from "all the countries of "the earth;" which were ſtated in the addreſs, to have been "awakened from a long ſlavery, by the trumpet which ſounded the reſurrection of a great nation, and by the joyful ſongs of a chorus of 25 millions of freemen." In the year 1791, on the very day on which the king ratified the new Conſtitution, which contained an expreſs diſavowal of all views of conqueſt and aggrandizement, the national aſſembly voted the annexation to France of Avignon and the Comtat Venaiſin, Provinces which belonged to the Pope, and which the aſſembly had from 1789 been endeavouring to excite to the moſt horrid extremes of violence, cruelty, and carnage, in order to compel them to throw themſelves into the arms of France, as the only means of obtaining a ſtate of comparative tranquillity. It is alſo well known that, in direct violation of the above diſavowal of aggrandizement, Savoy, Nice, and afterwards the Auſtrian Netherlands, and the Biſhop-

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ric of Liege were formally annexed to France. In Oct. 1791, the Aſſembly crowned with applauſe an offer, made by one Huré, of 100 livres towards the expences of war, and of his *arm* to be a *tyrannicide*. But in further teſtimony of the diſpoſition of French Revolutioniſts to excite inſurrection and revolt in other countries, I cannot refrain from inſerting a letter from one of the Patriotic clubs, ſigned by Rochambeau, addreſſed to the Patriots of Brabant, and induſtriouſly circulated in the Netherlands, after thoſe Provinces had returned to their allegiance to the Emperor, and when the perſons who had emigrated during the troubles were returning home:

Sep. 18th 1791.

" GENTLEMEN PATRIOTS,

" You know how to value liberty; you deſired it, and unhappy events have prevented you from acquiring it. The friends of the French Conſtitution *embrace the whole world in their ſyſtem of Philanthropy*, and in virtue of that right, they expreſs their hopes, that when you return into your country, you will ſcatter the ſeeds of our beneficent projects, that they may produce a plentiful harveſt."

Adhering to the principle that *the friends of the French Conſtitution embraced the whole world in their ſyſtem of Philanthropy*, the aſſembly encouraged attempts to excite the inhabitants of other countries to inſurrection. The Upper Valais, the Pays de Vaud, and the Swiſs Cantons, particularly thoſe of Fri-

Fribourg and Soleure, were among the firſt objects of thoſe attempts; Geneva, which at firſt, by the aid of ſome Swiſs troops fruſtrated a conſpiracy to ſurprize it, was afterwards completely revolutionized by the operation of French intrigues. By degrees, Emiſſaries were diſpatched into all the countries of Europe, and almoſt of the world, to propagate the principles of the Revolution, to excite diſaffection, and to ſpread the flames of revolt. A regular communication was eſtabliſhed between Jacobin clubs formed in other ſtates and the mother ſociety at Paris. Conſpirators flocked from other countries, and particularly from Great Britain, to the Bar of the Convention, where they received cordial and open encouragement to purſue their treaſonable deſigns. The effects of theſe fraternal labours were viſible in this country before the war, and particularly in the autumn of 1792; when, in all probability, Great Britain was preſerved from the horrors of a 10th of Auguſt by thoſe never to be forgotten aſſociations, which inſpired the conſpirators with awe, and obliged them to change their plans of immediate and open violence for the more inſidious projects of reform. At length the maſk was intirely thrown aſide, and by the decree of fraternity, November 19, 1792, the aſſiſtance of France was openly tendered to every people, who ſhould be diſpoſed to rebel againſt their Sovereign.

Such being the principles and the conduct of France in relation to other countries, previouſly to the war, What can be more abſurd than

than to aſcribe, to the operation of the war, that character of univerſal diſturbance and diſorganization, which the French Revolution afterwards more openly diſplayed? No war, indeed, could juſtify ſuch conduct, and therefore the defence attempted to be ſet up by the advocates for the Revolution is eſſentially bad: but that defence, miſerable as it is, is at variance with facts and with dates; for the ſyſtem it endeavours to juſtify, inſtead of being produced by the war, was anterior to it, and was purſued in time of profound peace. The war grew out of that ſyſtem, and was neceſſary to the attainment of its objects, both *internal* and *external*.

We have already ſeen that the war was entered into, in the firſt inſtance, in order to facilitate the entire abolition of royalty, and the eſtabliſhment of a republic; and it appears from Mr. E.'s own ſtatements, that it was neceſſary for the conſolidation of that republic. In like manner the *foreign* views of the French Revolutioniſts required the aid of war, without which it would have been impoſſible either to purſue with effect the fraternal ſcheme of *univerſal emancipation*, or to realize the ambitious project of *univerſal empire*.

Accordingly, when the war with the Emperor had effected its original purpoſe, "the abolition of royalty," the plan of foreign hoſtility began to extend itſelf, and to purſue both the above objects, upon an enlarged ſcale, and war was declared, in the true revolutionary ſtile, not againſt England and Holland, but againſt the King of England and the Stadtholder

of the United Provinces; and ſoon afterwards, againſt the King of Spain, who, in the declaration, was denominated a tyrant *.

Thus was that ſyſtem of univerſal interference, aggreſſion, and diſturbance, which has, at length, expoſed all civil ſociety to deſtruction, coeval with the French Revolution. How abſurd, how inſulting to the underſtanding, then, is the diſtinction made by Mr. E. between the firſt Revolution and thoſe ſucceeding convulſions, which, though they have aſſumed the ſame general title, were, in fact, but more advanced ſtages of the ſame revolutionary proceſs! How prepoſterous is the doctrine, that ſuch a Revolution ſhould, at any time, have been patronized and protected by us! We are now able, by the clear light of experience, to aſcertain the real nature and the original tendency of this wonderful and awful phenomenon. We can now trace the connection between its various parts, and pronounce, with certainty, that they form one uniform and conſiſtent whole. It has exhibited no

* The manner in which the war was expected to operate, in promoting the benevolent deſign of reſcuing every country from the *oppreſſion* of its *lawful government*, in order to ſubject it to the *mild dominion* of France, is diſplayed, in true revolutionary jargon, in the following ſpeech of Iſnard in the Convention, which may form a good companion to the declarations of Briſſot, on the ſubject of the war.

"From the moment when the enemies armies ſhall ſtruggle with thoſe of the French, the light of philoſophy will ſtrike their eyes, nations will embrace each other before the face of dethroned tyrants, Earth will be comforted and Heaven appeaſed."

variations but ſuch as might naturally have been expected to attend its paſſage from infancy to maturity; it has diſplayed no change but that of a gradual and progreſſive developement of its original character and diſpoſition; it has been one continued ſcene of profligacy, perfidy, injuſtice, cruelty and oppreſſion. There is no crime, however atrocious, no poſſible ſhade or complication of guilt, with which it has not abounded, while it has not been chequered with any mixture of virtue, public or private; nor can even a ſingle action, honourable to human nature, be laid to its charge *.

It has been, and ſtill is, the moſt deadly foe to religion and morality, and to the quiet, ſafety and happineſs of mankind, that ever infeſted the world, and, whatever hopes we may be encouraged to form by the Syren ſounds of peace, unleſs we ſee this Revolution in a true light, and hold its principles in a proper deteſtation, we ſhall, ſooner or later, be drawn into that tremendous gulf, which has ſwallowed up ſo large a portion of Europe, and which is, at length, daily ſwallowing up even thoſe ſtates, that

* As my object has been to conſider the French Revolution in a *political* light, and in its relation to other countries, I have not dwelt on thoſe ſcenes of domeſtic horror, barbarity, and carnage with which it has abounded, and which are unparalleled in the annals of cruelty. To keep alive the impreſſion which ſuch ſcenes are calculated to excite, is an uſeful and benevolent though a moſt painful and diſguſting taſk. That taſk has been executed with ability and fidelity, in a publication intitled "the Bloody Buoy," originally printed in Philadelphia and reprinted in London, for J. Wright, Piccadilly.

idly truſted to a *ſoothing neutrality* to preſerve them from the inſatiable and all devouring vortex.

But although it is now ſo eaſy to trace the evils we deplore, and the dangers we dread, to this tremendous Revolution, and although that Revolution exhibited at the firſt ſuch ſtriking marks of its real character and tendency, we are not to wonder that it did not at once impreſs mankind with any apprehenſions of the conſequences to which it led; or that no one, however enlightened, foreſaw that it would prove the hinge on which the deſtiny of Europe was doomed to turn. Events that are remarkable both for their novelty and their magnitude, muſt paſs a little by before they are properly underſtood;—like great objects, they are beſt ſeen at a certain diſtance.

It is very eaſy, and requires nothing but impartiality and attention, to follow up effects to their cauſes; but to pierce the veil of futurity, and to trace a Revolution, perfectly *anomalous* in its kind, to its ultimate conſequences, was an operation far beyond the powers of human penetration. Beſides, it was alſo one of the principal arts of the Revolution, to blunt the edge of ſuſpicion, by concealing from the eyes of the world its real character; for that purpoſe it aſſumed the moſt ſpecious diſguiſes and held forth the moſt plauſible profeſſions of juſtice, equity, and moderation; declaring that it renounced all views of conqueſt, and all wars of aggran-

aggrandizement, and that it would conſult the peace and harmony of the world, as well as the liberty of France. By ſuch arts did it gain credit with the bulk of mankind, who were thereby induced to overlook the obvious tendency of its principles, and the violence, cruelty, and injuſtice which marked its earlieſt ſteps. The people of this country, in particular, were the more diſpoſed to confide in ſuch profeſſions, by a generous though prepoſterous wiſh, that France might be able to realize ſome plan of ſocial liberty; forgetting that they themſelves had, by very different means, attained the bleſſing of legal and orderly freedom, they ſtill indulged the vain hope that the end might be the ſame; and fixing their eyes on the bright, but imaginary proſpect, preſented to their view, they did not attend to the horrid gloom which darkened the horizon, and which portended the moſt furious hurricane that ever deſolated the face of the earth.

I have to apologize to Mr. E. for my apparent neglect of him, during this diſcuſſion on the original character of the French Revolution. But he had rendered that diſcuſſion neceſſary, by endeavouring to weaken the ſalutary abhorrence which the Revolution ought to inſpire, and by repreſenting its origin and commencement as deſerving of our approbation, and even of our ſupport. A fallacy of ſo miſchievous a nature could not be too ſeriouſly refuted, ſince it tends, not only to keep up the veil of deluſion reſpecting the real cauſes of the war, but

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alſo to deprive the world of the benefit of an example, the moſt awful and important, ever exhibited for the admonition of mankind—an example which ſhould ſerve as a Beacon, to warn future ages of the fatal effects of Revolutions, particularly when founded upon thoſe viſionary but ſeductive principles, which are falſely denominated the " Rights of Man."

We have ſeen, on what inſufficient grounds, Mr. E. applied to the Britiſh Miniſter the character of " *Guardian Angel*" of France, on account of a war, which, inſtead of being produced by the agency of that Miniſter, was the unavoidable conſequence of French Anarchy. Very ſoon, indeed, Mr. E. ſtrips the *Guardian Angel* of all his beneficent qualities; for in alluſion to the ſame ſuperintending influence he ſays, " In the ſame manner the cruel confiſcations and judicial murders, which, under the ſame tyrannies deſtroying one another, diſgraced the earlier periods of the republican Revolution, may be mainly aſcribed to the ſame predominant cauſes." Page 50.

Such effects ſeem rather to belong to the operation of a malignant demon, rather than of a tutelary ſpirit. But certainly there is no more reaſon to conſider them as reſulting from the war, than there is to aſcribe the war to the Britiſh Miniſter. If France had not before the war abounded with confiſcations, maſſacres, and burnings, theſe atrocities might with more ſemblance of reaſon, have been " mainly aſcribed" to the war, as their " predominant cauſe."

But

But when we find, that the " earlier periods," not merely of " the Republican," but of the " firſt Revolution," when the war did not exiſt even in apprehenſion, were crowded, if not with " judicial," at leaſt with *popular* murders; which, although accompanied with worſe than ſavage barbarity, were in no one inſtance brought forward to " judicial" notice: when we find that, during thoſe periods, the Clergy were deſpoiled of their property in a manner no leſs *perfidious* than unjuſt *—that the nobles were deprived of their Titles, Dignities, and Honours (diſtinctions which to the refined and cultivated mind of our Honourable Author, muſt appear of far greater eſtimation than property)—that even their property was violated—that their perſons were hunted like wild beaſts—their manſions and ſeats converted into heaps of ſmoking ruins—themſelves obliged to ſeek refuge in exile—and the eſtates which they were compelled to abandon, for the preſervation of their lives, ſequeſtered;—we need not ſurely ſearch for any other cauſes of the

* The Clergy ſet the example of compliance to the nobility, by firſt acceding to the invitation of the Commons, delivered in the name of *the God of Peace*, to join them in their Hall, in order to conſtitute one Aſſembly; and upon genuine principles of revolutionary faith and gratitude the clergy were made the *firſt ſacrifice*. How juſt as well as ſevere was the reproach uttered by a Curate, who, fired by a ſenſe of the wrongs which he and his order had ſuſtained, exclaimed, " Did you invite us to join you, in the name of the God of Peace, that you might have a better opportunity of deſtroying us by famine?"

" cruel

" cruel confiſcations, and judicial murders," which ſucceeded ſuch atrocities, than thoſe which gave birth to the Revolution itſelf, and which ſtamped it with its original and indelible character of cruelty and injuſtice.

Whoever has paid the ſmalleſt attention to the progreſs of the French Revolution muſt be aſtoniſhed, to find the emigration of the Royaliſts aſcribed to *our* interference, without which, Mr. E. ſays, " Royaliſts of the Old School, and Royaliſts of the Monarchical Revolution, would have really, or ſeemingly, acquieſced in the new order of things; and thus numerous claſſes of men, poſſeſſing dignities and property, which have been chaſed from their country, or ſwept off the face of the earth, would have remained within the boſom of France?"

I cannot ſuppoſe it poſſible that Mr. E. ſhould be ignorant that the emigration of the nobility was principally before the exiſtence of the war; a circumſtance ſo notorious, that it is ſcarcely neceſſary to cite the Declaration of war iſſued by France againſt the Emperor, in which what is there called " the open protection (granted by that Monarch) to the *rebel ſubjects* of France," is made one of the principal grounds of complaint. To aſcribe the emigration to a cauſe which, in point of time, it actually preceded, is an anacroniſm for which I am at a loſs to account in any other manner, than by ſuppoſing, that our Author conceived himſelf intitled,

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as a political writer, totally to diſregard the order of events, and to poſſeſs a greater licence, with regard to *ſuch* matters, than belongs to either the epic Poet or the hiſtorical Dramatiſt; neither of whom, however, he may think himſelf at liberty to *bring together* events which time had placed at a great diſtance, has ever claimed the privilege of *tranſpoſing* ſuch events, and of making the laſt firſt, and the firſt laſt.

Having mentioned the Declaration of War againſt the Emperor, I cannot refrain from obſerving that nothing can be more falſe than the charge it contained againſt that Prince, reſpecting the emigrants. The laws of hoſpitality did not allow him to refuſe ſhelter to any objects of perſecution; but he gave the moſt ſolid proofs of a deſire for peace, by prohibiting and diſperſing all aſſemblages of French Emigrants in his dominions, and by preventing their being ſupplied with implements of war; and he notified to the Princes of the Empire, that ſuch of them as would not purſue the like meaſures, muſt not depend upon any aſſiſtance from him in caſe they ſhould be attacked. Accordingly all aſſemblages of theſe unhappy men, were diſperſed thoughout Germany, and even the Elector of Treves, in conſequence of the ſtrenuous interpoſition of the Emperor, obliged the *Gardes du Corps* to quit Coblentz. Indeed, no apprehenſions of danger had really been entertained by the French Jacobin rulers, on account of the Emigrants. On the contrary, the members of the Diplomatic Committee, and even Briſſot himſelf, had, in the Convention, ridiculed

the idea of their being formidable, by repreſenting them as Knights-Errant, and comparing them to a *Papal Army* and *an opera fire**. But it was found neceſſary to pick a quarrel with the Emperor; and the caution of that Prince did not afford them better pretexts for that purpoſe than the reception which humanity forbade him to refuſe to the unfortunate men who had been driven from France; and the part he had taken in the Concert of Princes, which, Briſſot himſelf had called a *chimera* †.

But nothing could reſtrain the impatience of the Jacobins for war ‡, which they cauſed to be declared, in ſpite of all the endeavours of the Emperor and the King of France to maintain peace. The former of thoſe Princes, far from having any hoſtile intentions, was by no means in a ſtate of preparation for war when it broke out, and ſeveral months elapſed before he was in a condition to act offenſively. As to the French King, after having in the month of January ſucceeded in checking, for a time, the warlike fury of the Aſſembly, he was compelled in the month of April to declare war

* See the eloquent defence of the Emigrants by M. Lally de Tollendal.

† The object of this concert was expreſſed in the declaration of Pillnitz, which ſtated that *the ſituation of the King of France was an object of common intereſt to all the Sovereigns of Europe*—A truth which I conceive no one will now venture to diſpute. For proof that what are uſually quoted as Treaties of Pavia and Pillnitz, were fabrications, I refer the reader to Mr. Vanſittart's excellent anſwer to Jaſper Wilſon.

‡ As one of the many proofs of that impatience, Briſſot declared in the aſſembly that "the only calamity to be feared was not to have war."

againſt the Emperor; but among other proofs of his repugnance to that meaſure, he required of his Jacobin Miniſters to ſign their opinion on the ſubject; a document which he preſerved, in teſtimony of his being obliged to ſacrifice his own.

But to return to our author. A diſcovery of his chronological error, in aſcribing the emigration of the French Nobility to the war, deſtroys the whole intended effect of the ſubſequent alluſion to the caſe of Great Britain, under the uſurpation of Cromwell; to whoſe Protectorſhip, as Mr. E. obſerves, "the Nobles and great men of the realm ſubmitted," inſtead of emigrating like the Nobles and great men of France. Mr. E. endeavours to account for this difference by aſcribing it to the war, undertaken, as he ſays, by the Powers of Europe, for the reſtoration of the French Monarchy, and which encouraged the Nobility and Gentry to flock to the ſtandard, thus erected in favour of their cauſe, while the Engliſh Nobility and Gentry had no ſuch inducement to quit their country. But as it happens, unfortunately for Mr. E.'s argument, that the war, whatever was its object, was ſubſequent to the emigration, other cauſes muſt be reſorted to, in order to account for the difference in this reſpect between the two caſes of England and France.

In England, Charles the Firſt, by the conceſſions he was prevailed on to make, in reſpect of his prerogative, undoubtedly laid the foundations of his own ruin, and of all the calamities which after-

wards afflicted his country; leaving thereby, to his ſucceſſors for ever, a leſſon *on record*, never to BEGIN to concede their juſt and lawful rights. Yet when this unfortunate Prince ſaw the fatal truth realized, that improper compliances are the ſure foundations of demands ſtill more exorbitant than thoſe, by which they were preceded, and that, in fact, nothing would ſatisfy his adverſaries but the virtual ſurrender of his Crown, he had the firmneſs to make a ſtand, and to erect his Royal Standard, around which the Nobility and Gentry had an opportunity of rallying. The Crown and its adherents thus, at length, afforded each other mutual ſupport; and although the civil war terminated fatally for the royal cauſe, *in conſequence of the delay which had attended the adoption of vigorous meaſures*, yet as the republican party, by their ſucceſs in the conteſt, gained *at once* ſo intire aſcendancy, that no other party could make head againſt them, the Nobles and Gentlemen were allowed to retain their titles and eſtates, ſubject only to heavy contributions: and when Cromwell, by the aid of conſummate artifice and dauntleſs enterprize, ſeized into his own hands the reins of power, he was enabled, by a ſuperiority of talents, to exerciſe the moſt deſpotic authority, and to make himſelf feared and obeyed, without reſorting to a ſyſtem of perſecution, or compelling any claſs of his temporary ſubjects to ſeek their perſonal ſafety under foreign protection. The Engliſh Nobility and Gentry, therefore, remained at home, becauſe they were not under the neceſſity

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of fleeing abroad; they bent under the ſtorm which they could not reſiſt; and they deplored, in ſecret, the ſucceſs of uſurpation againſt lawful authority.

In France, the unfortunate Louis never made a ſtand againſt his rebellious ſubjects. The Crown, indeed, was not attacked *directly*, as in England, but through the medium of its natural and conſtitutional bulwarks, the orders of Clergy and Nobility, which Mr. Neckar's imprudence, in doubling the repreſentation of the Commons, had expoſed to the incurſions of the democratical party. Still, however, the ancient right of ſeparate chambers, that is, of voting by orders, remained; and notwithſtanding the unaccountable and fatal omiſſion, on the part of the Court, to ſpecify and preſcribe an adherence to this cuſtom, as an indiſpenſable regulation in the proceedings of that Aſſembly of the States General, the right was eſtabliſhed on the baſis of immemorial uſage, and ſupported by the moſt obvious and cogent reaſon.

This right the Nobles wiſely determined to maintain declaring, by a ſolemn *arrêt*, that "the deliberation by orders was eſſential to the monarchical conſtitution, and that they would conſtantly perſevere in this principle, as being equally neceſſary to Monarchy and to freedom;"—a truth which has been awfully verified by ſubſequent experience. At that moment the fate of the Monarchy depended upon the King; but unfortunately that Monarch, among his numerous excellencies, did not poſſeſs *reſolution*:

Equal

Equal in *perſonal* courage to the braveſt of his anceſtors, he was totally deſtitute of that political firmneſs, *without which all the virtues of a King are of little value.* Regardleſs of his own life, but determined to make every ſacrifice, rather than expoſe the lives of others—he forgot, that to ſacrifice the rights of his Crown, and the eſtabliſhed order of his Government, was the direct way to expoſe the lives of his people to the moſt imminent danger. By yielding to the impulſe of a falſe humanity, and reſolving that no blood ſhould be ſhed in his cauſe, (which, though he did not ſeem to know it, was in the ſtricteſt ſenſe the cauſe of his people) he proved, *in effect,* the moſt cruel Prince that ever ſwayed a ſceptre, and gave occaſion to the ſhedding of thoſe torrents of human blood, which have ſince inundated his country.

Under the influence of ſuch miſtaken ſentiments Louis the Sixteenth determined to enforce, with his authority, the requiſition of the Commons, that the three orders ſhould unite in one chamber, and thereby he abandoned the Nobility and Clergy to their fate, and ſurrendered his Crown and his life. The remonſtrance of the Duke of Luxembourg, Preſident of the Chamber of *Nobleſſe,* when the King ſignified his pleaſure that they ſhould join the two other orders ſhould never be forgotten. That Nobleman repreſented to the King, "that it was ſtill more the cauſe of his Majeſty than their own, that the Nobles were defending, by reſiſting the plan

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of union. That the diviſion of the Eſtates in three Chambers was neceſſary to reſtrain them within legal bounds, and to preſerve the rights of the Crown—that united they would acknowledge no Sovereign, but ſeparate they would continue to be ſubjects—that rather than unite with the other orders, and ſhare with them the legiſlative power, it was alike the choice and the duty of the Nobility, to die in the defence of the royal prerogatives, and of the independence of the Crown." Inſtead of liſtening to theſe repreſentations (which inſpiration could not have rendered more ſage or more prophetic of the event), the infatuated Monarch replied, that he was determined on every ſacrifice—that not a ſingle man ſhould periſh for his ſake, and that he commanded the Nobility, as their King, to unite themſelves to the two other orders.

From this moment neither the King, the Clergy, nor the Nobles had any means of defence. They were at the mercy of the moſt furious and uncontroulable of all human influences—the influence of democracy, which was now become irreſiſtible. Inſtead of producing that harmonious tranquillity, that univerſal ſatisfaction and public gratitude, which, it was predicted, would be the fruits of a compliance with the popular demands, the union of the orders was the immediate cauſe of increaſed effervescence, of freſh diſcontents, and of the moſt criminal exceſſes. The two orders which, in obedience to royal authority, had given up their conſtitutional independence,

dence, inſtantly became the objects of the moſt virulent perſecution, and the Crown itſelf, deſtitute of ſupport, was unable to afford them any protection. Expoſed to every kind of violence and outrage, they were compelled to ſeek ſafety in exile This was the true origin of that emigration, which, although it took place before there was the leaſt idea of a rupture between France and any of the neighbouring Powers, Mr. E. aſcribes to the attractive influence *of a ſtandard erected by the nations of Europe to reſtore Monarchy in France.*

If the French Monarch, inſtead of yielding to the audacious demands of the popular leaders, had determined firmly and manfully to reſiſt every innovation on the ancient fundamental rights of the two higher orders, which were inſeparably allied to the Crown, he would have preſerved France from moſt of the miſeries which ſhe has ſince experienced. For even ſuppoſing the event to have happened, which he apprehended, and that the democratical party, rather than relinquiſh their object, had openly rebelled, he would have ſtill had an opportunity of erecting his ſtandard, like the Engliſh Monarch, and of collecting around his perſon all the friends of order and of the Monarchy. The blood that would then have flowed, would have been ſhed in the field of battle, inſtead of being poured forth at human ſhambles—thoſe who had fallen in the conteſt would have honourably loſt their lives, ſword in hand, inſtead of being the victims of maſſacre, butchery

and

and "judicial murder"—and had the civil war, like that in England, terminated fatally for the royal cauſe, the reſult would, moſt probably, have been infinitely leſs dreadful than the events which have occurred. The Sovereign, ſuppoſing his perſon to have been ſeized, would, at the worſt, have experienced the fate which has actually attended him. The ſupreme power would, by the very operation and ſucceſs of the conteſt, have been conſolidated in the hands of a few, perhaps of one; the horrors of *popular* anarchy would thus have been avoided, and the Revolution would never have aſſumed that ferocity of character, by which it has been diſtinguiſhed. The Nobles would have ſubmitted to an authority which they could not reſiſt, and which could for a time have maintained itſelf without the aid of "bloody murders and cruel confiſcations;" and ſome Cromwell, rather than a Robeſpierre, would have found means to concentre the power in himſelf*; until the nation, weary of ſubmiſſion to

* In ſuppoſing that *ſome Cromwell* would, in the caſe alluded to, have attained the ſummit of power, I rather refer to the *quality* than the *quantity* of character (if I may ſo expreſs mpſelf) which a *French* Cromwell would have poſſeſſed. Indeed, I hardly conceive that times like theſe, ſo luxurious, ſo enervating, ſo frivolous, ſo characterized by levity and *non-chalance*, ſo far removed from the manly and invigorating ſyſtem of chivalry, are, in *any* country, competent to the production of a Cromwell like that of the laſt century. The character and ſituation of this great wicked man, are finely deſcribed by the Rev. J. Brand, in his valuable work, intitled "an Hiſtorical Eſſay on Political Aſſociations."

uſurped authority, had, like the Engliſh, with one voice called for the reſtoration of the lawful heir; and every thing "would (according to Mr. E.'s obſervation) have ſtood in its place, and conſpired to favour his Reſtoration."

Such, as far as analogy can afford us a ground for reaſoning, would, we may ſuppoſe, have been the conſequences of a civil war in France, even if the King's arms had been unſucceſsful. But it is likely that the continental powers would have given to the French monarch, when engaged in open war with his rebellious ſubjects, that aid, which they could not ſo well afford him, while he was diſpoſed to ſubmit to every demand made by thoſe ſubjects; and the foreign interference, which is now only an artful fiction of a perverſe party, would then have been a reality, alike honourable in its object and beneficial in its conſequences.

I have dwelt on the internal occurrences in France, at this important juncture, not only becauſe they were neceſſary to explain that emigration, the cauſes of which are ſo groſly misſtated by Mr. E., but becauſe they convey ſo uſeful and ſalutary a leſſon to other countries, and to future times. It would be well if every Sovereign in the world would ſtudy this inſtructive period of the French Revolution, and view it in its relation to ſubſequent events. He would then learn that nothing is ſo vain and treacherous as the hope of aſſuaging the deſires, of conciliating the favour, and of exciting the gratitude

gratitude of factious men, whose demands are sure to increase with every concession; that it is his indispensible duty at once to face every danger, and to risk any extremity, rather than suffer any invasion of his just and lawful rights, or permit the constitutional previleges of those orders, which immediately support the Throne, to be infringed; and that, in political establishments, innovation is the sure road to subversion. The people too of every country may derive great benefit from attentively considering the transactions of this period. They will there see that the greatest possible misfortune, which can befal them, is to be deprived of the protection of their lawful Government; that the attainment of the objects which they pursue with the greatest ardour, and which they are taught to consider as essential to their felicity, may render them miserable beyond all description; and that the men who flatter them most, and who, under professions of the greatest regard, inspire them with discontent, or stimulate them to acts of violence, are their worst enemies, and seek only, by the aid of popularity, to raise themselves to power; on the attainment of which they will innstantly trample on the rights and sport with the lives of those, whom they had made the blind instruments of their ambition.

It is now easy to solve, in a most satisfactory manner, the difficulty suggested by Mr. E. in the following *quere*.——"Why the sagacity of that arch-statesman Cromwell did not foresee the consequences

of the nobles and great men having ſubmitted to his authority, inſtead of emigrating like perſons of a ſimilar deſcription in France."

It is plain that Mr. E. meant to inquire why Cromwell did not *prevent* the conſequences alluded to; ſince, without his ſo doing, it would have been of no avail to have *foreſeen* them. The anſwer to the above queſtion is ſo obvious, that no one, I will venture to ſay, would, without Mr. E.'s aſſiſtance, have found the leaſt difficulty in ſolving it to his ſatisfaction. Cromwell would have forfeited all claim to the character of an "arch ſtateſman" if he had, by acts of cruelty and oppreſſion, compelled the nobles and great men to emigrate, when he was able, without ſuch violent means, to enforce their ſubmiſſion to his authority. A tyrant of much *leſs* ſagacity than himſelf would have abſtained from unneceſſary rigour, the only effect of which would have been to produce oppoſition to his government, rather than acquieſcence under it. Even Robeſpierre himſelf, monſter as he was, would, upon maxims of policy, have avoided the effuſion of blood, if he had not found it neceſſary to the maintenance of his power. For as Mr. E. ſoon afterwards obſerves, "neither in England, nor in France, nor in any any other country, will men bear bloody murders or cruel confiſcations, but under the preſſure of ſome actual or apparent neceſſity, to form the tyrants plea;" and as that *neceſſity* did not exiſt in England,

Cromwell

Cromwell muſt have been a fool to reſort to meaſures which *men would not bear without it.*

As to the diſtant conſequences which might reſult, and which in fact did reſult, from the continuance of the nobility and gentry in this country, there is no reaſon to believe that they were diſcovered even by Cromwell's penetration. For it is not at all unlikely that he was led, by the ſeducing influence of ſucceſsful ambition, to form the moſt flattering pictures of a laſting empire, in himſelf and his poſterity; a hope which could ſcarcely appear chimerical after the immenſe difficulties which he had ſurmounted. But if he *had* ſuſpected theſe conſequences in queſtion, it is invariably the intereſt and the plan of uſurpers to look rather to the preſent than the future, to render their *poſſeſſion* as firm and ſecure as poſſible, and to ward off, as long they can, the reſtoration of thoſe rights, which they are apprehenſive muſt ſucceed at laſt, but the ſucceſs of which they would accelerate by rendering themſelves unneceſſarily odious.

This is the anſwer which naturally preſents itſelf to the mind upon reading Mr. E.'s queſtion. Now what is the anſwer which he himſelf furniſhes? I will give it in his own words, " He (Cromwell) could not do it. The powers of Europe, and his own ſubjects through their interference, did not furniſh him with the occaſion. Neither in England nor in France, nor in any other country, will men bear bloody murders, or cruel confiſcations, but under the

the preſſure of ſome actual or apparent neceſſity to form the tyrant's plea. This plauſible and unfortunate plea was given by confederated Europe, but principally by England, to the tyrants of France; and thus the Republic became not only conſolidated for the preſent, but the return of ſuch a ſtate of things was inevitably prevented, as might have led to a Reſtoration in France, like that which followed the Commonwealth in England."

It is evident from the terms of this anſwer that the ſole object of the queſtion, which apparently relates to England, was, by way of reply, to introduce an alluſion to the caſe of France. But in fact the reply is not applicable to the events which have happened in either country. For it is not true in reſpect of France, as I have already ſhewn, that the powers of Europe afforded the occaſion of that emigration which took place. It is not true that *this plauſible and unfortunate plea*, or that any plea for compelling the nobility, gentry, and clergy of France to emigrate into foreign countries, was furniſhed by thoſe powers. For their emigration took place before the war; and was, as we have ſeen, a flight from perſecution and death, from the flames of their dwellings, and the aſſaſſin's dagger, rather than a flocking to a ſtandard, as Mr. E. would fain induce his readers to conſider it: and if that ſtandard, which exiſted only in his own fancy, had really been erected, what attraction could it have had for the timid women and ſucking children who emigrated with

with their huſbands and their fathers, or for thoſe crowds of unwarlike prieſts, who, to ſave their lives, doomed themſelves to beggary and wretchedneſs in a ſtrange land?

I am at a loſs to conceive how a confederacy of all the powers of Europe, formed for the expreſs purpoſe of reſtoring the monarchy of France, if ſuch a confederacy had exiſted, could have furniſhed "a plauſible plea" even for thoſe "bloody murders" which continued after the war, and which rendered France a charnel houſe. I cannot conceive how it could be aſſigned as a plea for the maſſacre of great numbers of defenceleſs creatures in priſon, and in the interior parts of the country, far removed from the din of arms. In every point of view, therefore, in which the ſubject can be conſidered, the charge advanced by Mr. E. againſt the confederated powers, of having furniſhed the occaſion and the plea for ſuch barbarities, is the groſſeſt calumny. But when that charge is "*principally*" levelled againſt Great Britain, the country to which our author belongs, and againſt the government to which he owes reſpect and allegiance, it is infinitely worſe than a *calumny*. I will, leave it to Mr. E.'s conſcience, in a moment of calm reflection, to inform him in what light ſuch a charge ought to be conſidered.

I will conclude my obſervations on the compariſon introduced by Mr. E. between the two caſes of England and France, by propoſing in my turn a queſtion to that honourable gentleman. Why did

not

not the rebellion in England give occaſion to a confederacy, among the powers of Europe, ſimilar to *that*, which, though it did not produce the effects which he has aſcribed to it, has nevertheleſs certainly exiſted, in conſequence of the French Revolution? Mr. E. would doubtleſs anſwer, *becauſe there was no William Pitt on the Continent, to preach a cruſade, and to excite the princes of Europe to invade England, and to ſurround her with external war.* But the true anſwer is, that the rebellion in England was, in principle and in object, ſtrictly confined to that country, and did not, like the Revolution of France, ſeek to extend its effects, either by way of example, or by force of arms, to other countries. It was no part of the plan of the promoters and principal agents of the Engliſh rebellion to diſturb other governments, nor did they, in fact, endeavour to ſtimulate the ſubjects of thoſe governments to rebel againſt their ſovereigns.—The philoſophy of the Rights of Man was not ſufficiently advanced, to encourage them to engage in projects ſo extenſive; otherwiſe, I doubt not, they would have been ready enough ſo to do. But if the wiſh of the Engliſh republicans had been like that, which Briſſot acknowledged, to have actuated French republicans, before the 10th of Auguſt, 1792, "to eſtabliſh liberty in all Europe, by exciting the governed againſt the governors, and by exhibiting to the people the advantages of ſuch inſurrections."—If the Rump Parliament had aſſumed the function which Danton aſſigned to the French Convention,

that

that of being a Committee of Inſurrection," (not merely againſt the Britiſh Monarch, but againſt all the Kings in the univerſe;—if that Parliament had iſſued a Decree of Fraternity to excite every people to revolt, or declared, as France did, by another Decree, that ſhe would treat as enemies, "the people who, refuſing or renouncing liberty, ſhould determine to preſerve their Princes and privileged caſts;"—then, undoubtedly, the Powers of Europe would have confederated, as well to avenge ſuch inſults, as to prevent the accompliſhment of ſuch audacious deſigns; even if England had not, like France, ſucceſſively declared war againſt all its neighbours, and thereby reduced every act of hoſtility, on their part, to the ſimple principle of ſelf-defence, againſt an actual and direct attack.

Whatever cauſes may have contributed to produce that emigration, which has been one of the moſt diſgraceful conſequences of the French Revolution, Mr. E. argues upon the change of property, which is one of its effects, in a manner very diſcouraging to thoſe, who (like me) conſider the *exiſtence* of the new Republic, as fraught with the utmoſt danger to all the old Governments of Europe, our own not excepted. For, in conſequence of that change of property, Mr. E. conſiders the Republic as immoveably eſtabliſhed. "It ſtands (ſays he) upon a rock. It exiſts no longer from force but from will. It depends no longer upon opinion, but leans upon intereſt; and not

merely upon that general intereſt, which, after a ſtate of great agitation, naturally inclines a nation to reſt, but upon a particular and individual intereſt univerſally ſpread. The very exiſtence of all claſſes of the people now depends wholly upon the power and the continuance of the State. There is ſcarcely any property in France, real or perſonal, which in the hands of the preſent poſſeſſors, has any other foundation. There is no ancient undiſputed poſſeſſion of land which has ever been a title in moſt changes of human Governments: there is no money which may be buried till the ſtorm is overblown. On the contrary the land is almoſt univerſally held by the public creditors againſt the former poſſeſſors, either under a ſale from the Government, or as a pledge for money lent to it; and the paper currency of the nation (which is its perſonal eſtate) may, without loſs to the proprietors, be torn into a thouſand pieces, unleſs the Republic continue to be ONE AND INDIVISIBLE."

It is impoſſible to peruſe the above paſſage without noticing the extreme *ſang froid*, with which Mr. E. ſeems to expatiate upon the change of property which has taken place in France, in conſequence of the Revolution. Who could ſuſpect from that peruſal, that ſuch a change was effected by the moſt atrocious ſyſtem of violence, injuſtice, and robbery, that ever diſgraced any nation? Who could ſuſpect that the author's reſidence in the country is almoſt ſurrounded by unfortunate victims of that ſyſtem,

ſyſtem, or, that he cannot look out of his window, without caſting his eyes upon ſome of thoſe diſconſolate wanderers, who a little while ſince, in rank and opulence, at leaſt equalled himſelf? I do not, by theſe obſervations, mean to impute to him a want of humanity. I know that his heart is warm with every generous and benevolent feeling. I know that he ſuppreſſed his feelings in favour of his argument. But the queſtion cannot be juſtly ſtated without taking into the account, what he has purpoſely and ſtudiouſly omitted. I muſt, therefore, recal to his recollection the cauſe of thoſe effects on which he lays ſo much ſtreſs, and remind him of the manner in which they were brought about.

It was a principle of the *philoſophical* ſyſtem introduced into France, and called the Rights of Man, totally to diſregard all thoſe rights which man had been accuſtomed to conſider as ſacred, and in the inviolability of which conſiſts the well being of ſociety. Accordingly, one of the diſtinguiſhing features of the French Revolution has been a violation of the rights of property. The Clergy were the firſt to experience that there was no ſecurity, under the new ſyſtem, for rights of that deſcription, and they were, without the ſmalleſt ceremony, plilaged and diſpoiled, in open contempt both of humanity, juſtice, and religion. The booty thus acquired was not, however, found adequate to the wants of revolutionary rapacity, and the eſtates of

the Nobility were ſoon beholden with a wiſhful eye, as affording an inexhauſtible ſource of plunder. But, the titles, by which thoſe eſtates were holden, ſeemed to preſent a more formidable barrier to incurſion, than the equally well founded, but leſs reſpected rights of the church. That difficulty was eaſily ſurmounted by the aid of the lamp-iron, the torch, and the dagger; the terror of which drove great numbers of the nobility out of France, and, by a refinement of cruelty of which none but modern Philoſophers would have been capable, an eſcape from butchery was converted into a pretext for confiſcation. Thus did the Revolution thrive, for a time, upon the ſpoils of the Church, and the plunder of the Nobility; but although theſe reſources have been long ſince diſſipated, Mr. E. repreſents the new title of violence and injuſtice, under which the preſent poſſeſſors hold their eſtates, as giving to the Republic the ſolidity of a rock.

It is a moſt unfavourable ſymptom of Mr. E's opinion of human nature, that he can conſider ſuch a baſis as capable of affording a ſolid and laſting foundation, for any political eſtabliſhment. For my part I think more favourably of the human mind, which I conſider as poſſeſſing ſome innate principles of juſtice; which, though they may be ſuppreſſed for a time, nothing can eradicate, and which render all ſyſtems, erected upon ſuch a foundation, extremely precarious and unſtable. Beſides, Mr. E. exceedingly exaggerates even this cauſe of the ſuppoſed durability

of

of the French Republic; for the change of property has not been, by many degrees, ſo general as he repreſents it.

Happily the imperfect capacities of human nature impoſe a reſtraint even on its vices, and *that* wickedneſs, which in intention knows no bounds, in execution generally falls very ſhort of its original purpoſe.

From a variety of cauſes which it is not neceſſary to enumerate, numbers, even of the proſcribed claſſes, have remained in uninterrupted poſſeſſion of their property, many who had emigrated have found means to return to the enjoyment of their eſtates, and a very large proportion of Proprietors, real as well as perſonal, did not long belong to thoſe claſſes. Beſides, thoſe perſons who have been ſo kind as call themſelves the Nation, have been unable to find purchaſers for a great part of the confiſcated property, and that which they could diſpoſe of, has been ſold at a very low price; for the purchaſers not conceiving (like Mr. E.) that the Republic was founded upon a Rock, did not place a very high eſtimation on a title ſo derived; and their prudence, if not their conſciences, ſuggeſted to them that, in ſpite of all the decrees which the Convention could paſs, original and long eſtabliſhed rights, though overborne by violence, would command reſpect in the eyes both of God and man. From theſe conſiderations it will appear, that Mr. E's aſſertion, that "there is ſcarcely any property in France, real or perſonal,

perſonal, which, in the hands of the preſent poſſeſſors, has any other foundation than the power and continuance of the State," is at leaſt extremely exaggerated: and as the poſſeſſors of property of that deſcription, have in general purchaſed at a price vaſtly below the intrinſic value of their purchaſes, (upon an average below one-ſixth or perhaps one-eighth of that value) it is not at all unlikely that many of them would be diſpoſed to enter into ſuch terms of compromiſe with the original owners, as the latter would find it their intereſt to accord; and thus the Republican Rock, would be undermined by thoſe who have the greateſt intereſt in its ſtability *.

The inhabitants of France, and even the rulers of that country, entertain ſentiments very different from thoſe of Mr. E. on this ſubject. Far from thinking that *there is a particular and individual intereſt univerſally ſpread*, derived from the change of property during the Revolution, there is ſcarcely a meeting of the Councils which does not abound with the complaints of the Jacobins, that the purchaſers of national property are not ſuffered quietly to enjoy their acquiſitions;—nay, that the general deteſtation againſt them is ſo ſtrong, that even

* It has not been unuſual for the eſtates of Emigrants to ſell at leſs than 2 years value. And as a proof of the little confidence repoſed in the new title derived from confiſcation, it has been recently ſtated in a French paper, that the leaſes of lands ſo acquired, are made ſubject to the claims of M. le Comte or M. le Baron, in caſe thoſe claims ſhould ever be ſubſtantiated.

their

their perſons are not ſecure. I will give one ſpecimen of this nature, taken from the ſitting of the Council of Five Hundred, July 4th, in which Bailleul complains that the " public ſpirit is perverted, the Emigrants return in crowds, the baniſhed Prieſts revolt and murder—*the purchaſers of national domains are aſſaſſinated. On all ſides are found the expiring bodies* of faithful Adminiſtrators—*of virtuous acquirers of national property.*" The ſame ſitting was diſtinguiſhed by a meſſage from the Directory, containing details " of the melancholy ſituation of the *Commune* at Lyons," where, as well as in the neighbouring departments, theſe humane and compaſſionate rulers inform the Council, that " the acquirers of national domains are devoted to poignards." Theſe pictures though doubtleſs much exaggerated, demonſtrate the fallacy of Mr. E's reaſoning on this ſubject. That fallacy is, indeed, ſufficiently proved by the laſt election, by which a third was returned to the two Councils, conſiſting almoſt entirely of men who favour the return of the Prieſts and of the Lay Emigrants, and who cannot be prevailed on to take any ſteps to quiet the poſſeſſion of the purchaſers of national property.

Admitting, however, for the ſake of argument, that the change of property were as complete as Mr. E. ſtates it to be, it would by no means follow that the Republic has any ſolid foundation. Such a circumſtance might indeed prevent a preſent return of that ancient ſyſtem of which the deſpoiled

claſſes

claſſes were eſſential and integral parts, but it would not prevent a ſubſtitution of ſome other monarchical ſyſtem in the place of the Republic. I do not mean to inſinuate that any other form of Monarchy than the ancient one can be durable. I am convinced it cannot. I am convinced that France will continue a prey to domeſtic convulſions until ſhe returns to her duty, and ſubmits herſelf to her lawful Government. But if every proprietor in France held under the new title derived from confiſcation, it would not follow that the Republic would acquire a capacity of permanence, if it be, as I ſhall ſoon ſhew, deſtitute in its nature of that capacity.

If therefore the Republic has no other ſupport than a change of property, (and Mr. E. does not inſinuate that it has) inſtead of being founded on a *rock*, it is built upon *ſand*. I am not very anxious to launch into conjectures reſpecting the probable duration of this modern Coloſſus; but I will not heſitate to deliver it as my deliberate opinion, that the French Republic poſſeſſes no internal principle of coherence. It is not connected by any of thoſe *moral* ties which form the ſtrength of political inſtitutions. It is not ſupported by thoſe habits of ſubordination, or thoſe ſentiments of reſpect, duty and allegiance, which conſtitute the chief force of government, and the firmeſt cement of ſociety. The very principles on which it is founded, and which it has aſſiduouſly inculcated into the minds of its ſubjects, are at direct variance with ſuch habits

and

and ſuch ſentiments. Beſides it is not in the nature of things that a people ſhould reſpect an uſurped authority. There is a native dignity in the human mind, which makes it revolt at the idea of ſubmiſſion to any power that is not ſanctioned by ancient and indiſputable right; but when, beſides being deſtitute of ſuch a ſanction, it is in the hands of perſons elevated from the loweſt rank, and who have no pretenſions to diſtinction but what they derive from their newly acquired authority, it is not only odious but contemptible. It cannot therefore be doubted that the people of France moſt heartily deſpiſe their upſtart rulers; and all the accounts we receive from that country confirm this ſuppoſition, and prove that the Gallic tyrants are objects of ſcorn as well as deteſtation. The fear which they inſpire, and which is the ſole ſecurity for their power, cannot preſerve them from open contempt and deriſion.

The new Conſtitution, inſtead of affording ſtrength to the Republic, is one cauſe of its weakneſs, and will probably prove the means of its deſtruction. That Conſtitution was formed by the faction which was at war with the Jacobins, and it was intended to complete and to ſecure the triumph, which that faction had obtained over thoſe terrible enemies. For that purpoſe it was ſo framed as not only to diſavow their leading principles, but to check and controul the operation of thoſe principles. Hence it is that this Conſtitution is profeſſedly and in principle Anti-Jacobin. And it re-

quires very little penetration to diſcover that it will either become the prey of the Jacobins, or prove fatal to the Republic. For the natural Conſtitution of the Republic is Jacobiniſm. It was Jacobinical in its origin, it is Jacobinical in its eſſence and in its habits. Jacobiniſm is its element, and it muſt return to that element or it will expire. It will, therefore, for the preſervation of its own exiſtence be conſtantly and *inſtinctively* endeavouring to revert to the Jacobin ſyſtem. But the exceſſive terror with which the experience of this horrible ſtate of human exiſtence has inſpired the minds of the people, will make them ſtruggle to prevent its return, and the preſent Conſtitution, by affording them an opportunity of manifeſting their wiſhes, and of exerting their influence, through the medium of two diſtinct Aſſemblies, will perhaps enable them to prevent its regaining the aſcendancy.

Thus the Republic, even as it is now conſtituted, inſtead of poſſeſſing any internal principle of union, is compoſed of the moſt diſcordant materials, and has a direct tendency to diſſolution. What then is the tie that holds it together? Mr. E. has already furniſhed the anſwer to this queſtion. "*The neceſſity of reſiſting by combination external war, can alone counteract the ſeparation ariſing from her internal commotions.*" The ſeeds of thoſe commotions are ſown as thickly as ever, and whenever the preſſure of foreign war ſhall be removed, ſhe muſt be again expoſed to "*be rent aſunder by internal diviſions.*" Nothing but external

ternal force can compreſs this republican maſs into any kind of union or coherence. The Republic would ſoon periſh in its own fires, if it were to remain at peace with its neighbours. The Demon of the Republic will, therefore, be inceſſantly exerting its malign influence to keep alive, or to rekindle the flames of war, for which, it is to be feared, occaſions and pretexts will never be wanting *. And although the preſent conteſt ſhould be terminated by a general peace, a ſecond Briſſot may hereafter ſay of a future war; *but for the war France had ceaſed to be a Republic; but for the war the Conſtitution of* 1795 *had not been aboliſhed.*

It is of the utmoſt importance that the great powers of Europe ſhould be impreſſed with this incontrovertible truth, that THE FRENCH REPUBLIC CAN SUBSIST ONLY AS A MILITARY REPUBLIC. They will then be aware of the danger to which they muſt inevitably be expoſed at the concluſion of a general peace, and they will diſcover the means of repelling that danger. They will ſee the neceſſity of being ready and determined to ſupport each other, the moment the Republic ſhall ſhow a diſpoſition to attack any one of them. For ſhe will

* The preſent conduct of France in Italy proves that while ſhe purſues, with conſtantly increaſing avidity, her revolutionary ſyſtem in other countries, ſhe is making that ſyſtem ſubſervient to her military projects. Who can behold the immenſe ravages which ſhe is making among the Italian ſtates, without being convinced that ſhe is providing, by anticipation, pretexts as well as means for future wars.

be cautious, as ſhe has been during the preſent war, of raiſing againſt her a greater number of enemies than ſhe can encounter at once, and, while engaged with one Power, it will be her policy to continue at peace with the reſt, that ſhe may devour them one after another. But unleſs they ſhould forget all the leſſons which they have ſo dearly purchaſed, they will reſolve to conſider her attack of any one Power, however inſignificant, as an attack upon all, and they will be prepared to fall upon her with their united force, in order to prevent that gradual and ſucceſſive demolition, which it will be her grand object to accompliſh. By acting on ſuch a principle they will have a chance of preſerving the general peace, and of compelling France to keep her engagements, which ſhe may chuſe to do, rather than venture to face all Europe with her diſmounted batteries: and thus the Republic, deprived of her only ſupport, external war, will fall to pieces, and give place to a ſyſtem which may be compatible with ſocial order and general tranquillity. So much for the *rock* on which Mr. E. has thought proper to place this *heterogeneous* Republic.

It cannot fail to afford real ſatisfaction to every friend to Chriſtianity, to ſee Mr. E. in theſe days of infidelity, ſtand forward and avow himſelf a believer and a Chriſtian, in terms ſo emphatical, as the following: "No man ever exiſted who is more alive to every thing connected with the Chriſtian faith

faith than the author of theſe pages, or more unalterably impreſſed with its truths." p. 56*

I am diſpoſed to give Mr. E. full credit for the utmoſt ſincerity in this pious declaration, difficult as it is to reconcile it with the temper of mind diſplayed in the paſſage, by which he introduces this important and intereſting topic. He there ſays, "But it was a conteſt, it ſeems to ſave religion and its holy altars from prophanation and annihilation. Of all the pretences by which the abſurd zeal of the people of England has been hurried on to a blind ſupport of miniſters, this alarm for the chriſtian religion is the moſt impudent and prepoſterous. How it could ſucceed a moment in an enlightened age, and with a nation of chriſtians, will probably be conſidered hereafter as one of the moſt remarkable events, which has diſtinguiſhed this age of wonders."

As Chriſtian charity is eſſentially connected with the Chriſtian faith, how was it poſſible for ſo zealous an adherent to that faith as Mr. E., to be guilty of ſo violent and illiberal an attack upon all perſons, who happened to ſee the ſubject in a different light

* The late famous and eloquent ſpeech of Mr. E. in the Court of King's Bench, in defence of Chriſtianity, againſt the impious attacks of its inveterate enemy, Thomas Paine, deſerves the applauſe of the whole Chriſtian world. That ſpeech affords a convincing proof that good ſentiments predominate in Mr E.'s breaſt, and that he is upon principle attached to the cauſe of order, morality, and religion, although under the influence of political attachments and antipathies, he has laboured ſo much to injure that cauſe.

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from himſelf? If thoſe perſons were ſenſible of alarm, when he was full of confidence and ſecurity, he ſhould, upon the principles of the holy religion he profeſſes, have endeavoured to diſpel their fears, to animate their hopes, and to tranquillize their minds, rather than wound them with the bitterneſs of reproach. I truſt that I ſhall never, on any occaſion, be leſs ready than Mr. E. to avow myſelf a Chriſtian; though far from feeling myſelf intitled to boaſt of ſo fervent a piety as that by which he is animated, I am conſcious that the utmoſt humility ſhould accompany my profeſſions on that ſubject. But if, in conſequence of the weakneſs of my faith, I look with terror upon the French Revolution, and conſider it as the moſt dreadful enemy that Chriſtianity ever had to encounter, I ſhould not have expected a fellow Chriſtian of greater experience, and of higher attainments, to treat my alarm as "*impudent and prepoſterous.*" Does Mr. E. reſerve all his charity and kindeſs for thoſe, who have either openly renounced the faith he profeſſes, or who in their practice (at leaſt) appear to be totally deſtitute of all ſenſe of religion? He cannot be ignorant that the perſons in France, whoſe defence he ſo zealouſly eſpouſes, are of the former deſcription, and that moſt of thoſe with whom he acts and aſſociates in England, and towards whom he has, in his preſent work, expreſſed the moſt ardent attachment, are of the latter. And yet ſuch are the perſons, who ſo intirely engroſs all his tenderneſs, that he has none left for his Chriſtian brethren

thren, who are under the influence of alarm for the ſafety of that cauſe, which is not more dear to him than to them.

In juſtification of this attack upon thoſe, who could not like himſelf view with calmneſs and indifference the progreſs and the ſucceſs of a ſyſtem, which they conſidered as eſſentially hoſtile to the intereſts of Chriſtianity, our author asks," Who had ever heard of the Chriſtianity of the French Court, and its ſurrounding nobles, towards whom the hurricane of the Revolution was principally directed? Who had ever heard of their evangelical characters ſo as to lead to an apprehenſion that Chriſtianity muſt be extinguiſhed with their extinction?" But for the ſolemn aſſurances which Mr. E. has given reſpecting himſelf, I ſhould have ſuppoſed this to be the language of a ſcoffer at all religion, rather than of a man ſo *feelingly alive to every thing connected with the Chriſtian faith.* In reply to the queſtion ſo triumphantly put, *who ever heard of the Chriſtianity and evangelical character of the French Court and its ſurrounding nobles?* I might aſk who ever heard of the evangelical character of that court and of thoſe nobles, inſiſted on as the grounds of that alarm for the intereſts of Chriſtianity, which Mr. E. has cenſured with ſo much ſeverity? Admitting that not only the French Court and its ſurrounding nobles, but the whole country of France, afforded the moſt inconteſtible proofs of the decline of religion, (and I wiſh the nobles and people of this country did not afford the ſame cauſe

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for complaint, notwithſtanding the excellent example exhibited by the Britiſh Court); admitting that a ſpirit of infidelity had made a rapid progreſs throughout that kingdom, (a natural conſequence of the currency of thoſe writings and the propagation of principles which were the prediſpoſing cauſes of the French Revolution); yet who ever doubted that Chriſtianity was the profeſſed religion of the French Court and of its ſurrounding nobles? Who ever doubted that the forms (at leaſt) of this religion were preſerved, however its ſpirit might be enfeebled? And will Mr. E. pretend to compare the worſe than heatheniſh ſyſtem, introduced by the Revolution, with the profeſſion and practice, ſuch as they were, of the French Court? will he pretend to ſay, that the intereſts of religion and its influence on ſociety, have not materially ſuffered by the change? Will he aſſert that even that diſſipated Court did not contain perſons, whoſe lives were as pure, and whoſe piety was as ſincere and as fervent as his own? Or can he forget that the Monarch who was at the head of that Court, beſides poſſeſſing every private virtue that can adorn the human character, was a *religious* Prince, and that his religion ſtood the ſevereſt teſt to which it could be expoſed, and ſupported him through the moſt trying ſcenes, in which it can be the lot of humanity to appear?

Suppoſing, however, that the imputation contained in the above queſtion, reſpecting the perſons who compoſed the Gallic Court and Nobility, were

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as juſt as it is illiberal, it is extremely inaccurate to ſay that "the hurricane of the Revolution was principally directed towards ſuch perſons. The fury of that hurricane was firſt directed againſt the Clergy of France, who had ſcarcely yielded to the treacherous invitation of the Commons, to join the National Aſſembly, than they were robbed, perſecuted, and compelled, either to abandon their ſacred functions and their only means of ſubſiſtence, or to take an oath incompatible with the fundamental principles of their faith. From a perſecution of the Miniſters of Religion, the Revolution proceeded, by a quick tranſition, to the attack of religion itſelf, until at length it openly renounced chriſtianity—it *publicly diſclaimed all belief in the exiſtence of a God*, and in *the immortality of the ſoul*—it *gloried in atheiſm*—it *ſuppreſſed all religious worſhip*, and, horrible to repeat, it *converted blaſphemy as well as infidelity into a ſyſtem of Education*. It ſeems, indeed, that the Revolution has been diſtinguiſhed, if poſſible, by a ſtill more bitter and implacable hatred to religion and its Miniſters, than even to Monarchy itſelf—that its favourite employment has been to raiſe its impious hands againſt the MAJESTY OF HEAVEN—and that it has ſingled out, as its *choiceſt* victims thoſe, who were devoted to the ſervice of the KING OF KINGS*.

* Nothing has been omitted by this truly infernal Revolution that could tend to inflict a fatal wound on the intereſts of religion, and

But to prove the abſurdity of all alarm for Chriſtianity, on account of the ſucceſs of the French cauſe, Mr. E. chiefly relies on the certainty, in which all true Chriſtians rejoice, that this religion, being a divine eſtabliſhment, will finally prevail over all oppoſition. On this ſubject he aſks, "Who that ever really profeſſed the chriſtian religion from the times of the apoſtles to the preſent moment, ever before conſidered it as a human eſtabliſhment, the work of particular men or nations, ſubject to decline with their changes, or to periſh with their falls?" and ſoon afterwards he exclaims, "Weak men, not to have remembered, before they diſturbed the repoſe of the world by their pious apprehenſions, that the fabric of Chriſtianity was raiſed in direct oppoſition to all the powers and eſtabliſhments of the world, and that we have the au-

and to exterminate chriſtianity from the face of the earth. The Author of "a Reſidence in France by a Lady" (a work that I am unable to praiſe as it deſerves) juſtly aſcribes the new republican calendar to that impious deſign. "Amidſt the more miſchievous changes of a Philoſophic Revolution" (ſays this incomparable writer) "you will have learned from the newſpapers, that the French have adopted a new æra and a new calendar, the one dating from the foundation of their republic, the other deſcriptive of the climate of Paris, and the productions of the French territory. It was hoped that a new arrangement of the year, and a different nomenclature of the months, ſo as to baniſh all the commemorations of Chriſtianity, might prepare the way for aboliſhing religion itſelf; and if it were poſſible to impoſe the uſe of the new calender, ſo far as to exclude the old one, this might certainly aſſiſt their more ſerious atheiſtical operations."

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thority of God himſelf, that all the nations of the earth ſhall be finally gathered under its ſhadow. Raſh men, not to have reflected before they embarked in this cruſade of deſolation, that however good may be attained through evil, in the myſterious ſyſtem of Divine providence, it is not for man to ſupport that religion which commands peace and good will upon earth, by a deliberate and deep laid ſyſtem of bloodſhed, famine, and devaſtation."

Mr. E. takes care never to loſe any opportunity of introducing the charge of aggreſſion againſt this country, and he conſtantly takes the truth of that charge for granted, with as much confidence, as if he had ſupported it by the moſt incontrovertible evidence. We are not, however, to be ſurpriſed, by ſuch artifices, into a forgetfulneſs of the indiſputable truth, that the guilt of having "diſturbed the peace of the world;"—of having "embarked in a cruſade of deſolation,"—and of having purſued "a deliberate ſyſtem of bloodſhed, famine, and devaſtation," is imputable, not to us, but to France.

With reſpect to the main point here inſiſted on, I am as fully convinced as Mr. E. can be, that Chriſtianity will ſtand its ground againſt all oppoſition, and that it will finally obtain a complete triumph over all its adverſaries. In cheriſhing this belief I know that I rely on an authority that cannot err. But as I am ignorant of the time when this glorious victory will be accom-

pliſhed, as I conceive it very probable that it will be preceded by great fluctuations of ſucceſs, and as, for aught I know, the influence of Chriſtianity may be at a very low ebb before the happy period ſhall arrive, when "all the nations of the earth ſhall be finally gathered together under its ſhadow,"—I conſider it as a juſt cauſe for alarm, to every age and to every Chriſtian, when ſyſtems, hoſtile to this divine religion, are gaining ground among men. I feel it to be my duty to reſiſt, by all the means in my power, the progreſs of ſuch ſyſtems; not, indeed, for the ſake of Chriſtianity itſelf, but for that of the generation to which I belong, whoſe happineſs in both worlds ſo eſſentially depends upon the *preſent* prevalence and ſpread of the true faith.

For this faith, though not liable, as Mr. E. obſerves, to *periſh with the fall of particular men or nations*, nor, indeed, as he might have added, with that of all Chriſtendom, is certainly "ſubject to *decline* with thoſe changes," that would ſubſtitute the temporal dominion of its enemies, in the place of that of its profeſſors. A neglect to diſtinguiſh between the two caſes of an utter deſtruction, of which it is not ſuſceptible, and of a temporary decline to which it is undoubtedly expoſed, ſeems to have led Mr. E. to reaſon ſo erroneouſly on this ſubject.

But, on the above grounds, it is impoſſible to deny, that the ambition and the arms of a nation of infidels and atheiſts, are much more to be dreaded

dreaded than thoſe of a Chriſtian Power. And however Engliſhmen may have been accuſtomed to contemplate, with horror and indignation, the projects of univerſal empire attributed to the French Monarchy, Mr. E. will ſcarcely venture to aſſert, that the ſucceſs of ſuch a project on the part of the French Republic, would not, (on account of the intereſts and influence of religion) be an infinitely greater calamity. I beg leave, therefore, to conſider as a matter of exultation, what Mr. E. makes a ſubject of reproach, that the change which has taken place in France, in reſpect of religion, has ever appeared to me to afford an additional motive for vigour and energy in the proſecution of the preſent war; for ſurely *no* exertion ſhould have been ſpared to repel thoſe attacks, which had for their object, not merely the ſubverſion of our Government, but the eſtabliſhment of that impious ſyſtem, which, under the impoſing title of liberty and equality, ſeeks the deſtruction of every *religious* as well as of every *civil* eſtabliſhment.

It is but juſtice to obſerve that Mr. E. before he quits this ſubject, (though at the expence of his own conſiſtency,) vindicates the principle that human exertions may and ought to be applied for the ſupport and defence, even of the divine inſtitution of Chriſtianity. Fearful, as it ſhould ſeem, of injuring that cauſe to which he is ſo devoutly attached, while he meant only to wound his political antagoniſts, he thus qualifies (and in my opinion contradicts)

dicts) his preceding obſervations :—" *I by no means intend to inculcate by theſe obſervations, that, becauſe chriſtianity, if it be founded in truth, muſt ultimately prevail over all oppoſition, that therefore Chriſtian individuals are abſolved from their activities in its defence, or in its propagation. In this as in all other human diſpenſations, the Supreme Being acts by means that are human, and our duties are only exalted inſteado fb eing weakened by this awful conſideration.*" I wiſh for no better refutation of the charge, of " *impudent and prepoſterous alarm,*" which Mr. E. had advanced againſt all perſons, who were apprehenſive leſt the progreſs of the new French ſyſtem ſhould injure the intereſts of religion, as well as all other intereſts dear to humanity.

Mr. E. endeavours, indeed, immediately to qualify theſe apparent conceſſions, as if he were conſcious of having repelled the charge which he had before advanced ; for he adds, " but theſe duties whilſt they ſerve to quicken our zeal in what is good, can in no inſtance involve us in what is evil. They digniſy that piety which propagates the goſpel by chriſtian charities, but condemn that raſhneſs which would eſtabliſh or extend it by force." But as our zeal has in no reſpect had for its object *to eſtabliſh or extend the goſpel* by force, but merely *to employ in its defence thoſe activities, from which neither chriſtian nations, nor chriſtian individuals, can be abſolved,* it cannot be ſaid to have *involved us in what is evil* ; and we may plead the authority of Mr. E. himſelf,

ſelf, to juſtify all the ſolicitude we have felt, and all the exertions we have made, to "ſave religion and its holy altars from prophanation."

I have already far exceeded the bounds which the main queſtion I propoſed to diſcuſs ſeemed to preſcribe. But the topics which Mr. E. had brought into diſcuſſion were ſo important and intereſting, that I truſt the reader will pardon my having conſidered them ſo much at large. The remainder of Mr. E's reaſoning on that part of his ſubject which relates to the *cauſes of the war*, does not ſeem to call for much notice, becauſe it is founded upon the ſuppoſition that we *ruſhed blindly into the war*—a ſuppoſition which has been more than ſufficiently refuted. And therefore when he propoſes a ſtring of queſtions, on points which admit of no queſtion unleſs ſuch a fallacy be taken for granted, and pledges his *own reſpectability*, and even the *ſoundneſs of his intellects* on the anſwer, which the "*fair public voice of England*" is prepared to give to thoſe queſtions, it is fortunate for him that neither his reſpectability, nor his intellects, can be endangered by ſo wild and improvident a pledge.

To his obſervations on the ruinous nature of the ſyſtem of finance now purſued in this country, I ſhall reply by merely referring to the report, of the Select Committee of the Houſe of Commons, which was appointed in the laſt ſeſſion, to inquire into the

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ſtate of our finances *. This reference, I confeſs, is matter of ſurpluſage, as after a fair inveſtigation of the cauſes of the war, I do not conceive that any obſervations which take for their baſis the poſition that the war was, on our part, "*raſh and unneceſſary*," can make even the ſmalleſt impreſſion. When, therefore, Mr. E. tauntingly mocks the feelings of this country by holding up a picture of unbounded proſperity, in conjunction with uninterrupted peace, he only expoſes himſelf to that honeſt and juſt indignation, which ſo cruel and unmanly an inſult is calculated to excite.

* According to this report it appears, that by the application of the annual million, appropriated by Parliament, as a ſinking fund for the redemption of the national debt, the capital ſtock, which has been purchaſed between the 5th of July, 1786, and the 16th of March, 1797, amounted to upwards of 23 millions—that the *annual* ſum then applicable to that purpoſe, and conſiſting of the ſaid million, together with the accumulated intereſt of the ſums already redeemed, amounted to 3,359,602l. and that by the application of this ſum, with its future accumulations of various kinds, the whole of the national debt, as it exiſted before the war, will be cancelled, at the earlieſt date of calculation, in 33 years, from the 1ſt of February, 1797, and, at the remoteſt date of calculation, within 54 years from that time—the difference between theſe periods depending upon the different prices at which the various ſtocks, of which the public debt conſiſts, may happen to be purchaſed.

The debt incurred during the preſent war amounts, according to the ſame report, to 130,665,896l. But while we have been obliged to incur this additional debt for the defence of our religion, our laws, and our Conſtitution, a fund has been provided for its extinction, amounting already to the annual ſum of 1,418,749l.

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It cannot have eſcaped the obſervation of the reader, that the queſtion of Aggreſſion has been examined on the grounds, and according to the documents reſorted to by Mr. E. himſelf; and the reſult of the examination is, that France was the aggreſſor. What a ſtriking proof is this of the futility of the charge of aggreſſion which it is attempted to fix upon this country! A man of Mr. E's. abilities, profeſſional ſkill and experience, undertakes to eſtabliſh that charge. He enters the liſts for that purpoſe—not as a mercenary—but as a volunteer. He comes forward under the impulſe of feeling, and, I doubt not, with a firm conviction that he is engaged on the ſide of truth. He brings into the conteſt all the zeal of which his ardent mind is ſuſceptible. He does not, however, give vent to that zeal in an impaſſioned ſpeech. He goes into his cloſet, and, with all the advantages of ſtudy and deliberation, he collects his materials, he ſelects his topics, he arranges his arguments, and preſents the public with the reſult of his reflections and labour.

But the moſt incontrovertible proofs of the guilt of France, and conſequently, of the injuſtice of the charge advanced againſt Great Britain, though overpowered in his mind, by the zeal of party, ſhine through the miſts of ſophiſtry which he has endeavoured to caſt upon them. His work is, in effect, and very contrary to his intention, an honourable teſtimony in favour of his country. He has proved that it is impoſſible to ſtate the queſtion, with any

the leaſt regard to facts, without eſtabliſhing the juſtification of the Britiſh Government, and of the Britiſh people, both of whom he had accuſed. There is no occaſion to go into any defence. The caſe for the proſecution, though conducted by ſo able an advocate, affords the moſt complete refutation of the charge. The innocence of the party accuſed is manifeſt on the face of the evidence, collected by the greateſt ſkill and diſplayed by the greateſt ability, in ſupport of the accuſation. It would be a waſte of time to enter into other proofs. The Jury—the great nqueſt of the public—are ready to give their verdict without heſitation. They cannot, however, confine themſelves to a mere acquittal. Juſtice impels them to pronounce the charge as frivolous, vexatious and malicious, as it is unfounded; and the party, on whoſe behalf it was advanced, being arraigned at their bar, they declare him guilty, upon the evidence adduced by his own advocate, of the crime of which he had unjuſtly accuſed another.

The queſtion of Aggreſſion is thus, I truſt, for ever laid to reſt. I am convinced that Mr. E. will not think proper to meet the dilemma to which that queſtion has been reduced, and which, unleſs it can be got rid of, affords the moſt logical, and even mathematical proof, that FRANCE, inſtead of GREAT BRITAIN, was the aggreſſor. He will neither controvert the poſition, that the Declaration of war by France was a complete act of Aggreſſion, unleſs it was rendered neceſſary, in order to obtain ſatisfaction for ſome previous injury; nor will he venture

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to aſſert, after the inconteſtible proofs which he has adduced to the contrary, that any ſuch injury had been received or complained of by France, or that ſhe had applied to us for any kind of redreſs.

As little will he be diſpoſed to retract the conceſſions which his candour and love of juſtice impelled him to make, fatal as they were to his argument; and by which it is now eſtabliſhed on no leſs authothority than his own, that even previouſly to the Declaration of War, France herſelf was chargeable with acts which *no conſiderate perſon can juſtify*—that ſhe was guilty of *aggreſſions*, which left us no other alternative than *inſtant War, or ſafe and honourable Negociation*—and that we could not ſafely repoſe any confidence either in the durability of the council from which thoſe acts and aggreſſions proceeded, nor in the ſincerity of the explanations and aſſurances which they gave reſpecting their conduct and their intentions. So complete an exculpation of this Country from a charge which had been ſo often advanced by perverſe and factious men, and which, though intirely at variance with facts, had begun to acquire ſome weight from inceſſant repetition, ſhould warm every Britiſh breaſt with gratitude.

After ſo full and ſatisfactory a diſcuſſion of the main point, it cannot be neceſſary to enter into a formal examination of the reſt of Mr. E's work. The clear and convincing proof of the aggreſſion of France, which we have obtained by an inveſtigation of "the cauſes of the war," is

itſelf (for the reaſons ſuggeſted in page 5) the beſt poſſible anſwer to the charge that the war has been *purſued* "with blindneſs and obſtinacy." That proof alſo repels, in the moſt forcible manner, the cenſure which Mr. E. beſtows upon Parliament, for not liſtening to the propoſal, which Mr. Grey brought forward a few weeks after the declaration of war by France, to addreſs his Majeſty, "*imploring him to ſeize the moſt immediate opportunity of putting a ſtop to the hoſtilities which threatened all Europe with the greateſt calamities.*" That propoſal, as ſtated by Mr. E. was founded upon the charge *of miſconduct in Miniſters* "*in plunging the nation into war without any adequate neceſſity.*" Now as we have ſeen that we were plunged into the war by the miſconduct, not of Engliſh Miniſters, but of French Jacobins, the very foundation of the propoſal fails, and therefore no blame can attach, except to its own architect, if the ſuperſtructure fell to the ground. If ſuch a motion, with the ſpeech by which it was accompanied, together with other motions, and other ſpeeches of the like tendency, ſecured to Mr. Grey (as Mr. E. obſerves) "the well earned fame of a moſt accompliſhed orator and of an honeſt ſtateſman;" they ſhew, at the ſame time, that eloquence and honeſty are far from being *ſufficient* qualifications for a ſtateſman. Indeed a ſtronger inſtance of fatuity can hardly be conceived, than would have been diſplayed by the Houſe of Commons, in liſtening to the propoſal of *this accompliſhed orator and honeſt ſtateſman*.

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For as the war was begun by France, becauſe we would not comply with the conditions inſiſted on by M. Chauvelin, in the month of January, as the *ſine quâ non* of peace *, ſuch an addreſs in the month of February would, in effect, have been to adviſe his Majeſty, not only to acknowledge that he had been wrong in not complying with thoſe conditions, but to expoſe himſelf to others of a ſtill more inſolent nature, which French preſumption, fed by Engliſh humiliation, would doubtleſs have propoſed as the price of the pacific boon.

In like manner the diſcuſſion, into which we have been led of the queſtion of aggreſſion, has anticipated the juſtification of Parliament, in rejecting the various other propoſals of Gentlemen in Oppoſition, which have been noticed by Mr. E. Propoſals which *profeſſedly* had for their object to accelerate the return of peace, but which *in reality* tended only to palſy the operations of the war, to render our exertions languid and ineffectual, to crown the arms of France with ſucceſs, and to prolong the continuance of hoſtilities. Theſe ill timed pacificatory motions were, indeed, but a part, though a very prominent part, of that haraſſing and vexatious ſyſtem, which has been obſtinately purſued by the Oppoſition, and to which, perhaps, the preſent awful ſituation, not only of this country, but of all Europe, may, in a great degree, be juſtly attri-

* To ceaſe from complaining, to accept as ſatisfactory the perfidious explanations of France, and to diſcontinue our naval preparations.

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buted. For when we call to mind the indefatigable endeavours of that party to embarraſs and obſtruct Government in all its meaſures—to relax the energy, to darken the hopes, and to excite the deſpondency of the country—to render the war unpopular, and all its efforts, ordinary and extraordinary, irkſome and odious—and to deprive our Allies of that aid, which the immenſe ſuperiority of our reſources enabled us to afford them; and which, if adminiſtered in ſeaſonable and adequate ſupplies to the Emperor of Germany, might have enabled that Prince to cruſh the military force of the Republic, inſtead of being obliged, by a haſty peace, to leave the reſt of Europe to its fate—when we reflect on theſe, and the numerous other proofs of the active and deſperate malignity of the party in queſtion, during the whole of the conteſt, it is next to impoſſible to entertain a doubt that they have been materially inſtrumental to the triumphs of France, and to the *duration* of the war.

It will not ſuffice to reply to this reaſoning that Miniſters have, in ſpite of all Oppoſition, been powerfully ſupported both in and out of Parliament, and that their meaſures have not only been ſanctioned by large majorities, but have met with general approbation. Though I admit that they have been ſucceſsful and triumphant, to the full extent of this deſcription, they have, on all occaſions, been obliged to ſtruggle hard for their ſucceſs and their triumphs. And who will preſume to ſay that the *domeſtic* conteſts, in which they have been inceſſantly

ly engaged, have not materially embarraſſed and impeded them in their conteſt with the foreign enemy? Who will pretend to calculate the effect of this embarraſſment and of theſe impediments, either in the projection or the execution of their meaſures? Who will venture to aſſert that the Pilot has as good a chance to conduct the veſſel ſafely, through a difficult and dangerous navigation, when he ſees a part of the crew in open mutiny, and finds himſelf obliged to explain every manœuvre, in order to prevent others from being led aſtray by miſrepreſentation; as when diſcipline, ſubordination, and activity reign in every part of the veſſel?

Inſtead, therefore, of cenſuring Government, Parliament, and the large majority of the nation, (as Mr. E. has done), for turning a deaf ear to the inſidious and miſchievous propoſals of oppoſition, it would become the members of that party, (not to defend their own conduct—that is impoſſible—) but *to humble themſelves in the duſt, and to repent in ſack-cloth and aſhes.* At their door lies, perhaps, all the blood which has been ſhed during the *latter* years of the war! At their door lies, perhaps, the deſtruction of the Political Balance, and the derangement of the Social Syſtem! At their door, poſſibly, may lie, all the crimes and horrors, that can attend the extenſion of French Anarchy throughout the reſt of Europe! Without their alliance, without their encouragement and co-operation, France would, in all probability, have been

been long ſince driven back within her ancient limits, and reduced to a ſtate of order and ſubjection to lawful Government. But for their exertions in favour of the enemy, Europe might, perhaps, have eſcaped the unparalleled miſchiefs ſhe has already experienced, and been ſecure from the ſtill worſe evils, againſt which ſhe has yet to provide.

The ſeceſſion of the leaders of this party from Parliament, in this and in a neighbouring kingdom, muſt be conſidered as a happy event, and as an auſpicious omen for both countries. We have, it muſt be confeſſed, no reaſon to aſcribe that ſeceſſion to the influence of ſhame, or the operation of remorſe. But it is, nevertheleſs, a great relief to public buſineſs; and it affords a convincing and conſolatory proof, that the oppoſition find themſelves at a very low ebb; that their conduct is juſtly appreciated and properly deteſted by the public; and that they deſpair, at length, of accompliſhing their deep and dangerous deſigns,—at leaſt by ordinary means; and it is to be hoped that we ſhall be on our guard againſt any extraordinary means, to which, in their deſperation, they may be diſpoſed to reſort.

A ſatisfactory reply has alſo been furniſhed, in the courſe of this inquiry, to all the cavils with which Mr. E. has endeavoured to depreciate, and even to ſtigmatize, the repeated endeavours of the Britiſh Government, to put an end, by negociation, to the calamities of war. I feel the moſt perfect con-

fidence

fidence that no one who ſees, in a proper light, the *aggreſſions* of France, *previouſly* to the war, can be prevailed upon, by all the eloquence of the learned and honourable gentleman, to doubt, that the *exiſtence* and the *continuance* of the war have been owing to the operation of the ſame cauſe — the preponderance of the Jacobin ſyſtem; of which war is the natural element. Upon the event of the ſtruggle which exiſts, at this moment, in France, between the upholders and oppoſers of that ſyſtem, will depend the iſſue of the preſent negociation. Should the former be able to break the fetters, with which the New Conſtitution has endeavoured to reſtrain them, adieu! for the preſent to all hopes of peace. But ſhould the party, which is called moderate, prevail, it is highly probable that the ſword will be ſheathed.

On the terms which this country ought to expect at the cloſe of a war, as glorious and triumphant, as naval ſucceſſes and colonial acquiſitions could render it, it might be improper at this moment to expatiate. But I muſt be permitted to obſerve, that our object in making peace is to *preſerve* and *ſecure*, as our object in carrying on the war has been to *defend*, whatever is dear or valuable to SOCIAL MAN. And therefore the merits of any peace we may conclude cannot be duly appreciated by the conſideration of Iſlands ceded, exchanged or reſtored; but only by the influence which, under all circumſtances, the peace may reaſonably be expected to have upon

the general welfare of ſociety, and upon our own particular intereſt in that welfare.

Mr. E. delivers it as his ſerious opinion, that the conditions on which we may negociate a peace with France, are but " as duſt in the balance," when compared " to the ſpirit and temper in which " peace ſhall be made." He endeavours to ſupport this rhapſodical opinion by a forced and unnatural application of the conciliatory ſyſtem, by which Mr. Burke propoſed to reſtore harmony between Great Britain and her colonies. But before he preſumed, on Mr. Burke's authority, and in his language, to adviſe us to ſeek peace with France " in the ſpirit of peace," and to lay its foundations " in principles purely pacific," ſhould he not have ſhewn that there was ſome analogy between ſubſiſting circumſtances, and thoſe to which Mr. Burke alluded, when he recommended ſuch a ſyſtem of conciliation? Before he ventured to apply that ſyſtem to a pacification with *the ſworn foe of Royalty*, before he adviſed us to begin a new æra of ſecurity, confidence and friendſhip, ſhould he not have proved that we might confide with ſafety, and tha tthe friendſhip of republican France was compatible with the Monarchical Conſtitution of Great Britain? Should he not have explained on what grounds we might hope for a reciprocity of ſentiment, and expect a better return for our confidence than has been experienced by the Grand Duke of Tuſcany, and other Princes, who have ſought peace with France

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on principles purely pacific; or by America, Genoa, and other neutral ſtates, whoſe uninterrupted confidence, friendſhip, and aſſiſtance have been repaid with perfidy, ingratitude, and injury? Should he not, at leaſt, have ſhewn that France had changed her ſyſtem ſince ſhe was guilty of "aggreſſions," even in time of peace, "which no conſiderate perſon could juſtify?" P. 40; and ſince ſhe acted on principles which were "too diſorganizing and miſchievous for regular go-"vernments, under any reſtraints, to have intermed-"dled with, or even acknowledged." P. 49.

Mr. E. admits, that if we ſhould be able "by our "great reſources, and by the chances of war" to "drive the government of France to recede from "her preſent pretenſions," that the peace we ſhould ſo procure would be very precarious, and that "France would eaſily embroil us again to the ha-"zard of our finances and of our conſtitution." To avoid this danger, he adviſes us to accede to the pretenſions of France, exorbitant as they are, to rely on her friendſhip, and to repoſe that confidence in her generoſity, which, he owns, we could not ſafely indulge, if her powers of miſchief were diminiſhed; and if ſhe were obliged to reſtore that political balance, which, thanks to the cautionary and diſtruſtful ſpirit of our anceſtors, was eſtabliſhed and maintained for the purpoſe of curbing her ambition. It cannot but occur to every one as a matter of curious ſpeculation, how France has been able to procure ſuch ſtrenuous advocates in this country.

We are almoſt tempted to ſuſpect that modern patriots are no leſs corruptible than thoſe of former times. The Oppoſition to the Governnment of Charles II. and even that *virtuous republican* Algernon Sidney, did not ſcruple to liſten to French intrigues and to accept of French gold*. But the ſervices they rendered to Louis XIV. were but as "duſt in the balance," compared to thoſe which the oppoſition of the preſent day have conferred on Robeſpierre, Marat, and Danton—on Rewbell, Barras, and Lareveillere Lepaux.

Mr. F's known integrity muſt, however, preſerve him from the imputation of corrupt motives; and in caſe any of his party have followed the example of Sidney, he, at leaſt, muſt be ſuppoſed to prefer that of Lord Ruſſell, who rejected the bribes, though he joined in the intrigues and enliſted in the ſervice of France.

I deny that the ſyſtem of conciliation recommended by Mr. E. is, as he contends, applicable to caſes of "controverſy between equal and independ-"ent nations." It was plainly meant by Mr. Burke to heal a breach between a parent and her children, and to reſtore that mutual confidence, without which the connection between the Mother-Country and her Colonies could not, (as he thought,) be reſtored. But Mr. Burke certainly never conceived that confidence and friendſhip could be the baſis of peace between *independent* nations. He was too good a ſtateſman,—he was too well ac-

* See Dalrymple's Memoirs. Vol. I. Page 357—381.

quainted

quainted with hiſtory and with human nature not to know, that, between ſuch nations, the only ſolid foundation of peace muſt be laid in proviſions, which have for their object the ſecurity of each party againſt the others, and which, therefore, muſt be formed in the ſpirit of fear, caution, jealouſy, and diſtruſt, rather than of confidence and friendſhip. But what muſt have been his aſtoniſhment upon ſeeing his ſyſtem applied to the caſe of a pacification with the French Republic!—a Republic which aims at the deſtruction of every eſtabliſhed Government!—a Republic, the principles of which, are ſtill more formidable than its arms; and which, to accompliſh its undoubted project of univerſal revolution, relies on means which may poſſeſs more efficacy in peace than in war!—a Republic, in ſhort, which, previouſly to its being engaged in war with this country, iſſued a "general proſpective Declaration," that Mr. E. admits to have been "hoſtile to the peace of other nations;" and which has ſince been inceſſantly employed, for nearly five years, with conſtantly increaſing malignity, and with incredible ſucceſs, in giving effect to that declaration, and in ſubverting the very foundations of peace, order, and harmony among mankind!

To bring about his "liberal ſyſtem of pacification," Mr. E. admits that "a change in the Britiſh "Councils" is neceſſary. Inſtead of aſcribing ſuch a ſuggeſtion to party motives or to ſiniſter views, I will, in the name of the country acknowledge

ledge that public thanks are due to Mr. E. for pointing out the effects which may be expected to reſult from *a change in the Britiſh Councils*. The public have long deprecated ſuch a change, becauſe they thought it likely to bring into power a ſet of men pledged to French principles, and whoſe appointment to office could be conſidered as nothing leſs than the ſignal of a revolution. But as it is important to view danger on all ſides, they are undoubtedly much indebted to Mr. E. for the information, that a change of Miniſters would have the *additional* effect of rendering our national ſecurity dependent on the liberality, good faith, gratitude, and friendſhip of France.

But on whatever *terms* and in whatever *ſpirit* peace may be made, Mr. E. thinks that, "in the preſent "ſtate of the world, it will not ſecure Great Britain," unleſs it be accompanied by "a radical reform in "the repreſentation of the Houſe of Commons;" for without ſuch a reform he thinks the country will not be able to "redeem herſelf from her burdens "and from the corruptions which occaſioned them"— to "ſift and examine her reſources to the bottom"— and "to uphold her revenue." Surely he forgets that, in the year 1786, without *any reform in the repreſentation of the Houſe of Commons*, her *reſources were ſifted and examined to the bottom*, and that a ſyſtem was adopted to *redeem her burdens* and to *uphold her revenue*, the effect of which was, in a very ſhort time, to raiſe her 3 per cent. funds almoſt to par, and which, but for

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the war which France declared againſt us, and (as Mr. E. has proved) without any provocation, would probably, by this time, have freed us from all uneaſineſs on account of the magnitude of our debt.

To induce us, however, to try the effect of Parliamentary reform, Mr. E. has the courage to allude to the experience of France. A more unfortunate ſpecimen could not, I conceive, have been adduced. In conſequence of what he admits to have been "a "juſt and legitimate repreſentation of the people," France has exchanged a *deficit* in her revenue, which might eaſily have been ſupplied by good management, for *total bankruptcy*—ſhe has utterly exhauſted her capital—ruined her trade and manufactures,—dried up all her reſources—witneſſed more crimes and experienced more miſery in the ſpace of ſeven years than are to be found in the fourteen centuries of her monarchy—with the additional misfortune of having all her miſeries aggravated by inſult, and of being conſtantly congratulated on her enjoyment of happineſs and liberty, while ſhe was writhing with ſufferings, which language is unable to deſcribe, and groaning under a yoke of deſpotiſm and oppreſſion, which has no example in the hiſtory of the world.

But Mr. E. ſeems to think that all theſe misfortunes are counterbalanced by her being delivered, by *her juſt and legitimate repreſentation*, from "clubs and "knots of men who ſpread terror and confuſion," and on that account he exhorts us, in our turn, to try the effect of ſuch a *repreſentation*. It would, I acknowledge,

ledge, be a great happineſs for this country to be delivered from *clubs and knots of men, who* ſeek to *ſpread terror and confuſion.* It would be a moſt deſirable event to be delivered from "Revolution ſocieties"—from clubs miſcalling themſelves "The Friends of "the People" and the "Friends of the Freedom of "the Preſs"—from *Jacobin Clubs,* and from *Correſponding Societies.* But the example of France affords us no encouragement to hope for ſuch a deliverance by means of an equal repreſentation, by which Mr. E. wiſhes to infuſe into the breaſt of "every "man, who has a houſe over his head, the proud ſen-"ſation that he is preſent in the Houſe of Commons "by repreſentation." For it was preciſely ſuch a repreſentation which ſubjected France to the dominion of clubs, and, through their agency, reduced her to ſuch a ſituation, that *the proud ſenſation,* experienced by *every man who had a houſe over his head,* of being *preſent in a Houſe of Commons by deputation* was ſoon exchanged for the mortifying reflection, that no man's houſe could afford him the ſmalleſt protection. From theſe clubs, in the natural progreſs of political vegetation, ſprung forth a ſet of men, or rather of monſters, who, to ſecure the power they had obtained by ſuch means, found it neceſſary to ſuppreſs the very ſocieties from which they derived their conſequence, and to eſtabliſh a ſyſtem of terror, which rendered it impoſſible for one man to communicate with ſafety his thoughts to another.

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But Mr. E. in the ſame ſpirit of candour which he has diſplayed in ſo many parts of his work, has himſelf furniſhed a compleat anſwer, aud urged a moſt ſolid objection, to all propoſals which have for their object a change in the repreſentation of the people. Speaking of *the branches of the Conſtitution**, he ſays "They may long flouriſh together, if they will always be contented to hold their own places in the ſyſtem which gave them birth. It can only be from an attempt to change or to enlarge them that a ſcuffle may enſue, in which all of them may be

* I was not a little ſurprized to find that Mr. E. had ventured to ſpeak in a figurative manner of the parts of the Conſtitution, and particularly that he had adopted the term *branches*, which had expoſed Mr. Reeves to the wrath of the Houſe of Commons. I preſume that in uſing that expreſſion, he conſidered that the figure of a tree was aptly deſcriptive of the Conſtitution of this Country. I preſume alſo that in contemplating that figure he was far from ſuppoſing that the Conſtitutional tree conſiſted ſolely of *branches*, or that it did not, like all other trees, poſſeſs a *trunk* from which the branches proceeded, and through which they are ſuſtained. And I can hardly think that ſo excellent *a Conſtitutional lawyer* would aſcribe the function of a trunk to any other part of the Conſtitution, than that which Lord Coke deſcribes as the "*Caput principium et finis.*" I am at a loſs, then, to diſcover in what Mr. Reeves and Mr. Erſkine differ, unleſs the latter Gentleman ſhould diſpute the poſition of the former one, that if the branches ſhould be "lopped off and thrown into the fire," the tree would be "ſhorn of its honours." Such a ſuppoſition I cannot for a moment admit, and therefore, I conceive that the adoption of Mr. Reeves's figure was meant as a kind of *amende honorable* for the part which our author took againſt that gentleman on an occaſion, which, but for the verdict of an honeſt jury, would have effected the triumph of Jacobiniſm, in the perſon of Mr. Reeves, over all the ſound and rational friends of the Conſtitution.

 uſurped."

uſurped." I hope the good people of this Country will agree with Mr. E., that an attempt to change or to enlarge *any one* of the branches of the Conſtitution, will tend only to produce *a ſcuffle, in which all of them may be uſurped.*

Upon the whole, I truſt that the effect of this diſcuſſion will be to confirm the public in their conviction both of the juſtice and importance of the cauſe in which they are engaged; to put them on their guard againſt the miſrepreſentations of party at home, as well as againſt the miſchievous deſigns of the enemy abroad; and to convince them that on whatever terms the Crown may be able toaccomodate its political differences with that enemy, they muſt not indulge the hope that their difficulties and dangers will terminate with the War.

Peace with Republican France will be the beginning of a new epoch in civil ſociety; and if there be a man who can look forward to that epoch without diſmay, "*Illi robur, et æs triplex, circa pectus.*" Such a peace will greatly exceed in danger all the wars in which we have ever been engaged. It will bring with it dangers altogether new and unprecedented, and, of courſe, it will require precautions, which have never before been found neceſſary*. For Heaven's ſake! let us beware, leſt ruſh into ſuch a peace *blindfold and unprepared.* May the good ſenſe of the public

* This moſt important ſubject is ably diſcuſſed in a valuable Tract recently publiſhed, and intitled "Remarks preparatory to the Iſſue of the preſent Negociation."

diſcern

diſcern the real danger, and may the wiſdom of the Legiſlature provide *potent* and *adequate* remedies. Far from yielding to an impatience for repoſe, when repoſe cannot be attended with ſecurity, let us call forth all our vigilance and exert all our activity; leſt we experience the fate of the traveller amid Alpine ſnows, who incautiouſly ſuffers ſleep to ſteal upon his ſenſes, and *lies down*—TO RISE NO MORE!

THE END.

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